| 工程质量政府监督多层次利益分配与激励协同机制探究 |
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| 引用本文： | 郭汉丁,张印贤,陶凯. 工程质量政府监督多层次利益分配与激励协同机制探究[J]. 中国管理科学, 2019, 27(2): 170-178. DOI: 10.16381/j.cnki.issn1003-207x.2019.02.017 |
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| 作者姓名： | 郭汉丁 张印贤 陶凯 |
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| 作者单位： | 1. 天津城建大学经济与管理学院, 天津 300384;2. 天津城建大学生态宜居城市与可持续建设管理研究中心, 天津 300384 |
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| 基金项目： | 国家自然科学基金资助项目（71573188，71171141）；天津市高等学校创新团队项目（TD13-5006） |
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| 摘 要： |
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| 关 键 词： | 工程质量 政府监督 利益分配函数 博弈模型 激励机制 运行策略 |
| 收稿时间： | 2017-06-20 |
| 修稿时间： | 2018-04-24 |
Mechanism of Multi Level Interest Distribution and Incentive Coordination in the Government Supervision of Engineering Quality |
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| GUO Han-ding,ZHANG Yin-xian,TAO Kai. Mechanism of Multi Level Interest Distribution and Incentive Coordination in the Government Supervision of Engineering Quality[J]. Chinese Journal of Management Science, 2019, 27(2): 170-178. DOI: 10.16381/j.cnki.issn1003-207x.2019.02.017 |
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| Authors: | GUO Han-ding ZHANG Yin-xian TAO Kai |
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| Affiliation: | 1. School of Economic & Management, Tianjin Chengjian University, Tianjin 300384, China;2. Research Center of Eco Livable City and Sustainable Construction Management, Tianjin Chengjian University, Tianjin 300384, China |
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| Abstract: | The implementation of the government supervision of the quality of the project is an international practice. The basic form of government supervision of engineering quality is government supervision on the quality behavior of the engineering main bodies and its results by the competent government department entrusted. Its essence is a dual principal-agent process. The frequent accidents of the engineering quality reflect the loss and failure of the government law enforcement supervision of the engineering quality to some extent. Its root lies in the lack of endogenous power in the law enforcement supervision of the project quality government supervisors in the law enforcement supervision. Therefore, the incentive coordination mechanism of the government supervision based on the multi-level interest distribution is worth explored. In views of the multi-level management system which is formed by the government departments, government quality supervision organizations, quality supervision team (or group) for the government supervision of engineering quality. The benefit distribution function between every party is constructed, and the game model of the multi-level incentive and coordination for the government supervision in engineering quality is built. To solve and deduce from the first stage of the cooperative game and the second stage of the non-cooperative game, the cooperative game can obtain the reward coefficient: . The coordination degree of the best effort can be obtained by the non cooperative game. The result shows that:the coordination degree of government engineering quality supervisor is related to the coordination costs, and had nothing to do with fixed costs. The benefit distribution coefficient not only depends on the efforts of the quality government monitors, but also on the efficiency of other parties' efforts. The quality supervisors of the project will also focus on the coordination with other parties when enhancing their management capabilities to improve the overall performance of project quality government supervision. The strategy of the incentive coordination mechanism for the supervision and cooperation of the project quality government is:the government quality supervision team should set up the supervisory team properly, improve the coordination efficiency and reduce the cost of supervision-coordination to maximize the value of self-motivation. Quality supervision team (or group) should establish the partnership to improve the coordination efficiency for achieving the maximization of their own incentive value.The model and conclusion of incentive synergy mechanism based on multi-level benefit allocation mechanism are researched. It can provide theoretical support and practice reference for the market governance and supervision of general public goods. |
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| Keywords: | engineering quality government supervision interest distribution function game model excitation mechanism operation strategy |
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