扶贫瞄准中贫困户竞争与协同行为的演化博弈分析

扶贫瞄准过程是贫困户采取竞争和协同行为不断进行博弈的过程。行为演化的结果取决于两类贫困户扶贫协同收益和协同成本的对比关系，只有当协同收益都大于协同成本时，博弈才会向两者都选择协同行为的方向演化。协同收益及其分享系数、协同成本及其分担系数是影响贫困户行为演化路径的关键因素，政府的财政补贴能够改变贫困户的策略选择，并存在一个最佳的补贴临界点，使贫困户都选择协同行为。政府应该采取相应措施，促进博弈向协同方向演化。

Analysis on the Evolutionary Game of Poor Households' Competitive and Coordinative Behaviors in Poverty Alleviation Targeting

The process of povertyalleviation targeting is a game process in which the poor households compete and coordinate with each other continuously.The result of behavior evolution depends on the contrast relationship between the coordinative benefit and cost of the two types of poor households.Only when the coordinative benefit exceeds cost should the game turn to coordinative behaviors.The coordinative benefit and cost,with each share coefficient,are the key factors influencing the evolution of poor households' behaviors.Fiscal subsidies may change the poor households' strategy,and there is a best subsidy point at which all poor households choose coordinative behaviors.Proper measures should be taken so that the game should evolve in a coordinative way.