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不对等的博弈:土改中的基层政治精英
引用本文:李里峰.不对等的博弈:土改中的基层政治精英[J].江苏社会科学,2007(6):175-182.
作者姓名:李里峰
作者单位:南京大学公共管理学院政治学系,210093
摘    要:本文以山东、河北等省的土改运动为例,探讨了群众运动中基层政治精英的独特处境和行为特征.土改期间,基层政治精英并未完全成为国家的忠实代理人,而是在社会人、理性人的角色指引下与国家权力进行博弈,以维护村社利益或追逐个人私利.另一方面,乡村民众的介入改变了国家与基层精英的力量对比和博弈格局,致使基层精英既内在于又外在于国家权力体系,处于明显的权责分离状态,这又进一步强化了他们谋求私利和"去政治化"的离心倾向.

关 键 词:土地改革  基层政治精英  博弈  离心倾向  不对等  博弈格局  土改运动  基层  政治精英  Game  Reform  Land  离心倾向  去政治化  强化  分离状态  权力体系  力量对比  乡村民众  个人  利益  村社  维护  国家权力

An Unequal Game: the Grass-Roots Political Elites in Land Reform
Li Lifeng.An Unequal Game: the Grass-Roots Political Elites in Land Reform[J].Jiangsu Social Sciences,2007(6):175-182.
Authors:Li Lifeng
Abstract:Taking the land reform in Shandong and Hebei Provinces for example,the article explores the unique situation and behavioral charateristics of the grass-roots political elites in mass campaigns.During land reform,the grass-roots political elites did not entirely become loyal deputies of the state,but played a game with state power as social beings and rational beings to maintain either the interests of communes or their self-interests.On the other hand,the intervention of country people change the power balance and game pattern between the state and the grass-roots political elites so that they both internalize and externalize the system of state power,in an obvious separation of power and duty,intensifying their centrifugal tendency to seek self-interests and remove politics.
Keywords:land reform  grass-roots political elites  a game of chess  centrifugal tendency
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