Institutional investors: the vote as a tool of governance

Institutional investors are increasingly expected to engage with their investee companies to try to help ensure that the investee companies have an appropriate corporate governance structure and that they operate according to corporate governance best practice. There are a number of ‘tools of governance’ which institutional investors might utilise including constructive dialogue and voting. In this paper, the growth of institutional investors is discussed together with the development of the vote as one of the most powerful means that institutional investors have at their disposal. The cases of two of the UK’s largest and most active institutional investors are discussed to show how the vote is used in practice. The resolutions which tend to be the most contentious are those relating to the appointment/re-election of directors and board composition; remuneration packages and incentive schemes; and strategic issues that may impact on shareholders’ rights/ownership interests. The paper also contains an analysis of the resolutions which occur most frequently together with the average levels of dissent on such issues in various European countries: Austria, Belgium, France, the UK, Germany, Ireland, Italy, the Netherlands, Norway, Portugal, Spain, Sweden and Switzerland. The barriers to voting that may arise are examined; such barriers include control enhancing mechanisms which are prevalent in many European countries as well as on a wider global basis.     

Multi‐Echelon Inventory Management under Short‐Term Take‐or‐Pay Contracts

We extend the Clark–Scarf serial multi‐echelon inventory model to include procuring production inputs under short‐term take‐or‐pay contracts at one or more stages. In each period, each such stage has the option to order/process at two different cost rates; the cheaper rate applies to units up to the contract quantity selected in the previous period. We prove that in each period and at each such stage, there are three base‐stock levels that characterize an optimal policy, two for the inventory policy and one for the contract quantity selection policy. The optimal cost function is additively separable in its state variables, leading to conquering the curse of dimensionality and the opportunity to manage the supply chain using independently acting managers. We develop conditions under which myopic policies are optimal and illustrate the results using numerical examples. We establish and use a generic one‐period result, which generalizes an important such result in the literature. Extensions to cover variants of take‐or‐pay contracts are included. Limitations are discussed.     

CLUSTERING IN N‐PLAYER PREEMPTION GAMES

We study a complete information preemption game in continuous time. A finite number of firms decide when to make an irreversible, observable investment. Upon investment, a firm receives flow profits, which decrease in the number of firms that have invested. The cost of investment declines over time exogenously. We characterize the subgame‐perfect equilibrium outcome, which is unique up to a permutation of players. When the preemption race among late investors is sufficiently intense, the preemption incentive for earlier investors disappears, and two or more investments occur at the same time. We identify a sufficient condition in terms of model parameters: clustering of investments occurs if the flow profits from consecutive investments are sufficiently close. This shows how clustering can occur in the absence of coordination failures, informational spillovers, or positive payoff externalities.     

SOCIAL INCENTIVES AND VOTER TURNOUT: EVIDENCE FROM THE SWISS MAIL BALLOT SYSTEM

This paper uses a natural experiment to document the impact of social pressure on voting behavior. The main hypothesis is that social pressure creates incentives to vote for the purpose of being seen at the voting act. This incentive is particularly high in small and close‐knit communities. Empirically, I analyze the effect of postal voting on voter participation in Switzerland. Optional postal voting decreased the voting costs, but simultaneously removed the social pressure to vote. In spite of the large reduction in voting costs, the effect on aggregate turnout was small. However, voter participation was more negatively affected in the smaller communities. This lends support to the view that social incentives played a role for certain people's voting decisions. (JEL: H0, Z13)     

Over‐the‐Counter Markets

We study how intermediation and asset prices in over‐the‐counter markets are affected by illiquidity associated with search and bargaining. We compute explicitly the prices at which investors trade with each other, as well as marketmakers' bid and ask prices, in a dynamic model with strategic agents. Bid–ask spreads are lower if investors can more easily find other investors or have easier access to multiple marketmakers. With a monopolistic marketmaker, bid–ask spreads are higher if investors have easier access to the marketmaker. We characterize endogenous search and welfare, and discuss empirical implications.     

