集体行动中合作何以可能——从博弈论的视角看

对集体行动合作均衡的诉求构成人类永恒的政治主题之一,视角和观点的不同,带来分析结构论证和解释的差异。本文立足于博弈论的分析框架,来理解集体行动合作的难题,寻求合作博弈的均衡结果。从博弈论发展历程的几个阶段,探讨了熟人世界和陌生人世界的合作何以可能的问题,熟人社会清晰可辨的博弈历史形成的声誉机制有利于合作产生;在陌生人世界里,从行为纯正而非动机纯正作为出发点,以生存博弈为前提,道德博弈为生存博弈提供博弈框架,共同遵守内在博弈规则,内在博弈规则的演进和三方博弈的利益兼容机制,也可能达成合作。

On Possibility of Cooperation in Collective Action——Based on Game Theory

Seeking out cooperation and equilibration in collective action is one of eternal political themes. The different visual angles and standpoints result in the differences in analysis, demonstration and explanation. Based on the framework of game theory, this paper mainly discusses the difficult problem in understanding the cooperation in collective action and seeks out the equilibration of cooperative game. Through analyzing the development process of game theory, this paper demonstrates why the cooperation exists between the acquaintance world and the stranger world. In the acquaintance world, the fame mechanism resulting from the legible history of game is in favor of the cooperation. In the stranger world, it is also possible for people to be cooperative in collective action. People observe the rules of survival game, which is based on the framework of morale game. Meanwhile, people all observe the internal rules of game, whose evolution and the mechanism of compatible benefits of three parties who participate in the game also propel the cooperation in collective action.