共查询到20条相似文献,搜索用时 26 毫秒
1.
We utilize laboratory experiments to study behavior in sequential procurement auctions where winning an auction round increases a bidder's future costs. The game admits competitive as well as bid‐rotation style collusive equilibria. We find that (a) bidders show some propensity to account for the opportunity cost of winning an auction, but underestimate its magnitude; (b) revealing all bids (instead of only the winning bid) after each round leads to dramatically higher procurement costs. The rise in procurement costs is accompanied by an increase in very high (extreme) bids, a fraction of which appear to be collusive in nature. (JEL C91, D44, L44) 相似文献
2.
Experimental methods are used to examine the existence and detectability of collusion in environments that exhibit critical parallels to procurement auctions. We find that given the opportunity sellers often raise prices considerably. Moreover, noncollusive Nash equilibrium predictions are insufficient to dismiss "suspicious" behavior as innocuous: in an environment where identical prices are predicted in a noncollusive Nash equilibrium, common prices are observed only when sellers communicate. In a second environment designed to parallel construction procurement contracting, market rotations are observed both with and without collusion, but collusion can often be detected from the pattern of losing bids. 相似文献
3.
WING Suen 《Economic inquiry》1990,28(1):79-98
In a market with heterogeneous individuals, the fact that a particular group of individuals are the consumers of a particular product already indicates that there exist systematic differences between them and the average person. Simple tools from statistical theory are used here to analyze the implications of consumer diversity. It is argued that an increase in consumer diversity will increase the gains from trade, and that there is a "shadow price of heterogeneity" associated with product quality. Throughout the discussion, the significance of consumer self-selection and the distinction between "average" and "marginal" will be emphasized. 相似文献
4.
We study first price asymmetric private value auctions with resale opportunities presented in seller's and buyer's markets. We offer experimental evidence on bidding behavior, prices, and resource allocation. Building upon the Hafalir and Krishna (2008) model, we find that bidders will bid higher in an auction if the resale market is a seller's market than a buyer's market. There is a price/revenue‐efficiency trade‐off established theoretically between these two resale regimes. In equilibrium, however, final efficiency is high irrespective of the resale market structure. Evidence of bid symmetrization and higher final efficiency is found in the buyer‐advantaged resale case. (JEL D44, C92) 相似文献
5.
This article examines liquidity constraints within the household's intertemporal model with nonseparable consumption and leisure. The model includes wage income in the minimum wealth constraint. We derive an estimable equation for employed households that holds whether or not the family is credit constrained. The formulation enables direct testing for liquidity constraints. Empirical findings using the Panel Study of Income Dynamics strongly support the existence of debt constraints. Credit constrained households have significantly lower levels of consumption, disposable income, saving, and wage rates, a higher average propensity to consume, and smaller labor hours for the spouse but not the head. ( JEL D91, J22) 相似文献
6.
YVONNE DURHAM MATTHEW R. ROELOFS TODD A. SORENSEN STEPHEN S. STANDIFIRD 《Economic inquiry》2013,51(2):1357-1373
We present a series of laboratory experiments that examine auctions with buy prices, which are prices that allow a bidder to stop the auction and buy the item immediately. Two types of buy prices are considered, one that is available throughout the auction and one that disappears with an initial bid. Both are evaluated with and without proxy bidding. We find that the use of a buy price increases revenue, early bidding, and auction efficiency. Differences between outcomes in auctions with permanent and temporary buy prices are consistent with the observed choices in auction design made by online auction sites. (JEL C90, D44, C70, L81) 相似文献
7.
In this paper, we study auctions in which the revenue is fixed but the quantity is determined by the auction mechanism. Specifically, we investigate the theory and behavior of English quantity clock, Dutch quantity clock, last‐quantity sealed bid, and penultimate‐quantity sealed bid auctions. For theoretically equivalent fixed quantity and fixed revenue auctions, we find that fixed revenue auctions are robust to all the previously observed empirical regularities in fixed quantity auctions. (JEL C9, D4, L2) 相似文献
8.
The Pareto optimality and price behavior of English and Dutch oral auctions, and First-Price and Second-Price sealedbid auctions are compared under various procedures for assigning valuations among cash motivated bidders. The Vickrey propositions with respect to the mean and variance of prices under the English, Dutch and Second-Price auctions are not falsified by the data. Individual behavior and prices in the First-Price auction deviates considerably from Vickrey's Nash postulate. Behaviorly, the English and Second-Price auctions appear to be isomorphic, but the Dutch and First-Price auctions may not be isomorphic. 相似文献
9.
SILENT AUCTIONS IN THE FIELD AND IN THE LABORATORY 总被引:2,自引:0,他引:2
10.
We study experimentally the selection into first‐price sealed‐bid auctions for a risky or an ambiguous prospect. Most subjects chose to submit a bid for the risky prospect, leading to thinner markets for the ambiguous prospect. Transaction prices for both prospects were equal although subjects expected the ambiguous markets to be smaller. Evidence of a positive correlation between risk and ambiguity aversion suggests that the ambiguous markets were populated by relatively risk tolerant bidders. A control experiment with selection in a simple choice task shows that subjects correctly anticipate the effects of selection on market size and risk attitudes. (JEL C91, D44, D81) 相似文献
11.
