关键词: 委托代理模型；公平偏好；双代理人；激励契约

Abstract: The problem of mechanism design with multiple agents is usually discussed in terms of the competitive relationship between agents.Moreover, it is assumed that agents’ behaviors are not affected by emotional factors and agents’ preferences only pursue the maximization of their own benefits without considering the benefits of others. However, in practice, there is a large number of possible cooperation between multiple agents，and the agent’s behavior is affected by the emotion factor and the agent adopts the fair preference.Considering that human behaviors are affected by emotional factors, the principal-agent problem is discussed when two agents with fair preference choose competitive or cooperative behaviors under the condition of information asymmetry, the conditions are pointed out where the principal incentives agents to competition or cooperation, the ways of income distribution after agents choose cooperation are proposed, and it is discussed show the information rent generated by asymmetric information is affected by fairness preferences and behavior choice.The following conclusions are drawn from different preferences: i. agentsboth have higher optimal effort level in the case of competition, ii. the conditions under which the principal incentives agents to compete or cooperate change with the different fairness preferences, iii.the bigger the coefficient of competition, the income per unit of output, and the greater the intensity of pride, the bigger the reduction of information rent;the bigger the intensity of jealousy and sympathy, the smaller the reduction of information rent,iv.increased uncertainty of the external environment will promote the cooperation of agents. The research conclusions can be applied to solve two kinds of principal-agent problems that the principal needs to motivate the agent to compete or cooperate in the actual social production and life.

Key words: principal-agent model; fairness preference; double-agent; incentive contract