心物关系问题的解决：从胡塞尔到海德格尔

西方哲学史上，自笛卡尔至胡塞尔的认识论范式内，对主观意识如何认识外物的认识论难题，有四种不同的解决方式：实在论、内在观念论、先验观念论以及先验现象学。胡塞尔1906年首次提出了认识批判，它来自康德但又在其先验现象学框架内对康德作了批判。因胡塞尔仍在笛卡尔的认识论范式内，其先验现象学的问题亦受这一认识方式本身的局限。海德格尔提出切近物的首要方式不再是人的理性认识，而是此在的非理性的、情绪性的生存体验的基础存在论，使他走出了认识论框架，建立了新的心与物的关系范式，实现了问题的“范式转换”。

Solution to the relationship of consciousness and things:form Husserl to Heiddger

In the history of western philosophy, there are four different solutions to the epistemological problem of how subjective consciousness knows things outside of it, within the epistemological Paradigm from Descartes to Husserl, namely, Realism, Internal Idealism, Transcendental Idealism and Transcendental Phenomenology. In 1906, Husserl introduced for the first time his critique of cognition, which derived from Kant, while at the same time he critisized Kant whithin the framwork of Transcendental Phenomenology. Since Husserl＇s thought is still constricted in the epistemological Paradigm of Descarted, his transcendental phenomenology has the same limitation of this epistemological Paradigm. While Heiddger has proposed a Fundamental Ontology, for which the first and foremost important way to get close to things is no longer by mean of human＇s reason, but through experiences of Dasein, which had been considered as irrational and emotional, thus breaking out of the epistemological Paradigman and realizing a paradigm shift.