The fertility impact of changes in the timing of childbearing in the developing world

This study examines the role of tempo effects in the fertility declines of less developed countries. These effects temporarily inflate the total fertility of a population during periods when the age at childbearing declines and deflate it when childbearing is postponed. An analysis of data from the World Fertility Surveys and the Demographic and Health Surveys demonstrates that fertility trends observed in many less developed countries are likely to be distorted by changes in the timing of childbearing. In most countries women are delaying childbearing, which implies that observed fertility is lower than it would have been without tempo changes. This pattern is most clearly documented in Taiwan, where accurate birth statistics from a vital registration system make it possible to estimate the tempo components of fertility annually from 1978 to 1993. The small but unexpected rise in the total fertility of Colombia in the early 1990s is attributed to a decline in the negative tempo distortion that prevailed in the 1980s. Similar interruptions of ongoing fertility declines may occur in the future in other countries when existing negative tempo effects are removed.     

The End of the Fertility Transition in the Developed World

By the late 1990s the average period total fertility rate in the developed world had declined to 1.6, a level substantially lower than projected in the 1970s and 1980s. This article examines recent trends and patterns in fertility in the developed world with particular emphasis on the effects and implications of changes in the timing of childbearing. The main objective is to demonstrate that while fertility in these countries is indeed low, women's childbearing levels are not as low as period measures such as the total fertility rate suggest. To obtain a full understanding of the various dimensions of fertility change. several indicators are examined, including period and cohort fertility by birth order and childbearing preferences. An analysis of these indicators demonstrates that period fertility measures in many developed countries are temporarily depressed by a rise in the mean age at childbearing. The distortion of the TFR is as great as 0.4 births per woman in Italy and Spain. These effects have been present in many developed countries since the 1970s and could continue for years into the future. But tempo effects are temporary, and once the postponement of childbearing ends—as it eventually must—the corresponding fertility‐depressing effect stops, thus putting upward pressure on period fertility. Countries with very low fertility and substantial tempo effects may well experience rises in fertility in the near future if the timing of childbearing stabilizes. Even if this happens, however, it seems unlikely that fertility will rebound to the replacement level.     

Low fertility due to delay in -- not dearth of -- births

Population Council demographer John Bongaarts and his colleague Griffith Feeney argue that recent concern about a lack of births overlooks the fact that many women in developed countries are simply choosing to bear children later than women used to. So-called birth dearths are often caused by temporary delays in childbearing. The two demographers have designed a new way for demographers to account for the timing, or tempo, of childbearing in estimates of fertility. Their tempo-adjusted total fertility rate (TFR) allows demographers to correct skewed fertility trends, such as those leading to projections of birth dearths. The new measure provides a better indication of women's true propensity to bear children. Standard measures of fertility are distorted by changes in tempo. Such changes occur when large numbers of couples delay or accelerate their initiation of family building. The authors used historical data and theoretical arguments to validate the tempo-adjusted TFR, which improves upon the two common measures of fertility. Flaws in the TFR and the completed fertility rate (CFR) are corrected by Bongaarts and Feeney's new measure. To demonstrate their new tool, they examined the below-replacement fertility seen in recent decades in the US. By the mid-1990s, the TFR in almost every developed country had fallen below the replacement level of 2.1 births/woman, and in Italy, Spain, and Germany it fell below 1.5. If such fertility persists, declining population size, extreme population aging, and financial pressure upon social security systems may result. However, if fertility preferences hold at current levels, the very low fertility rates observed in the developed world will approach 2 children/couple.     

A demographic explanation for the recent rise in European fertility

Between 1998 and 2008 European countries experienced the first continent-wide increase in the period total fertility rate (TFR) since the 1960s. After discussing period and cohort influences on fertility trends, we examine the role of tempo distortions of period fertility and different methods for removing them. We highlight the usefulness of a new indicator: the tempo- and parity-adjusted total fertility rate (TFRp*). This variant of the adjusted total fertility rate proposed by Bongaarts and Feeney also controls for the parity composition of the female population and provides more stable values than the indicators proposed in the past. Finally, we estimate levels and trends in tempo and parity distribution distortions in selected countries in Europe. Our analysis of period and cohort fertility indicators in the Czech Republic, Netherlands, Spain, and Sweden shows that the new adjusted measure gives a remarkable fit with the completed fertility of women in prime childbearing years in a given period, which suggests that it provides an accurate adjustment for tempo and parity composition distortions. Using an expanded dataset for ten countries, we demonstrate that adjusted fertility as measured by TFRp* remained nearly stable since the late 1990s. This finding implies that the recent upturns in the period TFR in Europe are largely explained by a decline in the pace of fertility postponement. Other tempo-adjusted fertility indicators have not indicated such a large role for the diminishing tempo effect in these TFR upturns. As countries proceed through their postponement transitions, tempo effects will decline further and eventually disappear, thus putting continued upward pressure on period fertility. However, such an upward trend may be obscured for a few years by the effects of economic recession.     