12.
RICHARD M. H. SUEN 《Economic inquiry》2014,52(1):364-381
This paper examines the connection between time preference heterogeneity and economic inequality in a deterministic environment. Specifically, we extend the standard neoclassical growth model to allow for (1) heterogeneity in consumers' discount rates, (2) direct preferences for wealth, and (3) human capital formation. The second feature prevents the wealth distribution from collapsing into a degenerate distribution. The third feature generates a strong positive correlation between earnings and capital income across consumers. A calibrated version of the model is able to generate patterns of wealth and income inequality that are very similar to those observed in the United States. (JEL D31, E21, O15) 相似文献
13.
We compare bidding behavior in complete information all‐pay auction experiments that vary in the prizes and number of players. We confirm the observation from prior single‐prize experiments that there is overbidding relative to equilibrium predictions. Our primary results are that increasing the number of prizes and players proportionally does not reduce overbidding but increasing the number of prizes with a fixed number of players eliminates overbidding. We conclude that the overbidding phenomenon is related to the scarcity of the prize. We provide new theoretical results on the multi‐prize logit equilibrium, and our experimental results are qualitatively consistent with logit equilibrium predictions. (JEL D72, D91, C91, D44) 相似文献
14.
REWARDS, EXPERIENCE AND DECISION COSTS IN FIRST PRICE AUCTIONS 总被引:1,自引:0,他引:1
Consistent with a model of asymmetric risk aversion, subjects in first price auctions consistently bid above the risk neutral Nash prediction. It has been argued that this is due to low opportunity cost of deviating from the risk neutral bid. We increase opportunity cost (and payoff levels) by factors of 0, 1, 5, 10, and 20, from the normal levels generating payoffs up to $250 for risk neutral subjects and observe an insignificant increase in the slope of individual bid functions. The RMSE of bids declines significantly. This is consistent with a reward/decision cost model of bidding behavior. 相似文献
15.
Olga Chiappinelli 《Economic inquiry》2020,58(2):856-880
We exploit a new dataset based on European Union (EU) procurement award notices to investigate the relationship between the degree of centralization of public procurement and its performance. We focus on the case of Italy, where all levels of government, along with a number of other public institutions, are involved in procurement and are subject to the same EU regulation. We find that (a) municipalities and utilities, which currently award among the largest shares of contracts, achieve lower rebates than other institutional categories; and (b) decentralization implies lower rebates only when it comes with weak competences of procurement officials. The evidence seems to suggest that a reorganization of the procurement system, both in terms of partial centralization and increased professionalization of procurement officials, would help improve award-stage procurement performance. (JEL H11, H57, H71, H77) 相似文献
16.
When considering how to allocate scarce resources for the development of public infrastructure, many countries have a tendency to neglect maintenance in favor of new infrastructure investment projects. We examine the role of maintenance expenditures on output and on the distribution of wealth in a heterogeneous agents model. In our model, maintenance affects the quality of existing infrastructure and thus the flow of services derived from it. Furthermore, maintenance expenditures also affect the depreciation rates of both public infrastructure and private capital. We calibrate our model to Mexico and consider several policies that increase the flow of resources to infrastructure and find that a policy that allocates all additional resources to new investment is dominated by policies that allocate at least some of the additional resources to maintenance. Specifically, focusing all additional resources on maintenance is shown to generate the largest reduction in inequality, while a more balanced policy that increases both investment and maintenance maximizes output growth. (JEL E00, E62, H54) 相似文献
17.
This paper studies all‐pay auctions in which there is a buy‐price option for bidders to guarantee purchases at a seller‐specified price. We analyze symmetric increasing bidding equilibria in the first‐ and second‐price all‐pay auctions with the buy‐price option. While the optimal buy‐price in the second price is higher than are those in the first‐price all‐pay auction, both formats maintain the same expected profit. With an endogenous entry process, all‐pay auctions with the buy‐price can attract more consumers and ultimately reach a higher expected profit than does the uniform posted‐price selling mechanism. (JEL D44, L11, L81) 相似文献
18.
This article demonstrates that a robust tacit collusion evolves quickly in a "collusion incubator" environment but is destroyed by the simultaneous descending price auction. Theories of collusion-producing behavior, along with the detail of the states on which strategies are conditioned, lead to a deeper understanding of how tacit collusion evolves and its necessary conditions. These theories explain how the descending price auction destroys the collusion. The experiments proceed by conducting simultaneous ascending price auctions in the collusion incubator. Then, once the tacit collusion developed, changing to the descending auction. The change moved prices from collusive levels to near-competitive levels. ( JEL C71, C92, D43, D44) 相似文献
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20.
Lance Eric Brannman 《Economic inquiry》1996,34(4):730-745
Potential competition significantly affects the size of winning bids in Forest Service sealed-bid timber auctions and has little effect on winning bids in oral auctions. Winning sealed bids depend even more, however, on actual competition, a result suggesting collusion. This explanation is supported using an index representing the likelihood an auction was rigged. Preclusive bidding (a type of collusion) in oral auctions is indicated by a positive relationship between hauling distances and the size of winning sealed bids. Comparisons of winning-bid variances, overbids, and numbers of bidders across auction type support this explanation of oral auction prices. 相似文献