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我国P2P网络借贷的信号博弈分析
引用本文:朱晓峰,陈楚楚.我国P2P网络借贷的信号博弈分析[J].南京工业大学学报(社会科学版),2014(2):127-132.
作者姓名:朱晓峰  陈楚楚
作者单位:南京工业大学经济与管理学院,江苏南京211816
基金项目:国家自然科学基金项目(71272239);江苏省社会科学基金项目(12TQC013)
摘    要:针对我国P2P网络借贷中信用风险频发的现象,通过建立信号博弈模型,分析三种贝叶斯均衡下参与者的行为,找出信用风险的影响因素。研究表明:高低利率下借款者可获本金、风险担保金、修改信息使信用评级失真的成本、平台借款者总体信用等因素可以影响网络借贷信用风险,采用分离均衡策略能够降低这种风险。

关 键 词:P2P  网络借贷  信用风险  信号博弈

An Analysis of China's Online P2P Lending Based on Signal Game Theory
ZHU Xiaofeng,CHEN Chuchu.An Analysis of China's Online P2P Lending Based on Signal Game Theory[J].Journal of Nanjing University of Technology(Social Science Edition),2014(2):127-132.
Authors:ZHU Xiaofeng  CHEN Chuchu
Institution:(School of Economics & Management, Nanjing Tech University, Nanjing 211816,China)
Abstract:A model of signal game has been set up regarding the frequent occurrence of credit risk in the P2P lending. With the proposed model,the behaviors of participators behind the three categories of Bayesian Equilibrium of signal game are analyzed. Furthermore,factors of credit risk in P2P lending are concluded. In the end,some suggestions are given for promoting the development of P2P lending in our country.
Keywords:P2P  online lending  credit risk  signal game
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