基于变更的最优承包合同的研究

建设项目承包合同的不完全性、信息的非对称性以及承发包双方的信用危机共同作用，产生了隐藏信息的道德风险以及由此引起的非效率性问题、本研究采用动态博弈理论，建立了以政府机构为主导地位的，承发包双方针对施工条件变化，围绕着工期、合同价变更的不完全合同模型．研究表明，通过确定合理的施工条件、工期、承包价及合同变更规则，承包合同可以引导承发包双方投资，避免隐藏信息的道德风险，实现社会福利最优、

Research on optimal construction contract in connection with contract variation

The incomplete contracts, asymmetric information and credibility crisis give birth to moral hazard with hidden information and make social efficiency decrease in the construction work, According to the change of working condition for construction project, by using dynamic game theory, incomplete contract model about constructing time and price is set up. The study shows that the contract can lead to the optimal investment, conquer hidden information with moral hazard, and realize social efficiency optimization for construction work, through the determination of reasonable working condition, time, price and the rule of contract variation.