| 考虑线下权力结构的制造商线上销售模式选择研究 |
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| 引用本文： | 孙书省,浦徐进,韩广华. 考虑线下权力结构的制造商线上销售模式选择研究[J]. 中国管理科学, 2019, 27(5): 119-129. DOI: 10.16381/j.cnki.issn1003-207x.2019.05.013 |
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| 作者姓名： | 孙书省 浦徐进 韩广华 |
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| 作者单位： | 1. 江南大学商学院, 江苏 无锡 214122;2. 上海交通大学国际与公共事务学院, 上海 200030 |
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| 基金项目： | 国家自然科学基金资助项目（71871105）；教育部人文社会科学规划项目（18YJAZH068） |
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| 摘 要： | 在线下垂直实力对等、制造商主导和实体店主导三种渠道权力结构下,构建制造商、实体店和电商之间的博弈模型,探讨线下渠道权力结构与制造商线上销售模式的匹配关系。研究结果表明:(1)当电商要求的佣金比例较小时,在不同的线下渠道权力结构下,制造商都应该选择线上代销模式;而当电商要求的佣金比例较大时,在线下垂直实力对等结构下,制造商应该选择线上转销模式,而在制造商主导和实体店主导结构下,制造商应该选择线上代销模式。(2)当制造商选择线上转销模式时,在线下制造商主导的结构下,制造商给予实体店的批发价格最大,在垂直实力对等结构下次之,在实体店主导结构下最小。然而,线下渠道权力结构的差异并不会影响制造商给予电商的批发价格。(3)当制造商选择线上代销模式时,在线下制造商主导结构下,线下销售价格最高;在线下垂直实力对等结构下,线上销售价格最高。
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| 关 键 词： | 双渠道供应链 渠道权力结构 转销 代销 |
| 收稿时间： | 2017-09-08 |
| 修稿时间： | 2018-08-01 |
The Strategy of Online Channels Under Different Offline Channel Power Structures |
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| SUN Shu-xing,PU Xu-jin,HAN Guang-hua. The Strategy of Online Channels Under Different Offline Channel Power Structures[J]. Chinese Journal of Management Science, 2019, 27(5): 119-129. DOI: 10.16381/j.cnki.issn1003-207x.2019.05.013 |
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| Authors: | SUN Shu-xing PU Xu-jin HAN Guang-hua |
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| Affiliation: | 1. School of Business, Jiangnan University, Wuxi 214122, China;2. School of International and Public Affairs, Shanghai Jiao Tong University, Shanghai 200030, China |
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| Abstract: | The matching relationship between the offline channel power structures and online channel distribution modes, and is investigated the effects of manufacturer's optimal online channel model under different offline channel power structures are explored, including offline vertical Nash equilibrium, manufacturer Stackelberg, and retailer Stackelberg game. The game theory approach is established to analyze supply chain members' optimal pricing decisions and profits in the online reselling and online agency selling distribution models, respectively. Then, the manufacturer's equilibrium profits and supply chain members' optimal prices are compared under different offline channel power structures. The findings show that:When the commission coefficient is intuitively lower, the manufacturer would choose agency selling model in three scenarios; while the commission coefficient is significantly larger, the manufacturer tends to choose reselling model in vertical Nash equilibrium case, but in manufacturer Stackelberg and retailer Stackelberg case, the manufacturer would choose agency selling model. When the manufacturer chooses reselling model, the offline wholesale price is the largest in manufacturer Stackelberg case, while online wholesale price is identical in three offline channel power structures. When the manufacturer chooses agency selling model, the retailer would set the largest offline sales price in manufacture Stackelberg situation, while in the case of vertical Nash equilibrium, the manufacturer would decide the largest online sales price. Our findings not only complement the literature on emerging online channel distribution but also provide several practical insights and guidelines on the coexistence of the online and brick-and-mortar channels. |
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| Keywords: | offline power structure online distribution reselling agency selling game theory |
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