地方政府竞争对环境污染影响效应的实证研究

基于中国1998—2012年省际动态面板数据和通过改进后熵值法计算得到的环境污染综合指数,运用系统广义矩估计(GMM)实证地方政府竞争对环境污染的影响效应。结果表明:地方政府竞争对环境污染呈显著的正向影响,即地方政府竞争显著增加了地区污染排放,降低了区域环境质量。而经济发展水平、资本存量与环境污染均呈倒“U”形关系,经济发展短期会带来环境污染,长远则有助于环境质量的改善;资本存量决定了一个地方的投资能力,投资速度过猛或滞后均会给环境造成影响。认为,应从改革传统政绩考核办法、确立地方政府环境责任制度等方面优化地方政府竞争机制;并进一步加大地方政府环境治理投资力度,着力解决环境污染问题,从而提高环境质量。

An Empirical Analysis on the Impact of Local Government Competition on Environmental Pollution in China

Based on Chinese provincial dynamic panel data from 1998 to 2012, and through the improved entropy method, the paper calculated the comprehensive index of environmental pollution, used the system of generalized moment estimator(GMM)to carry empirical study of the local government competition's influence on the environmental pollution effect. Results show that the local government competition has significant positive effects on the pollution to the environment. Local government competition significantly increases the area pollution emissions, and reduces the regional environmental quality. The economic development level, capital stock and the environment pollution have an inverted“U”shaped relationship. Short-term economic development brings environmental pollution, but in the long run helps to improve environmental quality. Capital determines the investment ability the hastiness or slowness of which will affect the environment. In the end, we propose that we should reform the traditional performance evaluation methods, and establish the system of local government environmental responsibility for the optimization of local government competition mechanism. At the same time, we should further increase investment in environmental governance of local government, to solve the problem of environmental pollution and improve the quality of environment.