控股股东股权质押、分析师关注与股利政策

上市公司控股股东进行股权质押现象不断增多,逐渐成为上市公司的重要融资方式。基于2008—2017年中国A股上市公司数据,对控股股东股权质押与上市公司股利政策之间关系进行研究。实证结果表明,控股股东股权质押是影响上市公司股利政策的重要因素,随着控股股东股权质押比例的提高,上市公司的现金分红比例显著提高,而股票分红比例则显著降低。进一步分析发现,证券分析师关注度对控股股东股权质押与上市公司股利政策之间的关系具有抑制作用,即当证券分析师关注度较高时,可降低控股股东股权质押与现金分红之间的正向关系,并且降低控股股东股权质押与股票股利之间的负向关系。因此,要提高股权质押的信息披露,限定可用于质押的股票范围,强化动态监管并及时处置风险,来防止控股股东通过控制上市公司股利政策来缓解控制权转移风险。

Controlling Shareholders' Stock Pledge, Analyst Attention and Dividend Policies

The controlling shareholders of listed companies have increasingly carried out stock pledge, which has gradually become important financing method. Based on the data of listed companies from 2008 to 2017 on China''s A-stock market, this paper examines the relationship between controlling shareholders'' stock pledge and the dividend policies of listed companies. We find that the higher the percentage of stock pledge by controlling shareholders, the higher the proportion of cash dividends of listed companies and the lower the proportion of stock dividends. Further analysis finds that analyst attention has an inhibitory effect on the relationship between controlling shareholders'' stock pledge and dividend policies, and the higher the degree of attention of securities analysts, the lower the positive relationship between controlling shareholders'' stock pledge and cash dividends, and the lower the negative relationship between the controlling shareholder''s stock pledge and stock dividends. The conclusion not only enriches the current research on dividend policies from the perspective of stock pledge, but also analyzes the influence of analyst attention on the controlling shareholders'' stock pledge behavior and the development of dividend policy. This paper makes up for the shortcomings that the current researches only with the focus on the controlling shareholders'' stock pledge and economic consequences from the perspective of corporate internal governance, and expands the research boundary of the current hot topics in the capital market of stock pledge.