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隐性契约与公司股利政策研究
引用本文:程宏伟,何剑平.隐性契约与公司股利政策研究[J].成都理工大学学报(社会科学版),2006,14(4):31-35.
作者姓名:程宏伟  何剑平
作者单位:1. 成都理工大学信息管理学院,成都,610059
2. 成都理工大学计财处,成都,610059
摘    要:隐性契约以商品所有权分割为存在前提,含有隐性契约价格的商品出售使公司承担对顾客的隐性负债,从而对股利政策产生约束。专用性投资是偿还隐性负债的基础,在公司具备相当盈利能力的前提下,专用性投资与股利支付水平应具有负相关关系。实证研究表明,由于中国上市公司的自生能力不足,内部资金没有成为其主要的资金来源,导致专用性投资与股利支付率不具有显著的相关关系。

关 键 词:隐性契约  专用性投资  隐性负债  股利政策
文章编号:1672-0539(2006)04-031-05
修稿时间:2006年10月9日

On the Relation between Implicit Contracts and Dividend Policy
CHENG Hong-wei,HE Jian-ping.On the Relation between Implicit Contracts and Dividend Policy[J].Journal of Chengdu University of Technology:Social Sciences,2006,14(4):31-35.
Authors:CHENG Hong-wei  HE Jian-ping
Abstract:Implicit contract exists based on the division of the property of goods.Implicit liability comes into being as soon as goods including implicit contractual prices are sold.Dividend policy is subject to customer's implicit contractual claims.Specific investments are the foundation of paying for implicit liability and it should be negative to dividend payout if corporate has strong profitability.Because China listed companies are weak on viability and internal funds are not the primary source,empirical test indicates that specific investment has no significant relationship with dividend payout.
Keywords:implicit contracts  specific investment  implicit liability  dividend policy
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