人口、文化与政策：解读日本的低生育率

通过对日法两国生育状况进行对比（法国1．98,日本1．29）,挖掘日本总和生育率急剧下降的原因。两国都采取了政府干预的行政手段以及在实用主义的右翼政党支持下进行家庭政策改革,以期提高人口出生率,但是两国家庭政策的作用效果却不尽相同。一种可能的解释是植根于日本劳动力市场的文化：它使得年轻夫妇若中断他们的职业生涯来抚养孩子需要付出高额的机会成本：使得理想的雇员无法拥有太多的时间来安排家庭生活：同时假设并强化了一种传统的社会性别意识,将女性推向非正规劳动力就业市场,迫使她们只能在“正规工作”与“生养孩子”之间做出取舍。这也是越来越多的日本年轻人宁可选择单身并推迟结婚,也不愿轻易结婚生子的重要原因。     

欧洲生育支持政策效果的评估及启示——基于模糊集定性比较的分析

采用组态比较方法中的模糊集定性比较分析,系统性检验了2000—2018年29个欧洲典型国家社会情境和现行生育支持政策的条件组合与生育率变化的关系,试图为我国借鉴欧洲国家生育支持政策提供新的研究思路。通过欧洲各国三类生育支持政策(育儿津贴、生育假期和儿童照料设施供给)与三类社会情境的条件(经济发展水平、性别平等及家庭重视文化)进行必要条件检验,得到五类影响生育率的组态方案。通过将不同社会情境下各国生育支持政策的实施效果与我国国情的比较和讨论,本研究提出,我国生育支持政策的出台要充分考虑地区差异:对于性别较为平等的经济发达地区,大力发展儿童照料设施和有针对性的育儿津贴可以稳定生育率;对于性别平等较差的西部欠发达地区,育儿津贴更能提高生育率;在性别差距较大、重视后代的经济发达地区,较慷慨的生育假期和提供儿童照料设施双管齐下会有助于提升生育水平。     

日本和法国的少子化对策及启示

日本和法国同为发达国家,第二次世界大战结束以后都出现了比较严重的少子化问题,尽管导致两国少子化的原因不尽相同,但两国都为扭转少子化趋势推出了诸多举措。法国少子化对策的特点主要包括三个方面,一是推出了名目繁多的家庭补贴制度;二是积极创建工作育儿两不误的环境;三是在总和生育率尚处于并不太低的水平时就及早推出了各种举措。反观日本,日本政府自20世纪90年代中期以后陆续推出了诸多举措,但收效甚微,重要原因在于日本在总和生育率已降至很低水平时才调整人口政策并且日本少子化对策的力度远远不及法国。法国少子化对策取得了明显成效,其中最为重要的原因在于政府、企业、劳动者的紧密配合,举国一致为此付出努力。可见,要想从“低生育率陷阱”中摆脱出来,需要政府及社会各界及早深刻认识少子化的消极影响,举国一致付出艰辛努力,政府、企业、社会形成合力共同应对。     

Pronatalist population policies in some Western European countries

This article is restricted to a comparison of four Western European countries: France, the Federal Republic of Germany, the Netherlands and the United Kingdom. As the crude birthrates and total period fertility rates of these countries indicate, a stabilization of fertility has set in in France, the Netherlands and the United Kingdom. Official government attitudes towards these developments differ greatly, with France having clear pronatalist policy measures, the German Federal Government having only family policy measures, but some member states going further with a policy of family foundation loans. In the Netherlands and the United Kingdom, no official population policy exists, apart from a certain reluctance to accept more foreign immigrants. It must be concluded that the only common characteristic of population policies in the four countries is that they try to enable women to work and care for a family at the same time. The future effect of pronatalist population policy measures is still highly in doubt.This article was originally presented as a paper to the Annual Meeting of the Population Association of America, Washington DC, March 28, 1981.     

New Cohort Fertility Forecasts for the Developed World: Rises,Falls, and Reversals

With period fertility having risen in many low‐fertility countries, an important emerging question is whether cohort fertility trends are also reversing. We produce new estimates of cohort fertility for 37 developed countries using a new, simple method that avoids the underestimation typical of previous approaches. Consistent with the idea that timing changes were largely responsible for the last decades' low period fertility, we find that family size has remained considerably higher than the period rates of 1.5 in many “low‐fertility” countries, averaging about 1.8 children. Our forecasts suggest that the long‐term decline in cohort fertility is flattening or reversing in many world regions previously characterized by low fertility. We document the marked increase of cohort fertility in the English‐speaking world and in Scandinavia; signs of an upward reversal in many low‐fertility countries, including Japan and Germany; and continued declines in countries such as Taiwan and Portugal. We include in our forecasts estimates of statistical uncertainty and the possible effects of the recent economic recession.     