The Challenges of Socially Responsible Investment Among Institutional Investors: Exploring the Links Between Corporate Pension Funds and Corporate Governance

During the last few decades, globalization of finance markets has come under increasing pressure to manage the many risks that companies face due to the negative impact that certain financial crises have had on securities quoted on the stock exchange. Simultaneously, there is a growing tendency among different institutional investors to take into account nonfinancial aspects—social, environmental, and ethical values—of company management. In this respect, increasing numbers of asset managers are aware of the importance of nonfinancial aspects of company management for finance markets. Asset managers integrate corporate social responsibility, sustainability policies and corporate governance strategies as indicators in risk management and the search for long‐term investments. The largest segment of socially responsible investment (SRI) screened and mutual funds are portfolios that are privately managed on behalf of institutions. Socially responsible investors include private and public pension funds, mutual funds, and private accounts that are managed on behalf of institutional investors such as corporations, universities, hospitals, religious institutions, and nonprofit organizations, among others. The aim of this paper is to analyze the development of SRI‐screened management corporate pension plans in the Spanish finance market. Spain is one of the European countries with a less developed SRI institutional market. Since SRI is still at the fledgling stage in the Spanish institutional market, this analysis is restricted to the awareness of SRI among a sample of the total number of corporate pension funds or schemes in Spain. The paper concludes with some proposals to encourage wider SRI acceptance and practice in Spain.     

Vote‐Buying and Reciprocity

While vote‐buying is common, little is known about how politicians determine who to target. We argue that vote‐buying can be sustained by an internalized norm of reciprocity. Receiving money engenders feelings of obligation. Combining survey data on vote‐buying with an experiment‐based measure of reciprocity, we show that politicians target reciprocal individuals. Overall, our findings highlight the importance of social preferences in determining political behavior.     

Improving Voting Systems through Service‐Operations Management

We apply service‐operations‐management concepts to improve the efficiency and equity of voting systems. Recent elections in the United States and elsewhere have been plagued by long lines, excessive waiting times, and perceptions of unfairness. We build models for the waiting lines at voting precincts using both traditional steady‐state queueing methods and simulation models. We develop solution methods to allocate voting machines optimally to precincts. Our objective functions consider both the efficiency and the equity of the voting system. We compare our allocation algorithm to several competing methods, including those used in practice. We examine several different strategies for improving voting operations on both the demand and the capacity side of voting systems, and we present a complete case study of applying our method to data from the 2008 election for Franklin County, Ohio. We conclude that our method is superior to existing polices in terms of efficiency and equity and that it is robust in terms of uncertainties regarding turnout rates on Election Day. We also suggest several operational improvements to the voting process drawn from the service‐operations literature.     

WHY DO EMERGING ECONOMIES BORROW SHORT TERM?

We argue that one reason why emerging economies borrow short term is that it is cheaper than borrowing long term. This is especially the case during crises, as during these episodes the relative cost of long‐term borrowing increases. We construct a unique database of sovereign bond prices, returns, and issuances at different maturities for 11 emerging economies from 1990 to 2009 and present a set of new stylized facts. On average, these countries pay a higher risk premium on long‐term than on short‐term bonds. During crises, the difference between the two risk premia increases and issuance shifts towards shorter maturities. To illustrate our argument, we present a simple model in which the maturity structure is the outcome of a risk‐sharing problem between an emerging economy subject to rollover crises and risk‐averse international investors.     

参数不确定性对投资者最优资产组合的影响：基于中国的实证

现代金融学主要目标是给出具有科学依据的投资建议。这一任务对于投资期限较短的投资者已完成,但对面临时变性投资机会的长期投资者,金融学家还不能给出高精度的投资建议。文章考虑投资者自身预测力存在估计误差的感知风险(参数不确定性)对投资者最优资产组合选择问题的影响。运用我国资本市场数据的实证研究表明:忽略参数不确定性对资产组合选择问题的影响将会误导投资者配置过多的风险资产。     

Correlation of Noncancer Benchmark Doses in Short‐ and Long‐Term Rodent Bioassays

This study investigated whether, in the absence of chronic noncancer toxicity data, short‐term noncancer toxicity data can be used to predict chronic toxicity effect levels by focusing on the dose–response relationship instead of a critical effect. Data from National Toxicology Program (NTP) technical reports have been extracted and modeled using the Environmental Protection Agency's Benchmark Dose Software. Best‐fit, minimum benchmark dose (BMD), and benchmark dose lower limits (BMDLs) have been modeled for all NTP pathologist identified significant nonneoplastic lesions, final mean body weight, and mean organ weight of 41 chemicals tested by NTP between 2000 and 2012. Models were then developed at the chemical level using orthogonal regression techniques to predict chronic (two years) noncancer health effect levels using the results of the short‐term (three months) toxicity data. The findings indicate that short‐term animal studies may reasonably provide a quantitative estimate of a chronic BMD or BMDL. This can allow for faster development of human health toxicity values for risk assessment for chemicals that lack chronic toxicity data.     

