| 增长机会、股权集中度与财务政策选择 |
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| 引用本文： | 王平心,李小军.增长机会、股权集中度与财务政策选择[J].西安交通大学学报(社会科学版),2007,27(6):33-39. |
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| 作者姓名： | 王平心 李小军 |
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| 作者单位： | 1. 杭州电子科技大学,杭州,310018;西安交通大学,管理学院,西安,710049
2. 西安交通大学,管理学院,西安,710049 |
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| 摘 要： | 将2001-2004年3795家中国上市公司作为研究样本,检验了公司增长机会、股权集中度与公司政策选择之间的相关性。结果发现,在控制了公司规模和盈利水平的情况下,中国上市公司的资本结构和股利政策与其增长机会显著负相关,高增长企业支付更多的现金补偿给他们的高级管理者,研究结果支持了契约理论。同时,有证据表明,股权集中度越大的公司,发行更多的负债和支付更多的现金股利,但对管理者的现金补偿越小。
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| 关 键 词： | 增长机会 股权集中度 公司财务政策 |
| 文章编号： | 1008-245X(2007)06-0033-07 |
| 修稿时间： | 2007年9月18日 |
Growth Opportunity, Share Concentration and Corporate Finance Policy Choice |
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| WANG Ping-xin,LI Xiao-jun.Growth Opportunity, Share Concentration and Corporate Finance Policy Choice[J].Journal of Xi'an Jiaotong University(Social Sciences),2007,27(6):33-39. |
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| Authors: | WANG Ping-xin LI Xiao-jun |
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| Abstract: | Using 3795 China listed firms between the years 2001-2004, this paper examines the relationship between growth opportunities, share concentration and corporate finance policy choice. Results show a significant negative correlation between growth opportunities and levels of debt financing and dividend yields. Firms of high growth pay more cash compensation to their top executives. The results are consistent with contracting theory predictions. In addition we have documented that firms which have higher concentration of shares tend to issue more debt and pay more dividend, but pay less cash compensation to their top executives. |
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| Keywords: | growth opportunity share concentration corporate finance policy |
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