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失业保险金给付博弈分析及其优化设计
引用本文:周江涛.失业保险金给付博弈分析及其优化设计[J].西北人口,2014(3):6-9.
作者姓名:周江涛
作者单位:滨州学院经济管理系山东省安全文化研究基地,山东滨州256603
基金项目:基金项目:教育部人文社会科学研究项目(项目编号:09YJC840005);山东省社科规划项目(08CSHZ04);滨州学院博士科研启动项目(2008Y09);滨州学院重大课题(2011ZDW02).
摘    要:我国现行失业保险制度运行中存在失业保险金的给付两难,给付双方是一种博弈关系。通过构建政府与失业人员的失业保险金给付静态博弈和完全而不完美信息动态博弈并进行解析,需要从缩短失业保险金的给付期限、充分发挥失业保险金的促进就业功能等方面对现行失业保险制度进行优化设计。

关 键 词:失业保险  政府  失业人员  给付  博弈

Game Analysis and Optimization Design on the Payment of Unemployment Insurance Benefits
ZHOU Jiang-Tao.Game Analysis and Optimization Design on the Payment of Unemployment Insurance Benefits[J].Northwest Population Journal,2014(3):6-9.
Authors:ZHOU Jiang-Tao
Institution:ZHOU Jiang-Tao ( Department of Economic Management, Research Base of Safety Culture Shandong Province, Binzhou University, Binzhou Shandong 256603 )
Abstract:There are dilemmas in the payment of unemployment insurance benefits in current unemployment insurance system. Through building and analyzing the Static Game,the Complete and Imperfect Information Dynamic Game between the govern- ment and the unemployed, some designs should be optimized from the aspects of shorting the payment deadline of unemploy-ment insurance benefits, giving full play to promote employment.
Keywords:unemployment insurance  government  the unemployed  payment  game
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