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有限理性视角下区域内地方政府博弈行为的演化与稳定
引用本文:罗正清,温博慧.有限理性视角下区域内地方政府博弈行为的演化与稳定[J].大连理工大学学报(社会科学版),2008,29(4):68-72.
作者姓名:罗正清  温博慧
作者单位:1. 天津大学,管理学院,天津,300072
2. 天津财经大学,经济学院,天津,300222
基金项目:国家社会科学基金重大项目  
摘    要:文章从有限理性视角出发,运用演化博弈理论对区域内地方政府间的博弈行为进行分析.研究发现:在外部条件既定的情况下,区域内同质、异质地方政府的博弈存在各自不同的演化路径和稳定策略;并且实现稳定策略的路径不是经典博弈理论下的简单线性路径,而是复杂的非线性路径,存在关键性的阀值.这意味着,对区域内地方政府间博弈行为的调节需要依博弈参与者的不同属性和博弈的演化路径来进行,并且有效地调节思路需在博弈的外部求解.

关 键 词:有限理性  地方政府  演化博弈理论  演化稳定策略

Analysis of the evolution and stabilization of local governments' game behavior in region from a bounded rationality perspective
LUO Zheng-qing,WEN Bo-hui.Analysis of the evolution and stabilization of local governments'' game behavior in region from a bounded rationality perspective[J].Journal of Dalian University of Technology(Social Sciences),2008,29(4):68-72.
Authors:LUO Zheng-qing  WEN Bo-hui
Institution:LUO Zheng-qing1,WEN Bo-hui21.School of Management,Tianjin University,Tianjin 300072,China,2.School of Economics,Tianjin University of Finance , Economics,Tianjin 300222
Abstract:In this paper,local governments' game behavior in region is analyzed based on the evolutionary game theory from bounded rationality.The result shows that as external conditions established in the case,there are different evolution paths and stable strategies in the game of homogeneous and heterogeneous local governments,and that the paths to achieve stable strategies are complex and nonlinear where critical threshold is required,but not simple and linear under the classical game theory.It is suggested that ...
Keywords:bounded rationality  local governments  evolutionary game theory  evolutionary stable strategy  
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