| 劳动合同理论研究 |
| |
| 引用本文： | 严维石.劳动合同理论研究[J].江苏社会科学,2009(4). |
| |
| 作者姓名： | 严维石 |
| |
| 作者单位： | 广东商学院经济贸易与统计学院,510080 |
| |
| 基金项目： | 广东省教育厅人文社科类育苗工程项目，广东商学院国民经济研究所资助项目 |
| |
| 摘 要： | 本文分析劳动合同的可执行特征和在可执行要求下,劳动合同条款须具备可检验性,这要求明确期限和工资,同时劳动强度与劳动范围却是模糊的.进一步阐释劳动合同中劳动强度与劳动范围的模糊性的原因以及在劳动合同中劳动强度与劳动范围的模糊性情况下,相关制度安排怎样抑制雇佣双方机会主义行为,雇佣双方退出权的不对称是有效抑制雇佣双方机会主义行为的安排.
|
| 关 键 词： | 可执行性 劳动强度 劳动范围 隐藏信息 |
A Theoretical Study of Labor Contract |
| |
| Yan Weishi.A Theoretical Study of Labor Contract[J].Jiangsu Social Sciences,2009(4). |
| |
| Authors: | Yan Weishi |
| |
| Abstract: | The paper analyzes feasibility and validity of labor contracts, which requires definite term and salary but vague labor intensity and labor scale. It, furthermore, explains why both labor intensity and labor scale in labor contracts are vague and how related institutions restrain opportunism of both employers and employees with vague labor intensity and labor scale. Asymmetry of employers' and employees' withdrawing right is an effective solution to opportunism. |
| |
| Keywords: | feasibility labor intensity labor scale implicit information |
| 本文献已被 CNKI 万方数据 等数据库收录！ |
|
