| 季节交替下农业废弃物第三方治理稳定性研究 |
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| 引用本文： | 张浩, 涂国平, 庄道元. 季节交替下农业废弃物第三方治理稳定性研究[J]. 北京理工大学学报（社会科学版）, 2020, 22(5): 42-48. DOI: 10.15918/j.jbitss1009-3370.2020.3065 |
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| 作者姓名： | 张浩 涂国平 庄道元 |
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| 作者单位： | 1.1. 淮北师范大学 经济与管理学院, 安徽 淮北 235000 |
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| 基金项目： | 国家自然科学基金项目（71764016）；安徽省高等学校人文社会科学研究项目（2019SK09，SK2018ZD029）；安徽省哲学社会科学规划重点项目（AHSKZ2019D004） |
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| 摘 要： | 农业废弃物第三方治理是缓解农业面源污染、提升资源再利用率的重要途径，该模式的稳定运营依赖于农业生产者和第三方治理企业的持续参与。受季节交替影响是农业生产的显著特征，构建季节交替下农业废弃物第三方治理演化博弈模型，分析双方参与策略选择，以江西××环保工程有限公司的两个农业废弃物集中处理项目为例进行案例分析。研究表明，农业废弃物第三方治理稳定性受季节交替影响而存在两种周期性变化规律，但具体表现出何种变化规律取决于农业生产者合规处理废弃物与违规处理废弃物成本之间的大小关系；提高农业生产者违规处理废弃物成本、降低双方的参与成本均能有效提升第三方治理的稳定性。建议政府根据周期性变化规律制定针对性的短期政策并与长期政策相结合，利用组合政策推动农业废弃物第三方治理的长期稳定运营。
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| 关 键 词： | 农业废弃物 第三方治理 稳定性 演化博弈 复制动态 |
| 收稿时间： | 2019-09-04 |
Study on the Stability of Third-Party Management of Agricultural Waste under Seasonal Alternation |
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| ZHANG Hao, TU Guoping, ZHUANG Daoyuan. Study on the Stability of Third-Party Management of Agricultural Waste under Seasonal Alternation[J]. Journal of Beijing Institute of Technology (Social Sciences Edition), 2020, 22(5): 42-48. DOI: 10.15918/j.jbitss1009-3370.2020.3065 |
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| Authors: | ZHANG Hao TU Guoping ZHUANG Daoyuan |
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| Affiliation: | 1.1. School of Economics Management, Huaibei Normal University, Huaibei Anhui 235000, China |
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| Abstract: | The third-party management of agricultural waste is an important way to alleviate non-point source pollution and improve the recycling rate of resources. Its stable operation depends on the continuous participation of agricultural producers and third-party management enterprises. Being vulnerable to seasonal alternation is a remarkable feature of agricultural production. The evolutionary game model of third-party management under the alternation of seasons was constructed, and the strategy choice of both sides was analyzed. Case studies of two centralized agricultural waste management projects of Jiangxi Zhenghe Environmental Protection Engineering Co., Ltd. were done. The research shows that the stability of third-party management is affected by seasonal alternation, and there are two periodic variation laws. But the specific change law depends on the relationship between the cost of legal treatment of waste and the cost of illegal treatment of waste; the cost of illegal treatment by the agricultural producers should be increased. The stability can be effectively improved by increasing the cost of illegal treatment by agricultural producers, reducing the participation cost of both parties. It is suggested that the government should formulate targeted short-term policies and combine them with long-term policies according to the periodic variation laws, and use the combined policies to promote the long-term stable operation of third-party management of agricultural wastes. |
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| Keywords: | agricultural waste third-party management stability evolutionary game replicator dynamics |
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