企业自主创新的博弈分析及政策激励

采用线性规划、Shapley值求解、动态均衡求解等研究方法,着重对企业自主创新的二人零和博弈、多人博弈、非常和"理想状态"博弈等静态博弈模型进行分析和求解,同时对企业自主创新的动态博弈模型进行扼要分析。研究的结论是,企业自主创新的战略选择过程是一个博弈的过程,是根据企业内外部环境作出的理性选择;应努力改善企业自主创新的环境,从政策上激发企业自主创新的主动性。

Game Analysis of Enterprise's Indigenous Innovation and Policy Motivation

Using the research methods of linear programming, the Shapley value and dynamic equilibrium, this paper focuses on enterprise’s indigenous innovation to analyze and resolve the two-person zero-sum game, n-person game and non-constant-sum "ideal game" in the static game models. Simultaneously, it gives a brief analysis to the dynamic game model in enterprise’s indigenous innovation. The research concludes that the procedure of strategic choice in the enterprise’s indigenous innovation is a game procedure, which is the rational choice that depends on both external and internal environments in an enterprise. Efforts should be made to improve the environments for enterprise’s indigenous innovation so that the policies can motivate the initiatives of enterprise’s indigenous innovation.