上市公司股权结构、高管层激励组合与公司绩效的实证研究

股东由于所有权性质不同而有不同持股目的,进而通过股东大会对上市公司提供具有自身特点的激励,激励拥有经营权的高管层,使之价值取向与己趋于一致。不同股权结构给上市公司高管层提供了不同侧重的激励组合,通过高管层的经营决策,影响上市公司绩效。运用典型相关分析研究了股权结构与公司绩效的关系。研究表明:法人股、流通股比国有股主体更关心上市公司的市场价值和经营收益,并有利于提高上市公司绩效,而国有股、法人股股东更关心上市公司社会贡献;流通股股东更关心上市公司市场表现和经营状况;适度股权集中度有利于提高上市公司经营业绩和社会价值;大股东的存在有利于提高上市公司经营业绩,但一股独大与之负相关。

Shareholding Structure, Managerial Incentives Combination and Corporate Performance

There are different kinds of shareholders. Due to ownership intension, the general assembly provides managers with incentives of different characteristics. The shareholders provide incentives with different emphasis. The decision can affect the operational results of the listed company. By applying Canonical Correlation Analysis this paper studies the relationship between shareholding structure and the company performance. Result shows that the shareholders of legal-person shares and traded shares concerns market value and return more than the holders of state-owned shares. State-owned shares and legal-person share holders concerns more on the social contribution; holders of traded shares concern more about performance and market value.