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基于利益相关者治理的公司监事会制度研究
引用本文:丁春贵.基于利益相关者治理的公司监事会制度研究[J].安徽大学学报(哲学社会科学版),2007,31(3):132-136.
作者姓名:丁春贵
作者单位:广东金融学院,会计系,广东,广州,510521
摘    要:监事会形同虚设是我国公司治理中普遍存在的严重问题.我国公司监事会制度虚化的具体原因是由于现行监事会缺乏独立性,监事的专业性普遍不足,监事会没有监督的动力,其监督权力无法落实等,而究其根本原因则在于我国监事会功能定位不准.基于利益相关者治理理论,我国公司监事会功能应定位于代表利益相关者对董事会、经理层实施监督.我国目前需要采取措施进一步完善利益相关者治理下的监事会制度.

关 键 词:公司治理机制  监事会  利益相关者  独立董事制度
文章编号:1001-5019(2007)03-0132-05
修稿时间:2006-11-26

Discussions on the Company Administration Committee System Based on Common Interests
DING Chun-gui.Discussions on the Company Administration Committee System Based on Common Interests[J].Journal of Anhui University(Philosophy & Social Sciences),2007,31(3):132-136.
Authors:DING Chun-gui
Institution:Department of Accounting, Guangdong University of Finance, Guangzhou, Guangdong,510635
Abstract:That the company administration committee is but an empty shell is a serious common problem in the company administration in our country.The reason is that the company administration committee lacks the independence and motive force and thus can't fulfil its authority to supervise.Further exploration of the issue reveals that this problem has been caused by the functional orientation deviation of the company administration committee.The author of the present essay holds that the company administration committee should supervise the Board of Directors on the basis of common interests and further perfect the company administration committee system.
Keywords:the mechanism of company administration  the company administration committee  administration of common interests  system of independent Board of Directors
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