| 代理理论中的管理层持股激励有效性争论述评及其启示 |
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| 引用本文： | 戴亦一,潘越.代理理论中的管理层持股激励有效性争论述评及其启示[J].学术问题研究,2006(1). |
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| 作者姓名： | 戴亦一 潘越 |
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| 作者单位： | 厦门大学 厦门361005 |
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| 摘 要： | 本文在系统地回顾了国外自Jensen和Meckling(1976)后有关管理层持股与绩效关系的理论与实证研究文献的基础上,探讨了管理层持股激励有效性各派观点迥异的内在原因,认为实证研究中对管理层及其持有的股权以及公司绩效的界定和测度不同、所使用的研究方法、采用的解释变量不同及对管理层股权内生性的认识不同是导致不同实证研究结果的主要原因,并对我国现阶段公司治理激励机制的建设提出了一些个人观点。
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| 关 键 词： | 代理理论 管理层持股 公司绩效 |
Commentary of the Controversy of the Executive Option Plan Incentive Efficacy and Its Inspiration |
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| DAI Yi-yi & PAN Yue.Commentary of the Controversy of the Executive Option Plan Incentive Efficacy and Its Inspiration[J].Academic Research(Integrated Edition),2006(1). |
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| Authors: | DAI Yi-yi & PAN Yue |
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| Abstract: | Based on theoretical and empirical research documents at home and abroad of the relations between executive option plan and performance since Jensen and Meekling(1976), the article explores the internal cause of the views evaded by various schools of the executive option plan incentive efficacy. The author presents his personal viewpoints for the construction of corporate incentive mechanism administration at present. |
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| Keywords: | agent theory executive option plan performance |
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