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| 收益激励的优化与最优工期的选择 | |
| 引用本文： | 夏远强, 董慧茹, 夏宇. 工期不确定下的外包项目激励机制设计[J]. 电子科技大学学报社科版, 2019, 21(2): 80-84. DOI: 10.14071/j.1008-8105(2017)-0005 |
| 作者姓名： | 夏远强 董慧茹 夏宇 |
| 作者单位： | 1.电子科技大学 成都 610054;2.上海财经大学 上海 200433 |
| 摘 要： |  对于科技研发等具有明显时间价值的项目以及水电站建设等大型项目而言，提前完工能够带来显著的经济效益，基于资源、进度和成本因素的考虑，外包成为此类项目的战略选择。当前对项目收益激励及工期优化问题的研究较多基于确定性工期或非合作视角，在实际施工中由于外生变量的影响工期往往不确定，因此分析工期不确定情况下，考虑参与各方的风险偏好，设计基于合作的激励机制对项目外包实践有重要的意义。基于此，从合作博弈的角度，分别制定了工期确定、工期不确定情况下的激励合同；通过模型对比，分析外界因素、承包商、分包商各自对激励机制设计的影响；并进一步提出基于收益最大化的联盟合作在工期确定时可以达到，在工期不确定时可以通过基于信任的Partnering项目管理模式达到。最后提出了对于外包项目激励机制设计的一些建议。  |
| 关 键 词： | 项目外包 收益工期优化 激励机制 合作博弈 信息不对称 |
| 收稿时间： | 2017-05-13 |
Incentive Contracts for Managing a Project with Uncertain Completion Time |
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| XIA Yuan-qiang, DONF Hui-ru, XIA Yu. Incentive Contract Design in Outsourcing Project with Uncertain Completion Time[J]. Journal of University of Electronic Science and Technology of China(SOCIAL SCIENCES EDITION), 2019, 21(2): 80-84. DOI: 10.14071/j.1008-8105(2017)-0005 | |
| Authors: | XIA Yuan-qiang DONF Hui-ru XIA Yu |
| Affiliation: | 1.University of Electronic Science and Technology of China Chengdu 610054 China;2.Shanghai University of Finance and Economics Shanghai 200433 China |
| Abstract: | For projects with obvious time value, such as scientific research and development and large-scale projects like hydropower construction, early completion can bring significant economic benefits. Considering resources, schedule and cost, outsourcing has become a strategic choice for such projects. At present, the research on project income incentives and duration optimization is mostly based on deterministic duration or non-cooperative perspective. In actual construction, the duration is often uncertain due to the influence of exogenous variables. Therefore, in the uncertainty of the duration, considering the risk preferences of all parties involved, designing a cooperative incentive mechanism is of great significance to the project outsourcing practice. From the perspective of cooperative game, this article makes cooperative incentive contracts with certain and uncertain duration respectively, to enlarge the project output, so both contractor and subcontractor can earn more. Finally, it provides several meaningful suggestions for the outsourcing project incentive problem in practice through model analysis. |
| Keywords: | outsourcing project project time optimization incentive contract design cooperative project information asymmetry |
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