Why do English-speaking countries have relatively high fertility?

In broad terms, the division in Europe between countries with very low fertility and countries with sustainable fertility matches Esping-Anderson’s classification of the same countries into ‘conservative’ and ‘social democratic’ (Esping-Anderson 1990). A central difference between these two types relates to their preferred models of the family. The conservative countries hold more to the ‘breadwinner’ model of the family while the social democratic countries seek higher levels of gender equity within the family and in the workplace. State support in both conservative and social democratic countries is designed to be consistent with these differing views of the family. Would we then not expect fertility to be very low in Esping-Anderson’s third group of countries, the ‘liberal’ countries, essentially English-speaking countries? By the Esping-Anderson definition, liberal countries are notable for their lack of support for families from public sources. Instead, according to Esping-Anderson, families must rely upon market provision for the services that they may need to combine work and family and they must rely on market employment to generate the income required to support their children. Contrary to this theory, whether measured by contemporary cross-sectional fertility or completed cohort fertility, with the exception of Canada, English-speaking countries now have the highest fertility rates among the countries that were classified by Esping-Anderson. Given the strength of theoretical explanation that arises from comparative studies of fertility in Europe, the paper examines why fertility in English-speaking countries seems not to follow expectation.     

Famine Mortality in Nineteenth-Century Japan: The Evidence from a Temple Death Register

Economic and demographic historians who have studied Japan's early modern period argue that preventive checks to fertility were the primary cause of Japan's stationary population in the eighteenth and early nineteenth centuries, and that the role of ‘positive’ checks was negligible. This paper presents evidence and a claim that mortality crises – famines in particular – also played an important role in checking population growth during this period. It analyses data from the death register of Ogen-ji, a Buddhist temple in the Hida region of central Japan. These data provide a remarkably detailed picture of the short-term demographic consequences of Japan's last great famine, the Tenpō famine of the 1830s. ‘Normal’ mortality patterns, by age and sex, are compared with patterns of mortality during the famine. Mortality of males rose considerably more than that of females, with the greatest rise occurring among young boys aged 5–14 and adult men aged 30–59. A surprising finding was that mortality at ages 0–4 rose relatively little, in part a consequence of a marked fall in the number of births during the famine. The Tenpō subsistence crisis was not the sole cause of population stagnation in the Ogen-ji population, but it was a prominent feature of the ‘high mortality regime’ that this population experienced during the eighteenth and nineteenth centuries.     

我国家庭政策的发展路径与目标选择

我国家庭政策的发展经历了与欧美国家完全不同的路径。由于社会福利和保障制度背景和发展水平不同,我国家庭政策的发展方向与发达国家存在本质上的差异,与发达国家"去家庭化"的方向相反,我国家庭政策发展的主要方向应该是"家庭化",即基于家庭责任前提构建福利保障体系,通过强化家庭功能实现为公民提供福利和保障的目标。我国的家庭政策具有双重任务:一方面要补充社会福利发展水平低造成的保障程度不足,提升家庭自身福利供给和保障能力;另一方面要针对家庭变化产生的问题,调整社会福利配给和组织方式,扩大以家庭为生计单位的福利保障。我国的发展型家庭政策要以提升家庭发展能力为重点,包括就业支持政策和供养家庭支持政策两大类。     

A Case for “Reverse One-Child” Policies in Japan and South Korea? Examining the Link Between Education Costs and Lowest-Low Fertility

Household spending on children’s pre-tertiary education is exceptionally high in Japan and South Korea, and has been cited as a cause of low fertility. Previous research attributes this high spending to a cultural emphasis on education in East Asian countries. In this paper, we argue that institutional factors, namely higher education and labor market systems, play an important role in reinforcing the pressure on parents to invest in their children’s education. We review evidence showing that graduating from a prestigious university has very high economic and social returns in Japan and South Korea, and examine the implications for fertility within the framework of quantity–quality models. Finally, we put forward ‘reverse one-child’ policies that directly address the unintended consequences of these institutional factors on fertility. These policies have the additional virtues of having very low fiscal requirements and reducing social inequality.     

Case study: fertility decline in Iran

Iran has experienced one of the most successful family planning programs in the developing world, with 64 percent decline in total fertility rate (TFR) between 1986 and 2000. This paper focuses on Iranians’ unique experience with implementation of a national family planning program. Recognition of sensitive moral and ethical aspects of population issues resulted in successful collaboration of technical experts and religious leaders. Involvement of local health workers, women health volunteers and rural midwives led to great community participation. Demographic and Health Survey (DHS) data in 2000 indicated a TFR of 2.0 births per women and 74 percent contraceptive use among married women. This case study will help policy makers and researchers in Moslem countries and other developing countries with high fertility rate to consider a successful family program as a realistic concept with positive impacts on nation’s health and human development.     

