从语义学到心灵哲学： 重思对阿奎那关于理智之非物质性论证的一些批评

阿奎那关于个别感觉与普遍理性表征的理论是其对理智之非物质性论证的关键部分，但这一理论受到司各特、奥卡姆及布里丹等后来者的批评。然而，这些批评其实都不能成立。阿奎那的论证并不像罗伯特·帕斯纳奥对他的诘难中所说的那样，犯了从一个表征的语义内容推出此表征之本体论属性的“内容谬误”。此外，由布里丹本人的评论可以看出，布里丹实际上不得不接受他所批评的阿奎那论证所蕴含的主要内容。

From Semantics to the Philosophy of Mind: Reconsidering Some Late-Medieval and Modern Critiques of Aquinas' Argument for the Immateriality of the Intellect from the Universality of Concepts

quinas' account of singular sensory and universal intellectual representation is crucial in one of his main arguments for the immateriality of the intellect. However， it had been challenged by Scotus， Ockham and Buridan.I argue that their objections to Aquinas' account are untenable. I also show that，contrary to what Robert Pasnau claims， Aquinas' argument does not have to commit “the content fallacy.” Finally， I explain why Buridan has to accept the main implication of Aquinas' argument， even though he actually rejects that implication．