策略博弈、约束性激励与规制“软化”

作为政府缓解生态治理危机的一种重要手段，环境规制已经渗透到环境治理的各个领域中。已有研究表明，“环境外部不经济性”是造成环境规制失灵的重要原因，而环境规制的悖论即是规制主体间策略博弈和激励结构重组的缺失使其呈现出局部有效和范围性失控的规制“软化”结果，并非整体性的规制失灵。策略博弈表现为政企联盟和央地“委托—代理”关系，导致目标置换和过程异化。约束性激励表现为央地之间的激励错配和地方政府与企业的激励阻滞，过度关注晋升的“硬指标”。为扭转规制“软化”局面，应采取“助推式”环境规制，逐渐从命令—控制式规制工具向混合式规制工具转变，从约束性激励向兼容性激励转变，从策略博弈向动态均衡博弈转变，实现环境规制“软化”向制度创新的过程转变。

Strategic Game,Binding Incentives and Regulation "Softening" —Paradox and Governance of Environmental Regulation

As an important means of relieving ecological crisis, environmental regulation has penetrated into every field of environmental governance. Studies have shown that “the diseconomy of environmental externalities” is an important cause of environmental regulation failure, while the paradox of environmental regulation is the result of regulation “softening” that is locally effective and out of control in scope due to the lack of strategic game and incentive structure reorganization, rather than the whole regulation failure. Strategic game is characterized by government-enterprise alliance and central-local “principal-agent” relationship, leading to target displacement and process dissimilation. Binding incentives are characterized by incentive hindrance and incentive mismatch between central government, local government and enterprise, especially more attention to the “hard indicators” of promotion by local government. In order to reverse the “softening” situation of regulation, the “boosting” environmental regulation should be adopted, gradually shifting from command-control to hybrid regulation tools, from binding incentives to compatibility incentives, from strategic games to dynamic equilibrium games, and from “softening” of environmental regulation to institutional innovation.