Migration, fertility, and state policy in Hubei Province, China

Despite China s one-child family planning policy, the nation experienced a slight rise in the birth rate in the mid-1980s. Many observers attributed this rise to the heightened fertility of those rural-to-urban migrants who moved without a change in registration (temporary migrants), presumably to avoid the surveillance of family planning programs at origin and destination. Using a sequential logit analysis with life-history data from a 1988 survey of Hubei Province, we test this possibility by comparing nonmigrants, permanent migrants, and temporary migrants. While changing family planning policies have a strong impact on timing of first birth and on the likelihood of higher-order births, migrants generally do not have more children than nonmigrants. In fact, migration tends to lower the propensity to have a child. More specifically, the fertility of temporary migrants does not differ significantly from that of other women.     

East Asian childbearing patterns and policy developments

Childbearing behavior in East Asian countries has changed rapidly during the past half century from an average of five to seven children per family, to replacement-level fertility, and subsequently to unprecedentedly low levels, the lowest in the world. This article analyzes fertility trends in Hong Kong, Japan, singapore, south Korea, and Taiwan using cohort fertility data and methods, then examines social and economic causes of the childbearing trends, and surveys policies pursued to reverse the fertility trends. Postponement of childbearing started in the 1970s with continuously fewer delayed births being "recuperated," which resulted in ultra-low fertility. A rapid expansion of education and employment among women in a patriarchal environment has generated a stark dilemma for women who would like to combine childbearing with a career. Policy responses have been slow, with a more serious attempt to address issues in recent years. Thus far public and private institutions are not devoting sufficient attention to generating broad social change supportive of parenting.     

Unemployment,Nonstandard Employment,and Fertility: Insights From Japan’s “Lost 20 Years”

In this study, we examine relationships of unemployment and nonstandard employment with fertility. We focus on Japan, a country characterized by a prolonged economic downturn, significant increases in both unemployment and nonstandard employment, a strong link between marriage and childbearing, and pronounced gender differences in economic roles and opportunities. Analyses of retrospective employment, marriage, and fertility data for the period 1990–2006 indicate that changing employment circumstances for men are associated with lower levels of marriage, while changes in women’s employment are associated with higher levels of marital fertility. The latter association outweighs the former, and results of counterfactual standardization analyses indicate that Japan’s total fertility rate would have been 10 % to 20 % lower than the observed rate after 1995 if aggregate- and individual-level employment conditions had remained unchanged from the 1980s. We discuss the implications of these results in light of ongoing policy efforts to promote family formation and research on temporal and regional variation in men’s and women’s roles within the family.     

Back to the Future: a Sensitivity Analysis to Predict Future Fertility Rates Considering the Influence of Family Policies—The Cases of Spain and Norway

This article analyzes the relationship between family policies focused on childcare for children under the age of three and fertility levels. In the current context of very low European fertility, it is important to understand whether public support for families can help increase fertility or if, on the contrary, existing fertility levels are the exact reflection of the reproductive desires of families, regardless of the family-support of the policies that may exist in each country. This analysis was carried out through a stochastic dynamic mathematical model that incorporates both demographic variables and family policy variables. A sensitivity analysis was carried out on Spain and Norway, two countries that have very different models of family policies. This sensitivity analysis allows establishing a relationship between the existing family policies and the total fertility rate and also the expected evolution of fertility rates in the future, if the current family policies remain constant. The results showed that the models which lead to an increase in fertility are those which are most generous and which also incorporate a gender perspective, so they allow the identification of good practices and maximum levels of policy efficiency in regards to different objectives such as increase fertility and advances towards gender equality. By contrast, models with erratic and insufficient support clearly contribute to maintaining fertility at very low levels and perpetuate unequal gender relationships. There is, therefore, space for state agency to develop more effective public policies in both dimensions.

     

On the scale of global demographic convergence, 1950-2000

The second half of the twentieth century saw global demographic change of unprecedented magnitude, with pronounced falls in both mortality and fertility in many developing countries. This article assesses the extent to which these changes have led to the convergence of demographic patterns around the world. It considers not just the levels of fertility and mortality in each country at different points in time, but also the size of each population. It also disaggregates China and India into their constituent provinces and states in order to provide estimates for units more typical of the size of the populations of other countries. The note presents proportions of the world's population according to the levels of life expectancy and total fertility they experienced in the early 1950s, the late 1970s, and around 2000. The graphs and tables thus produced give a convenient and novel way to view the scale and nature of demographic convergence over the last 50 years.     

Declining fertility and policy intervention in Europe: Some lessons for Australia?

