论信贷融资中的履约监督激励

本文根据信贷合约履行分阶段进行的特点构建了一个履约监督模型，集中探讨信贷履约监督对于保障债权人权益的作用问题。尽管违约条款和担保的设定有助于合约的履行，也有利于贷款人加强信贷监督，但是，信贷监督必须付出一定的成本。只有在履约监督成本低于监督所带来的收益时，信贷监督才是真正有效的。相对于徒有虚名的形式监督而言，实质性监督更能增加贷款人的收益。

Incentives to Monitor Borrowers in Fulfilling Loan Contracts

The paper focus on analyzing the function of financial institutions in monitoring borrowers to fulfill loan contracts. Although the institutional lenders benefit from monitoring, the presence of monitoring cost reduces its incentives to do this. It is feasible for the lenders to carry out monitoring if and only if its gains from monitoring exceed its cost of monitoring. Thus loan contracts must be structured to enhance the lender's incentive to monitor. Covenants and the ability to collateralize can be motivated as contractual devices to increase a lender's incentives. Comparatively, the realistic monitoring will be superior to nominal monitoring in defending credit risk and increasing the lender's profit.