债务约束、管理层过度自信与投资效率

从行为金融学理论出发，以2014—2018年A股上市公司为研究对象，运用实证研究的方法，研究管理层过度自信和债务约束对投资效率的影响，并进一步分析两者共同对投资效率发挥的作用。研究发现，管理层过度自信程度越高，企业的投资效率越低；企业的债务约束强度越大，对投资效率的削弱作用越明显；在债务约束程度不断增强时，管理层过度自信对投资效率的反向作用得到抑制，反映债权人对管理层发挥一定的外部监管作用。文章的研究结果可以为企业及相关监管部门提供一定的借鉴。

Debt Constraints, Management Overconfidence and Investment Efficiency

Based on the theory of behavioral finance, taking A-share listed companies from 2014 to 2018 as the research object, the method of empirical research was used to study the impact of managerial overconfidence and debt constraint on the investment efficiency respectively, and the roles of the two were further analyzed on the investment efficiency. The results show that the higher the degree of managerial overconfidence, the lower the investment efficiency of the enterprise; the greater the debt constraint strength of the enterprise, the more obvious the weakening effect on the investment efficiency; when the degree of debt constraint is increasing, the reverse effect of management overconfidence on investment efficiency is restrained, which reflects that creditors play a certain role in external supervision of management. The research provides a certain reference for the enterprises and related regulatory departments.