The contemporary fertility situation in Europe is outlined with emphasis on trends in the late 1990s. It is shown that while most European countries have lower fertility levels than Australia there is wide variation between countries with respect to both their levels of fertility and their rate of fertility decline. While almost all countries are experiencing fertility decline the rate of decline is higher and the fertility is lower in countries where the male-breadwinner model is strongest. Attempts to influence fertility in European nations are discussed, particularly those involving the introduction of family-friendly policies. It is clear that despite popular beliefs to the contrary, societies where male-breadwinner models influence policy most are those with lowest fertility. The lesson for Australia is that family-friendly policies not only are desirable from the perspective of moving toward gender equality but are likely to stabilize or perhaps even marginally increase fertility.     

Does family policy affect fertility?

From the mid-1960s to around 1980, Sweden extended its family policies that provide financial and in-kind support to families with children very quickly. The benefits were closely tied to previous work experience. Thus, women born in the 1950s faced markedly different incentives when making fertility choices compared to women born only 15–20 years earlier. This paper examines the evolution of completed fertility patterns for Swedish women born in 1925–1958 and makes comparisons to women in neighbouring countries where the policies were not extended as much as in Sweden. The results suggest that the extension of the policy raised the level of fertility, shortened the spacing of births, and induced fluctuations in the period fertility rates, but it did not change the negative relationship between women’s educational level and completed fertility.     

An investigation of the unexpectedly high fertility of secular,native-born Jews in Israel

Secular, native-born Jews in Israel enjoy the socio-economic status of many affluent populations living in other democratic countries, but have above-replacement period and cohort fertility. This study revealed a constellation of interrelated factors which together characterize the socio-economic, cultural, and political environment of this fertility behaviour and set it apart from that of other advanced societies. The factors are: a combination of state and family support for childbearing; a dual emphasis on the social importance of women's employment and fertility; policies that support working mothers within a conservative welfare regime; a family system in which parents provide significant financial and caregiving aid to their adult children; relatively egalitarian gender-role attitudes and household behaviour; the continuing importance of familist ideology and of marriage as a social institution; the role of Jewish nationalism and collective behaviour in a religious society characterized by ethno-national conflict; and a discourse which defines women as the biological reproducers of the nation.

Supplementary material for this article is available at: http://dx.doi.org/10.1080/00324728.2016.1195913     

Social change,population policies,and fertility decline in Colombia and Venezuela

This paper takes a comparative case-study approach to examine the social and policy correlates of fertility decline. The analysis compares fertility behavior across a mature and young cohort of women in Colombia and Venezuela, two countries that experienced rapid demographic change under dissimilar socioeconomic and population policy conditions. Based on the distinction between birth-spacing and birth-stopping behavior the analysis tests several propositions derived from the adaptation and innovation explanations of fertility decline. Results show that fertility regulation at low parities was largely absent among mature women in both countries, representing an innovative behavior among younger women. The introduction of fertility control, however, was highly dependent on women's socioeconomic position, particularly their educational and occupational characteristics. The strong family planning programs in Colombia resulted in a more rapid extension of contraceptive use, particularly female sterilization, and stopping behavior after two children relative to Venezuela. Results highlight the diversity of conditions under which fertility can decline in developing countries and the importance of family planning and other policy initiatives to understanding the different pathways towards lower fertility.     

Does low fertility call for new policies in some Asian countries?

Over the past 2 decades, Japan, China, Singapore, Hong Kong, and South Korea have completed a demographic transition from high birth and death rates and runaway population growth to reduced fertility and mortality and population growth approaching replacement levels. Among the outcomes of fertility decline, 3 have particularly far reaching effects: 1) Changes in family types and structures. Marriage and family formation are postponed, childbearing is compressed into a narrow reproductive span that begins later and ends earlier, and higher-order births become rare. Large families are replaced by small ones, and joint and extended families tend to be replaced by nuclear families. 2) Shifts in the proportions of young and old. Declining fertility means that the population as a whole becomes older. Decreases in the proportion of children provides an opportunity to increase the coverage of education. Increases in the proportion of the elderly means higher medical costs and social and economic problems about care of the aged. 3) Changes in the work force. There is concern that low fertility and shortages of workers will cause investment labor-intensive industries to shift to countries with labor surpluses. Another outcome may be an increase in female participation in the work force. The potential consequences of rapid fertility decline have sparked debate among population experts and policy makers throughout Asia. Current family planning programs will emphasize: 1) offering a choice of methods to fit individual preferences; 2) strengthening programs for sexually active unmarried people; 3) encouraging child spacing and reproductive choice rather than simply limiting the number of births; 4) making information available on the side effects of various family planning methods; 5) providing special information and services to introduce new methods; and 6) promoting the maternal and child health benefits of breast feeding and birth spacing.