An analysis of the fertility of Chinese women]

The 1982 census provided detailed information on fertility in China. It recorded 20,689,704 births in 1981, producing a birth rate of 2.1%, a decrease, respectively, of 43% and more than 50% in comparison with 1952 and 1963. The birth rate has varied widely over the last 30 years, from 3.6% in the early 1950's, to 1.8% in 1961, after a planned birth program was begun, to a record high of 3.7% in 1962 following the economic recovery, to 3.3% in 1970, after a gradual decline through the 1960's. By 1981 the birth rate had declined to 2.1%, clearly resulting from the intense planned fertility promotion begun in the early 1970's. In the mid- and late 50's, urban birth rate was consistently higher than rural, with the mass move to the cities at the beginning of the People's Republic. General economic development after 1957 brought simultaneous declines of both urban and rural rates, both reaching a low point in 1961. Age structure of the population also has an influence, depending on the proportion of childbearing women in the population. In 1981, the fertility of China's childbearing women was 8.3%, lower than that of the developing countries, but higher than the developed countries. By age group, the fertility rates reached 14.7% and 23.9% respectively in women between 20-24 and 25-29 years of age; the legal marriage age is 20. The fertility rate in large cities is generally lower than that of provinces. Higher educational and socio-economic level also exert an inverse influence on fertility rates; in low socio-economic areas the rate reached 3.5%, and in more advanced areas it was held to 2.2%. In all professions with the exception of agriculture, fishing, and forestry, the percentage of families with 1 child was 81.8%. Since planned fertility was implemented, the overall fertility rate has dropped from 3% to 2%. China's fertility mode has changed to that of developed countries, with high intensity between 20 and 29 years of age. Appropriate measures should be taken to lower the fertility rate in different regions.     

Eastern Europe: pronatalist policies and private behavior

Fertility trends in the 9 Eastern European socialist countries (Albania, Bulgaria, Czechoslovakia, German Democratic Republic, Hungary, Poland, Romania, USSR, Yugoslavia) are reviewed. Official policy in all these countries but Yugoslavia is explicitly pronatalist to varying degrees. Attention is directed to the following areas: similarities and differences; fertility trends (historical trends, post World War 2 trends, and family size); abortion trends (abortion legislation history, current legislation, abortion data, impact on birth rates, abortion seekers, health risks, and psychological aftereffects); contraceptive availability and practice; pronatal economic incentives (impact on fertility); women's position; and marriage, divorce, and sexual attitudes. The fact that fertility was generally higher in the Eastern European socialist countries than in Western Europe in the mid-1970s is credited to pronatalist measures undertaken when fertility fell or threatened to fall below replacement level (2.1 births/woman) after abortion was liberalized in all countries but Albania, following the lead of the USSR in 1955. Fertility increased where access to abortion was again restricted (mildly in Bulgaria, Czechoslovakia, and Hungary at various times, and severely in Romania in 1966) and/or economic incentives such as birth grants, paid maternity leave, family and child care allowances, and low interest loans to newlyweds were substantially increased (Bulgaria, Czechoslovakia, Hungary, and Poland to some extent, in the late 1960s and early 1970s, and the German Democratic Republic in 1976). Subsequent declines in Bulgaria, Czechoslovakia, Hungary, and Romania suggest that policy induced increases in fertility are short-lived. Couples respond to abortion restrictions by practicing more efficient contraception or resorting to illegal abortion. It is evident that the region's low birth rate is realized mainly with abortion, for withdrawal remains the primary contraceptive method in all countries but Hungary and the German Democratic Republic. It seems that cash incentives have advanced the timing of 1st and 2nd births without substantially increasing the 3rd births required to keep national fertility above replacement level. Demographic factors alone will most likely keep birth rates low in several Eastern European countries during the 1980s and the 1990s. Due to the low birth rates in the 1960s, there will be fewer women in the prime childbearing ages of 20-29 in at least Poland, Czechoslovakia, Bulgaria, and Hungary. It becomes clear that policy efforts to influence private reproductive behavior can only be moderately successful if the living conditions are such that women are determined not to have more than 1 or 2 children.     

