| 有限合伙制风险基金管理者的激励机制 |
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| 引用本文： | 刘萍萍,韩文秀.有限合伙制风险基金管理者的激励机制[J].电子科技大学学报(社会科学版),2005,7(3):5-7. |
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| 作者姓名： | 刘萍萍 韩文秀 |
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| 作者单位： | 天津大学,天津,300072 |
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| 摘 要： | 在有限合伙制风险基金中,基金管理者和投资者之间存在着委托代理关系,基金管理者的风险补偿主要源于基金的管理费用和附带权益.对于不同发展阶段的风险投资基金,由于基金管理者水平及其环境的差异等因素,风险补偿机制的形式与程度也不同.文中通过模型分析了对于新创立的风险基金和发展阶段基金其基金管理者的有效激励问题,以提高投资者对基金监管的质量和效率.
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| 关 键 词： | 有限合伙制 风险基金管理者 风险补偿 激励机制 |
| 文章编号： | 1008-8105(2005)03-0005-03 |
| 修稿时间： | 2005年1月15日 |
Incentive Mechanism of Venture Capitalist in Limited Partnership |
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| LIU Ping-ping,HAN Wen-xiu.Incentive Mechanism of Venture Capitalist in Limited Partnership[J].Journal of University of Electronic Science and Technology of China(Social Sciences Edition),2005,7(3):5-7. |
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| Authors: | LIU Ping-ping HAN Wen-xiu |
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| Institution: | Tianjin University Tianjin 300072 China |
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| Abstract: | There is a principal-agent relation among venture capitalists and investors in the venture capital limited partnership.The compensation for venture capitalists are fixed and variable pay.For different development phase of venture fund,because of some factors such as different level of venture capitalist and environment change,the form and degree of venture compensation mechanism also differ.The paper establishes a model about new and development phase of venture fund to analyse incentive mechanism of venture capitalists and to advance quality and efficiency of investors' fund oversight. |
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| Keywords: | limited partnership venture capitalist venture compensation incentive mechanism |
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