反收购条款对上市公司风险承担的影响

针对上市公司在公司章程中预先设定的反收购条款与该公司风险承担水平的关系，基于2008~2017年A股上市公司的面板数据，采用OLS和Tobit等实证方法，考察了累积投票制、绝对多数条款、董事提名权的时间限制和股份限制、董事会资格审查和交错董事会等6种反收购条款的数目与公司风险承担水平的关系，并用PSM-DID和工具变量法考虑了自变量的内生性问题、自变量的滞后效应和非线性影响、风险承担的度量、公司的个体效应等进行了稳健性检验。研究认为，反收购条款的数目与风险承担水平呈正相关关系，上市公司的反收购条款越多，风险承担能力就越强；当公司的股权集中度较低、CEO为创始人、CEO存在股权激励、产权性质属于民营企业及处于创新型行业时，上述反收购条款对风险承担的影响将更大。研究表明，应当鼓励创新型公司制定一些反收购条款，稳定公司的控制权，使管理层更加专注于公司的长期发展。?

Influence of anti takeover provisions on risk taking of listed companies

In response to the relationship between the anti takeover provisions preestablished in the articles of associationof the listed companies and their risk taking abilities, this paper adopts the empirical methods such as OLS and Tobit model based on the panel data of A share listed companies from 2008 to 2017, examines the relationship between the six types of anti takeover provisions, namely cumulative voting,supermajority provision, time and share limitation to nominate directors, qualification examination of the board of directors and staggered board, and the companies’ risk taking abilities, and examines issues such as endogeneity of independent variables, lagged effect of independent variables, non linear impact, measurement of risk taking and individual effect of companies, before conducting relevant robustness tests. The research results show that there is a positive correlation between the number of anti takeover provisions and the companies’ risk taking abilities. The more anti takeover provisions a listed company has, the more capable it is to take risks. Furthermore,this impact is more pronounced in companieswhich have a more dispersive share structure, a CEO as the founder or having equity incentive, which belong to private companies in terms of the nature of property right and belong in the innovative industry. Therefore, the innovative companies should be encouraged to formulate anti takeover provisions to stabilize their ownership structure, allowing the management to focus more on the companies’ long term development.