Timing effects and the interpretation of period fertility

Low fertility levels and later childbearing in many developed countries have reinvigorated the debate between period and cohort perspectives on fertility and on the meaningfulness of the period total fertility rate (TFR). Here, fertility-timing effects are defined as level changes in period fertility that do not reflect level changes in the completed fertility of cohorts. That definition leads to the average cohort fertility (ACF) as a measure of period fertility adjusted for timing effects. In an influential paper, Bongaarts and Feeney (1998) presented an alternative approach and a different measure, TFR*, to adjust for timing effects. Here, the two measures are compared. In the context of model populations, the ACF performs well, reflecting an average of the fertility of the active cohorts. The Bongaarts-Feeney TFR*, however, is frequently unreliable and can be erratic when there are cycles in period timing. When applied to twentieth-century U.S. experience, the TFR* behaves like a period measure and yields adjustments that are often wide of the mark. The ACF shows the stability associated with cohort measures and quantifies the substantial impact that timing effects had during the "birth dearth" of the 1970s. The period TFR reached a low of 1.74 in 1976, but the ACF never went below 2.06 during the 1970s.     

Statistical modeling of selected aspects of the childbearing process with application to world fertility survey countries∗

The childbearing process should be monitored in developing countries experiencing high population growth rates and high levels of maternal and infant mortality. A mathematical model for estimation of certain aspects of the childbearing process, which requires only data on age‐specific fertility rates, is developed. Synthetic maternal childbearing indices, namely, mean ages at first and last birth, length of reproductive life span, inter‐birth spacing, and proportion of childless women, in addition to the well‐known mean age at childbearing, for the WFS countries are obtained using the proposed model. The indices are free from age truncation effects, and, under certain assumptions, provide information about a cohort's completed fertility before the women stop reproducing. The effects of women's residence and education on fertility are also examined.     

The Changing Institutional Context of Low Fertility

Using data for 1960–97 for 22 low fertility countries, we document a dramatic change in the association of fertility levels to women's levels of labor force participation. Until the 1980s, this association had been strongly negative. However, during the 1980s itbecame positive, and since 1990 strongly positive. We also document an emerging positive association of the country-level total fertility ratio (TFR) and nonmarital ratio (e.g., the proportion of births to unmarried women). We argue that these transformed associations reflect societal level responses that, in some contexts, have eased the incompatibility between mother and worker roles, and loosened the link betweenmarriage and childbearing. These arguments imply that societal responses to mother/worker incompatibility exert substantial influence on fertility levels in low fertility countries.     

Baby boomlet for older mothers?

In recent years, a number of celebrities have begun childbearing after age 35. The phenomena of older first-time mothers has received a great deal of attention in the popular press. Are these celebrities indicative of a national trend? Does the increase in fertility portend a reversal of the declines in fertility which have been occurring since the baby boom? The present paper uses central and cumulative birth rates for cohorts of American white women born between 1882 and 1953 to investigate childbearing between ages 35 and 50. While there has been a noticeable upsurge in first birth rates for cohorts in their mid to late 30s in recent years, overall central birth rates for women in their 30s are among the lowest on record, with cumulative birth rates at record low levels. A major reason for this is that these women are having relatively few third and higher order births. These cohorts will need to have a relatively high proportion of births in their older years of childbearing in order to reach replacement level. However, attaining replacement level is unlikely because such a high proportion of women have remained childless at ages 35–40 and a relatively low proportion are having three or more children.     

Sex preference versus number preference: the case of Korea

The author argues that the effect of sex preference must be disentangled from the effect of number preference in Korea. This study tests--with hazard models--the effect of the number of previous children on the next birth according to the sex composition of previous children. Data were obtained from the 1974 Korean Fertility Survey. This paper also analyzes the timing of childbearing in recent periods in order to determine whether replacement-level fertility is temporary or permanent. The ideal number of children declined from 3.9 children in 1965 to 2.1 in 1991. The age-specific fertility rates for ages 20-24 years declined rapidly during the late 1980s. The fertility rates among women aged 25-29 years and 30-34 years increased during 1985-90. The proportion of fertility among women aged 20-29 years increased from 67.9% in 1975 to 86.6% in 1984. Women born in the late baby boom period of the late 1950s to mid-1960s reached prime reproductive age during the late 1980s and 1990s, but the crude birth rate remained about the same during 1985-92. A higher percentage of women (22.4%) born during 1955-59 remained single in 1990. During 1960-90, the percentage of women aged 20-24 years who were married declined. These trends indicate later age at childbearing and an explanation for the temporary nature of below-replacement fertility in the late 1980s. Korean women did not want to have more than 2 children, and the interval between first and second births increased since 1985. Among pregnancies of parity 2 conceived since 1985, over 90% of women with at least one son ended subsequent pregnancies by abortion compared to only 59% without sons. Hazard models of 1974 data reveal that son preference had an important effect on fertility. Fertility was higher among women with only daughters. Findings suggest that the value of sons must be measured at the societal and not at the individual level.     

