| 政府规制下废旧汽车非正规回收渠道的演化博弈 |
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| 引用本文： | 孙嘉楠,肖忠东. 政府规制下废旧汽车非正规回收渠道的演化博弈[J]. 北京理工大学学报(社会科学版), 2018, 20(5): 26-36. DOI: 10.15918/j.jbitss1009-3370.2018.5318 |
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| 作者姓名： | 孙嘉楠 肖忠东 |
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| 作者单位： | 西安交通大学管理学院,陕西西安,710049;西安交通大学管理学院,陕西西安,710049 |
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| 基金项目： | 教育部人文社会科学研究规划基金项目资助（16YJA630058）；国家自然科学基金面上项目资助（71671136） |
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| 摘 要： | 为探究政府监管力度对废旧汽车非正规回收群体回收策略的影响，构建政府和废旧汽车非正规回收群体间的演化博弈模型。基于有限理性假设，对废旧汽车非正规回收群体与监管部门的动态博弈关系展开研究，进而得出演化博弈模型的收益矩阵；通过单一策略和混合策略演化稳定性的分析，讨论政府不同规制方式对废旧汽车非正规回收群体策略的影响；通过数值仿真，进一步验证初始策略比例、政府规制力度等对策略演化稳定性的影响。结果表明:系统复制动态方程组由4个鞍点和1个中心点组成，策略演化过程具有反复性和周期性，每个局部区域都会收敛到稳定点。政府监管部门应鼓励汽车制造企业积极开展供应链纵向整合，同时加大对正规回收渠道的补贴力度，并严厉打击非正规回收渠道。非正规回收群体应积极寻求合作，形成产业联盟并逐步完成转型升级，降低面临政府管制的风险。
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| 关 键 词： | 废旧汽车 非正规回收群体 政府规制 演化博弈 |
| 收稿时间： | 2018-01-13 |
Evolutionary Game of Informal Recycling Channel of End-of-life Vehicles under Government Regulation |
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| SUN Jia''nan and XIAO Zhongdong. Evolutionary Game of Informal Recycling Channel of End-of-life Vehicles under Government Regulation[J]. Journal of Beijing Institute of Technology(Social Sciences Edition), 2018, 20(5): 26-36. DOI: 10.15918/j.jbitss1009-3370.2018.5318 |
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| Authors: | SUN Jia''nan and XIAO Zhongdong |
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| Affiliation: | 1.School of Management, Xi'an Jiaotong University, Xi'an shaanxi 710049, China |
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| Abstract: | In order to explore the impact of government regulation on the recycling behavior of informal recycling groups of end-of-life vehicles (ELV), an evolutionary game model between the government and ELV informal recycling groups was constructed. First of all, based on the hypothesis of bounded rationality, the dynamic game relationship between ELV informal recycling groups and the regulatory authorities was studied, and then the pay-off matrix was obtained. Secondly, through the analysis of the stability of single and mixed strategy evolution, this paper discussed the influence of different government regulation methods on the recycling strategy of ELV informal recycling groups. Finally, the influence of initial strategy ratio and government regulation on the stability of strategy evolution was further verified through numerical simulation. The results showed that the system replicated dynamic equation group consisted of four saddle points and a central point. The process of strategy evolution had the characteristics of repeatability and periodicity, and each local area would converge to a stable point. The regulators should encourage auto manufacturing enterprises to actively carry out vertical integration of supply chains, while increasing subsidies for formal recycling channels, and severely crack down on informal recycling channels. Informal recycling groups should positively seek cooperation in order to form industrial alliances, and gradually complete the transformation and upgrading, reducing the risk of government regulation. |
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| Keywords: | end-of-life vehicles informal recycling groups government regulation evolutionary game |
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