THE OPTIMAL DEFENSE OF NETWORKS OF TARGETS |
| |
| Authors: | Dan Kovenock Brian Roberson |
| |
| Affiliation: | 1. 714‐628‐7226714‐628‐2881;2. Economic Science Institute, Argyros School of Business and Economics, Chapman University, One University Drive, Orange, CA 92866 |
| |
| Abstract: | This paper examines a game‐theoretic model of attack and defense of multiple networks of targets in which there exist intranetwork strategic complementarities among targets. The defender's objective is to successfully defend all the networks and the attacker's objective is to successfully attack at least one network of targets. Although there are multiple equilibria, we characterize correlation structures in the allocations of forces across targets that arise in all equilibria. For example, in all equilibria the attacker utilizes a stochastic “guerrilla warfare” strategy in which a single random network is attacked. (JEL C72, D74) |
| |
| Keywords: | |
|
|
