国有资本收益收取政策对央企上市公司现金股利影响研究

自2007年国务院出台中央企业国有资本收益收取办法以来,经过2010年和2014年的连续调整,国有资本收益收取初步形成了一套制度体系,影响力也在不断扩大。在这样的背景之下,央企上市公司的现金股利政策是否受到国有资本收益收取政策的影响、国资收益收取比例是否合理值得进一步探究。基于代理理论对国有资本收益收取政策和上市公司现金股利政策的关系进行了理论分析并提出研究假设。研究结果表明,上市公司现金股利政策不仅受到传统的公司特征以及公司内部治理特征因素的影响,还受到宏观政策的制度因素的影响。

The Influence of State-owned Capital Gains Policy on the Dividend of Listed Companies of Central Enterprises

Since the State Council promulgated the collection method of central enterprises state-owned capital gains, a system of state-owned capital gains collection has initially been formed after the adjustments since 2010 and 2014, and its influence has been continuously expanding. Under such a background, whether the cash dividend policy of the listed companies of central enterprises is influenced by the policy of collecting state-owned capital gains and whether the ratio of the collection of state-owned capital gains is reasonable are worth further study. Based on the agent theory, this paper theoretically analyzes the relationship between the state-owned capital gains collection policy and the cash dividend policy of listed companies, and puts forward research hypotheses. The results of the present study show that the cash dividend policy of listed companies is influenced not only by traditional corporate characteristics and internal corporate governance characteristics, but also by institutional factors of macroeconomic policies.