家族企业股东异质性与CEO选聘决策

家族企业积极引入并利用非家族资本时,CEO人选对其职业化经营和现代化转型具有重要促进作用。基于2004—2017年中国2065家上市家族企业数据,从家族企业股东异质性的视角考察了其对家族企业CEO人选的影响。研究发现:家族大股东和非家族大股东投票权不对称性与职业经理人担任CEO显著负相关。非家族大股东类型越多,投票权不对称性与职业经理人担任CEO的负相关关系越强,但家族股东数量增加会抵消这种作用。横截面差异检验表明,不同类型非家族大股东对CEO人选具有不同的影响,未发生代际传承、由家族直接创办、审计质量较低的家族企业,投票权不对称性与职业经理人担任CEO之间的负相关关系更强。研究结论表明,家族式的非制度管理可能成为家族企业高质量发展的瓶颈,积极引入非家族股东并保持权力制衡有助于职业经理人的引入,这对于企业最终实现高质量发展意义重大。

Shareholder Heterogeneity and CEO Selection in Family Enterprises

Selection of the CEO is of vital importance for the professionalization and modernization transformation of a family enterprise which chooses to actively pursue and use non-family capital. Based on the data of listed family enterprises in China from 2004 to 2017, this paper examines the impact of shareholder heterogeneity on CEO selection in family enterprises. The empirical results show that there is a significant negative correlation between the asymmetric structure of voting rights between major family shareholders and non-family shareholders and the incidence of a professional manager as the CEO. The aforementioned negative correlation becomes more robust if the types of non-family major shareholders increase, but increase of the number of family stakeholders tends to offset this negative correlation. The cross-sectional difference test shows that different types of non-family major shareholders have divergent influences on the selection of CEO. Specifically, for family enterprises that are directly founded by the family, have yet to experience intergenerational inheritance and has low audit quality, the negative correlation between voting asymmetry and the incidence of professional CEO is more significant. This paper proves that non-institutionalized management by the founding family can hold back the quality development of family enterprises. To introduce non-family stakeholders and maintain balanced voting right can facilitate the selection of professional CEOs, which is of vital importance for the modernized transformation of family enterprises.