风险投资、不良贷款与产业转型升级——基于中国省级面板数据的实证研究

理论上，从风险收益匹配性的视角探讨了风险投资影响产业转型升级的内在机理，并着重对比了市场运营和政府主导的风险投资对产业升级的异质影响，同时阐释了不良贷款阻碍产业升级的影响机制。实证上，通过熵权法加权14项统计指标，构建了中国29省2005—2014年的产业转型升级指数，采用面板数据模型对提出的理论假说进行了实证分析和稳健性检验。研究发现:政府主导的风险投资模式会产生预算软约束、多级委托—代理、绩效评价困难、决策偏差等一系列问题，不利于产业转型升级；而不良贷款会导致金融资源的低效配置和阻碍创造性破坏的熊彼特动态，也不利于推动中国产业升级。最后，结合经济理论与中国现实提出了针对性的政策建议。

Venture Capital，Non-performing Loans and Industrial Upgrading—Empirical Research based on Chinese Provincial Panel Data

The effect of venture capital on industrial upgrading was discussed theoretically from the risk-return matching perspective, and the different effects of private sources and government-leading venture capital on industrial upgrading were compared. In addition, the internal mechanism between non-performing loans and industrial upgrading was also explained. Subsequently, the industrial upgrading index of 29 provinces in China from 2005 to 2014 was measured by entropy weight method, then the proposed theoretical hypothesis was tested by panel data model. It was found that government-leading venture capital will generate a series of horrible problems, such as soft budget constraint, multi-level principal-agent problem, performance evaluation difficulty, decision-making mistake, which is detrimental to industrial upgrading. Besides, it was also found that non-performing loans will lead to inefficient allocation of financial resources and hinder Schumpeterian dynamics of creative destruction, so it is not conducive to China’s industrial upgrading. Finally, some policy?suggestions are proposed considering related theory and Chinese economic reality.