公司控制权行使的正当性分析--一种法律经济学视角

该文从公司控制权行使入手,通过理论与实证分析,从法律经济学角度探讨了公司控制权行使的正当性问题,并利用非连续、不可微条件下的全局优化算法估算第一大股东持股比例以及外部董事比例的阈值以及它们与公司绩效关系的Panel Data模型分析,从控制权行使的正当性方面为公司治理改革政策的制定提供分析依据.

An Analysis of Legitimateness in Exertion of Corporate Control from the Perspective of Law-economics

at present, the heated issues induced by the problems of unique block shareholder in state-owned enterprises, are focused on the insider control and missing property right claimer non-independence and inefficiency of independent directors, expropriation of minority shareholders' rights and interests, and sacrifice of state-owned assets in takeover market. with regard to these issues, through the theoretic and empirical analysis, this paper directly explores the problem of the legitimateness in exertion of corporate control in view of law-economics. by use of the whole optimization arithmetic under non-continuity and non-differentiation it estimates the thresholds of proportions of the largest shareholder and outside directors, and by use of unbalance panel data models investigates the relation between thresholds and corporate performance, thus providing useful information on legitimate exertion of corporate control to policy makers.