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哈贝马斯对康德的理性兴趣概念的扬弃
引用本文:钱厚诚.哈贝马斯对康德的理性兴趣概念的扬弃[J].青岛农业大学学报(社会科学版),2006,18(3):65-68.
作者姓名:钱厚诚
作者单位:复旦大学,哲学系,上海,200433
摘    要:哈贝马斯考察了康德的理性兴趣概念。康德为了说明自由是如何可能的而提出了理性兴趣概念,这一概念是康德从道德情感中引申出来的,然而,难以解释纯粹理性何以伴随着感性经验的因素。哈贝马斯认为,康德在解释理性兴趣和自由时处于困境的要害在于,康德割裂了理论理性与实践理性,仅仅强调后者优于前者而不是前者从属于后者,这是需要修正的关键环节。哈贝马斯则重新对兴趣概念进行定位和规划,来说明自由如何可能。

关 键 词:哈贝马斯  康德  理性兴趣  理论理性  实践理性
文章编号:1008-7141(2006)03-0065-04
修稿时间:2006年5月9日

Habermas' Sublation to the Concept of the Reasonable Interest of Kant
QIAN Hou-cheng.Habermas'''' Sublation to the Concept of the Reasonable Interest of Kant[J].Journal of Laiyang Agricultural College(Social Science Edition),2006,18(3):65-68.
Authors:QIAN Hou-cheng
Abstract:Habermas observed Kant's concept of the Reasonable Interest.In order to explain how possible the(freedom) can be,Kant put Forward the Reasonable Interest which was extended from the Moral Emotion by Kant,but it hard to explain why the Absolution Reason is always followed by the element of perception.Habermas(considered)that the very reason why Kant was trapped was that he separated the Theory Reason and the Practice(Reason),and only emphasized that the later has advantages over the former instead of emphasizing that the former belongs to the later,and that is the key point.Then Habermas defined and decorated the reasonable interest again to show how possible the freedom can be.
Keywords:Habermas  Kant  the reasonable interest  the theory reason  the practice reason  
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