Usage‐Based Pricing and Demand for Residential Broadband

We estimate demand for residential broadband using high‐frequency data from subscribers facing a three‐part tariff. The three‐part tariff makes data usage during the billing cycle a dynamic problem, thus generating variation in the (shadow) price of usage. We provide evidence that subscribers respond to this variation, and we use their dynamic decisions to estimate a flexible distribution of willingness to pay for different plan characteristics. Using the estimates, we simulate demand under alternative pricing and find that usage‐based pricing eliminates low‐value traffic. Furthermore, we show that the costs associated with investment in fiber‐optic networks are likely recoverable in some markets, but that there is a large gap between social and private incentives to invest.     

Short‐term versus Long‐term Impact of Managers: Evidence from the Football Industry

Studies into the impact of top manager change on organization performance have revealed inconsistent findings. Using longitudinal data over a 12‐year period on football organizations, we test for the short‐term and long‐term effects of manager change in comparison to the tenures of incumbent top managers. We find that long incumbent tenures are associated with performance far above the average. But when looking at change events, contrary to theoretical expectations, we find that change in the short term leads to a brief reprieve in poor performance only for performance to deteriorate in the long term as underlying weaknesses once again take hold. Our findings reveal the illusion of a short‐term reprieve and the long‐term consequences of this illusion. We map several implications for research and practice from our work.     

Older and Wiser: How CEOs’ Time Perspective Influences Long‐Term Investments in Environmentally Responsible Technologies

Most theories of corporate governance argue that chief executive officers (CEOs) take less risk as they near the end of their career, and therefore are less likely to make major investments. This prediction is based on decisions related to firm‐specific benefits; however, it may not be generalizable to decisions that involve broad societal goals. In terms of societal investments, CEOs with a longer time perspective may be more likely, rather than less likely, to invest. In this paper, we argue that a CEO's future time perspective is fostered by shorter career horizons, longer tenures, higher organizational ownership and less short‐term compensation. We test these hypotheses on 150 observations from the US investor‐owned electric power generation sector over a three‐year unbalanced sample (64.3% of the population). We applied random‐effects generalized least squares (GLS) estimations to test our hypotheses, and found support for three out of four hypothesized relationships.     

MUST‐TAKE CARDS: MERCHANT DISCOUNTS AND AVOIDED COSTS

Antitrust authorities often argue that merchants cannot reasonably turn down payment cards and therefore must accept excessively high merchant discounts. The paper attempts to shed light on this must‐take cards view from two angles. First, the paper gives some operational content to the notion of must‐take card through the avoided‐cost test or tourist test: would the merchant want to refuse a card payment when a non‐repeat customer with enough cash in her pocket is about to pay at the cash register? It analyzes its relevance as an indicator of excessive interchange fees. Second, it identifies four key sources of potential social biases in the payment card systems' determination of interchange fees and compares the industry and social optima both in the short term (fixed number of issuers) and the long term (in which issuer offerings and entry respond to profitability).     

Demand Fluctuations in the Ready‐Mix Concrete Industry

I investigate the role of demand shocks in the ready‐mix concrete industry. Using Census data on more than 15,000 plants, I estimate a model of investment and entry in oligopolistic markets. These estimates are used to simulate the effect of eliminating short‐term local demand changes. A policy of smoothing the volatility of demand has a market expansion effect: The model predicts a 39% increase in the number of plants in the industry. Since bigger markets have both more plants and larger plants, a demand‐smoothing fiscal policy would increase the share of large plants by 20%. Finally, the policy of smoothing demand reduces entry and exit by 25%, but has no effect on the rate at which firms change their size.     

How to Win “Spend” and Influence Partners: Lessons in Behavioral Operations from the Outsourcing Game

The Outsourcing Game is a role‐play simulation that has been deployed in industry and academic training courses worldwide. It incorporates the concepts of hidden actions, hidden information, and misaligned incentives, and conveys messages about power, trust, and reputation. The game depicts the adventures of Acme, the brand owner of a product manufactured by an outsourced supply chain. Through a series of negotiations, Acme attempts to influence its partners (two suppliers and two service providers) by distributing its procurement “spend.” These partners, in turn, sway each other via side payments. To simulate the non‐linear shifts in power that occur as outsourcing increases, we represent decision‐making by a voting scheme with uneven vote allocations. This paper analyzes a database of game results to reveal behavioral factors that can undermine conspicuous win–win process improvements. For instance, preferences can be sensitive to the sequence in which the alternatives are encountered; decision‐makers might value not only their own rewards, but also fairness in the allocation of total gains; and effectiveness of negotiation tactics will vary with community norms of acceptable behavior. Along the way we extend the political economics literature about power in block‐based voting by proposing a heuristic approach for incorporating voter preferences.     

