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信息对称与非对称条件下激励机制的优化设计
引用本文:张前荣.信息对称与非对称条件下激励机制的优化设计[J].北京理工大学学报(社会科学版),2008,10(5):78-81.
作者姓名:张前荣
作者单位:中央财经大学,统计学院,北京,100081
摘    要:由于信息问题,委托人不能观测到企业经营者工作的努力程度,因此,委托人需要对企业经营者进行激励和监督。文章探讨了将代理人的努力水平系数和努力成本系数引入最优激励机制模型中,通过模型的设计与求解给出相应的最优激励系数和代理人的努力程度,分析了各种影响因素,最后给出改善委托代理关系的策略。

关 键 词:契约  激励机制  优化
收稿时间:2007/3/13 0:00:00

Optimal Design of Inspiration Mechanism under Symmetrical and Asymmetrical Information Conditions
ZHANG Qian-rong.Optimal Design of Inspiration Mechanism under Symmetrical and Asymmetrical Information Conditions[J].Journal of Beijing Institute of Technology(Social Sciences Edition),2008,10(5):78-81.
Authors:ZHANG Qian-rong
Institution:1.School of Statistics, Central University of Finance and Economics, Beijing 100081
Abstract:Because of information problems,the agent can not observe how hard the client works,so he needs to motivate and supervise the client of his corporation.This paper attempts to put the operating standard coefficient and manufacturing cost coefficient into the optimal excitation mechanism model,in order to get the corresponding optimal motivating coefficient and know how hard the client works,through the design and calculation of the model.This paper analyzes all kinds of affecting elements and finally,offers ...
Keywords:agreement  excitation mechanism  optimization  
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