FEAR OF NOVELTY: A MODEL OF SCIENTIFIC DISCOVERY WITH STRATEGIC UNCERTAINTY |
| |
| Authors: | Damien Besancenot Radu Vranceanu |
| |
| Affiliation: | 1. 33 14940384133 149402807;2. Professor, Department of Economics, University of Paris 13 and CEPN, Villetaneuse 93430, France |
| |
| Abstract: | This paper analyzes the production of fundamental research as a coordination game played by scholars. In the model, scholars decide to adopt a new idea only if they believe that a critical mass of peers is following a similar research strategy. If researchers observe only a noisy idiosyncratic signal of the true scientific potential of a new idea, we show that the game presents a single threshold equilibrium. In this environment, fundamental research proceeds with large structural breaks followed by long periods of time in which new ideas are unsuccessful. The likelihood of a new idea emerging depends on various parameters, including the rewards of working in the old paradigm, the critical mass of researchers required to create a new school of thought and scholars' ability to properly assess the scientific value of new ideas. (JEL O31, C72, A14) |
| |
| Keywords: | |
|
|
