机构投资者持股对内部人控制与盈余管理关系的影响——基于中国上市公司的经验分析

通过从机构投资者持股对内部人控制与盈余管理之间关系的影响这一视角出发,来说明机构投资者在公司治理中的作用,研究发现以6%为机构持股高低的分界点,机构持股比例高时,可以抑制董事长与总经理两职合一的内部人控制对盈余的操纵,当机构持股比例低时,则可以加剧内部人控制对盈余的操纵。

A Study on the Effect of Institutional Investor Shareholding upon the Relation between Internal Control and Earnings Management——Based on Empirical Study of China's A-share Listed Companies

This paper illustrates the role of institutional investors in corporate governance from the perspective of the effect of institutional investor shareholding upon the relation between internal control and earnings management. The study finds that the shareholding ratio is at a level of 6% as the boundary benchmark. When the shareholding ratio of institutional investors is higher,institutional investors can hold back the manipulation of earnings management by internal control in case that president and general manager are the same person. When the proportion of institutional investor shareholding is low,it can increase the manipulation of earnings management by internal control.