首页 | 本学科首页   官方微博 | 高级检索  
     检索      

次贷证券化下金融机构的道德风险及危机传导
引用本文:张筱峰,刘甜,钟晓华.次贷证券化下金融机构的道德风险及危机传导[J].长沙理工大学学报(社会科学版),2009,24(1):22-26,108.
作者姓名:张筱峰  刘甜  钟晓华
作者单位:长沙理工大学,经济与管理学院,湖南,长沙,410076
摘    要:次级抵押贷款证券化由于能够成功实现贷款风险的转移,为金融机构放松风险控制提供了条件,由此产生了极其严重的道德风险.次级贷款证券化、金融机构以市定价的会计记帐方法和以在险价值为基础的资产负债管理模式,导致危机从信贷市场传导至资本市场,而资产价格泡沫破灭通过负向财富效应对居民消费的抑制,通过托宾Q效应和金融加速器效应影响企业投资,使得危机从金融市场传导至实体经济.

关 键 词:次贷证券化  金融机构  道德风险  危机

The Moral Hazard and Transmitting Crisis of Financial Institutions Under the Condition of Subprime Mortgage Securitization
ZHANG Xiao-feng,LIU Tian,ZHONG Xiao-hua.The Moral Hazard and Transmitting Crisis of Financial Institutions Under the Condition of Subprime Mortgage Securitization[J].Journal of Changsha University of Science & Technology,2009,24(1):22-26,108.
Authors:ZHANG Xiao-feng  LIU Tian  ZHONG Xiao-hua
Institution:School of Economy & Management;Changsha University of Science and Technology;Changsha;Hunan 410076;China
Abstract:Because the subprime mortgage securitization can successfully transfer the credit risk and provide conditions for financial institutions to relax the risk control,it results in an extremely serious moral hazard.The subprime mortgage securitization,the mark to market accounting of financial institutions and the asset liability management model based on Value at Risk induce the crisis transfer from credit market to capital markets,but the bursting of asset price bubble restrain consumer through the negative w...
Keywords:subprime mortgage  securitization  finace organization  moral hazard  crisis  
本文献已被 CNKI 维普 万方数据 等数据库收录!
设为首页 | 免责声明 | 关于勤云 | 加入收藏

Copyright©北京勤云科技发展有限公司  京ICP备09084417号