Personal income taxation under mobility, exogenous and endogenous welfare weights, and asymmetric information |
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| Authors: | Petter Osmundsen Guttorm Schjelderup Kåre Petter Hagen |
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| Institution: | (1) Stavanger University College, Section of Petroleum Economics, PO Box 2557 Ullandhaug, 4004 Stavanger, Norway. (Fax: +4-51 83 15 50; email: Petter.Osmundsen@tn.his.no), NO;(2) Norwegian School of Economics and Business Administration, Helleveien 30, 5035 Bergen-Sandviben, Norway (Fax: +4-55 95 95 43; e-mail: Gutton.Schjelderup@nhh.no; Kare.Hagen@nhh.no), NO |
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| Abstract: | This paper analyses how governments should tax labour income accruing to a group of highly skilled and geographically mobile
individuals who divide their time or career between several jurisdictions. The analysis differs from previous models on migration
and taxation by addressing optimal regulation when agents work for several principals. Optimal taxation is developed for social
welfare functions with exogenous and endogenous welfare weights. Marginal income taxes are applied for screening purposes,
and the rates are lower with endogenous than with exogenous welfare weights.
Received: 22 January 1998/Accepted: 3 July 1999) |
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| Keywords: | JEL classification: D82 L51 H21 |
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