Electricity Time‐of‐Use Tariff with Stochastic Demand

In this article, we study the electricity time‐of‐use (TOU) tariff for an electricity company with stochastic demand. The electricity company offers the flat rate (FR) and TOU tariffs to customers. Under the FR tariff, the customer pays a flat price for electricity consumption in both the peak and non‐peak periods. Under the TOU tariff, the customer pays a high price for electricity consumption in the peak period and a low price for electricity consumption in the non‐peak period. The electricity company uses two technologies, namely the base‐load and peak‐load technologies, to generate electricity. We derive the optimal capacity investment and pricing decisions for the electricity company. Furthermore, we use real data from a case study to validate the results and derive insights for implementing the TOU tariff. We show that in almost all the cases, the electricity company needs less capacity for both technologies under the TOU tariff than under the FR tariff, even though the expected demand in the non‐peak period increases. In addition, except for some extreme cases, there is essentially no signicant reduction in the total demand of the two periods, although the TOU tariff can reduce the demand in the peak period. Under the price‐cap regulation, the customer may pay a lower price on average under the TOU tariff than under the FR tariff. We conduct an extensive numerical study to assess the impacts of the model parameters on the optimal solutions and the robustness of the analytical results, and generate managerial implications of the research findings.     

Risk‐Cost‐Benefit Analysis for Transportation Corridors with Interval Uncertainties of Heterogeneous Data

Access management, which systematically limits opportunities for egress and ingress of vehicles to highway lanes, is critical to protect trillions of dollars of current investment in transportation. This article addresses allocating resources for access management with incomplete and partially relevant data on crash rates, travel speeds, and other factors. While access management can be effective to avoid crashes, reduce travel times, and increase route capacities, the literature suggests a need for performance metrics to guide investments in resource allocation across large corridor networks and several time horizons. In this article, we describe a quantitative decision model to support an access management program via risk‐cost‐benefit analysis under data uncertainties from diverse sources of data and expertise. The approach quantifies potential benefits, including safety improvement and travel time savings, and costs of access management through functional relationships of input parameters including crash rates, corridor access point densities, and traffic volumes. Parameter uncertainties, which vary across locales and experts, are addressed via numerical interval analyses. This approach is demonstrated at several geographic scales across 7,000 kilometers of highways in a geographic region and several subregions. The demonstration prioritizes route segments that would benefit from risk management, including (i) additional data or elicitation, (ii) right‐of‐way purchases, (iii) restriction or closing of access points, (iv) new alignments, (v) developer proffers, and (vi) etc. The approach ought to be of wide interest to analysts, planners, policymakers, and stakeholders who rely on heterogeneous data and expertise for risk management.     

期权动态套期保值双相机决策模型及实证研究

金融市场具有多变性,投资者一般需要根据市场情况动态地改变套期保值策略,使套期保值组合价格波动的风险被对冲掉。因此,有必要建立期权动态套期保值模型,得到动态的最优期权头寸,这意味着投资者需要按照模型所得到的头寸动态调仓才能达到风险最小的目的。然而,买入期权进行套期保值需要支付期权金成本,也就是投资者为了达到风险最小化的目的需要付出成本代价。那么,付出的代价是否“划算”是投资者面临的一个问题。此外,买入欧式看跌期权可以规避现货价格下跌的风险,但欧式期权只有到到期日时才能被执行,而投资者不一定要持有期权直到到期日。于是,投资者在投资期间选择何时退出是期权动态套期保值的另一个问题。 针对传统的期权套期保值策略存在错失退出良机和调仓过于频繁的问题,提出退出和调仓双相机决策准则,进一步优化传统套期保值策略。在满足预算、预期收益、头寸约束条件下,建立基于在险价值的最优期权动态套期保值模型,得到传统动态套期保值策略。在此基础上,基于经济价值视角将风险和成本代价统一化度量,利用期末绩效评价提出退出和调仓双相机决策准则,进一步修正期权套期保值策略。利用上证50ETF及以上证50ETF为标的的期权开展实证研究。 研究结果表明,运用退出相机准则提供了提前退出投资的参考时间点,运用调仓相机准则通过减少不必要的调仓降低调仓成本。通过对比发现传统的期权动态套期保值策略存在缺陷,运用双相机抉择的期权套期保值策略能够获得更有效率的套期保值结果。利用退出相机提供7个参考退出交易日,若在这些交易日选择退出,投资者将获得比较大的利润,利用调仓相机后增加了收益。 考虑双相机决策的期权最优套期保值模型改进了传统模型的单一决策,提出了更有效的风险控制策略,为投资者提供决策参考具有实际意义。