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供应链联盟的经济学解释
引用本文:黄震.供应链联盟的经济学解释[J].中北大学学报(社会科学版),2003,19(3):17-19.
作者姓名:黄震
作者单位:华北工学院,经济管理系,山西,太原,030051
摘    要:本文从经济学的各个角度对供应链联盟的必要性和合理性进行了论证。从分工角度而言 ,供应链联盟将分工层次从企业内部拓展到市场内企业之间的分工 ,分工的程度从简单专业化分工深化至企业核心能力的分工。为了进一步解决分工层次的拓展问题 ,从企业的边界入手 ,以交易成本为重要工具 ,就威廉姆森的静态交易成本学对其进行了更深入的分析。最后 ,我们利用博弈论的两个模型论证了供应链联盟企业间合作的可能性及长期合作关系的稳固。

关 键 词:供应链  交易成本  分工理论  核心能力  博弈论
文章编号:1009-4520(2003)03-0017-03
修稿时间:2003年6月10日

Explanation for Supply Chain Alliance on Economics
HUANG Zhen.Explanation for Supply Chain Alliance on Economics[J].Journal of North China Institute of Technology(Social Sciences),2003,19(3):17-19.
Authors:HUANG Zhen
Abstract:The necessity and rationality of the supply chain alliance from every aspect of economics are discussed. From the aspect of the labor division theory, the supply chain alliance expands the level of labor division from inside enterprises to enterprises in market, and the degree of labor division deepens from simple division of labor on the basis of specialization to the core competence of enterprises. Beginning with the border of firms and using the transaction cost as an important tool, the basis of static transaction cost economics of Williamson is analyzed to further solve the expansion problem of labor division level. Finally, two models of the game theory are used to prove the possibility and stability of long-term cooperation between firms of the supply chain.
Keywords:supply chain  transaction cost  labor division theory  core competence  game theory  
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