Japan's fertility: effects of contraception and induced abortion after World War II

This report studies the effects of contraception and abortion on crude birth rate (CBR) and total fertility rate (TFR) in Japan from 1947-1980. The CBR declined from 34.3 in 1947 to 17.3 in 1957, and the TFR from 4.5 to 2.0 in the same period. Both stabilized (CBR in the range of 17.0 to 19.0 and TFR at 2.0 to 2.1) between 1957 and 1973. This dramatic decline in fertility was initiated under the serious socioeconomic difficulties of post-World War II Japan. At the onset of the postwar fertility decline, fertility within marriage was controlled most strongly by induced abortion, and to a lesser extent, lactation and contraception. During the period of stable low fertility (1960-1980) the effect of abortion decreased and the effect of contraception increased. KAP surveys show that in the late 1970's more than 75% of contraceptive users in Japan employed the condom, while condom use in other Asian countries is generally very low. A shift from traditional to modern methods of contraception is unlikely to alter the already low level of fertility in Japan but would have considerable social, medical, and economic impact.     

China's Below‐Replacement Fertility: Recent Trends and Future Prospects

Between 1970 and 1990, China experiencoed a rapid and sharp fertility decline—from total fertility rates of approximately six births to two. The degree to which Chinese fertility has continued to fall after 1990 is controversial. We use survey data from the 1997 National Population and Reproductive Health Survey and from the 2001 Reproductive Health and Family Planning Survey to document recent trends in Chinese fertility. Our estimates provide further evidence that China's fertility is well below‐replacement level at the turn of the twenty‐first century—with TFR levels of approximately 1.5 children per woman. Trends in parity‐specific cohort fertility by age also suggest below replacement completed fertility for cohorts still in the childbearing years. In the article's second section, we identify key components of low period fertility in order to frame our discussion of two questions: 1) in what ways is Chinese low fertility different from/similar to that in other low‐fertility countries? And 2) what are the likely future trends in Chinese fertility?     

Changes in the Quantum of Russian Fertility During the 1980s and Early 1990s

To investigate whether Russia's dramatic fertility changes pre‐ and post‐Soviet times were due primarily to tempo effects, as has been argued recently, or to quantum effects, this study standardizes for factors that distort conventional fertility indexes. A time series spanning 1978–93 of period parity‐progression ratios for the Russian Federation is constructed applying the PADTFR technique, which takes into account age, parity, and time elapsed since the birth of the previous child, to data from the Russian micro census of February 1994 (2.8 million maternity histories). Both the fertility rise of the 1980s and the fertility fall of the early 1990s are found to be primarily due to changes in the probability of a second birth. The impact of tempo on the conventional TFR is significant, but of relatively minor magnitude in comparison to changes in the quantum of fertility. The social and economic context in which the fertility change took place is described.     

浅析中国1991～2000年生育模式变化对生育水平的影响

分析生育模式的变化对生育水平的影响 ,通过计算 1 991～ 2 0 0 0年中国去进度效应总和生育率TFR’ ,清楚地看出 ,提高初婚年龄和拉大一孩至二孩生育间隔所造成的生育模式的变化导致中国 1 0年间TFR偏低。去进度效应总和生育率TFR’较之TFR更加接近中国妇女的实际终身生育水平     

The Effect of Urbanization on China’s Fertility

The relationship between urbanization and fertility decline is known to be inverse in developed countries. However, the nature of this relationship in developing countries that already have relatively low fertilities is not well-understood. This study aims to illustrate how much urbanization contributed to China’s fertility decline between 1982 and 2008 and forecasts how much it can contribute to future reductions in fertility. The study examines changes in the total fertility rate (TFR) at both the national and provincial levels, given regional differences in the urbanization rate. The results show that changes in rural fertility behavior accounted for most of the decline in the national TFR between 1982 and 2008. This finding suggests that official birth control policies were instrumental in curbing China’s population growth. However, urbanization was responsible for about 22% of the decrease in TFR during this period, and its effect was especially important during the latter years (2001–2008). In most provinces, urbanization associated with a decline in provincial-level fertility. The forecasts indicate that urbanization will become the primary factor behind future declines in national fertility. Given the negative effect of urbanization on the TFR, it is possible to relax the one-child policy without having adverse implications for population growth.     

The international family planning movement

Over the past 3 decades, the number of women using family planning has increased 6-fold to over 400 million married women of childbearing age. The evolution of behavior and attitudes toward using birth control among third world couples reflects the goals and hard work of an international network of individuals, governments and organizations. This article follows the progression of this movement, from early opposition in developed as well as developing countries, to the present day, when birth control is practiced by a slight majority of the world's women of childbearing age. Among world regions, contraceptive use ranges from about 17% in Africa to 75% in Asia. In some African countries, however, family planning is still a foreign concept, and fewer than 5% of women use any birth control. International organizations played a crucial role in spread of family planning by providing training for developing country professionals, funding actual family planning programs and helping to evaluate programs. But the success of a country's family planning program also was dependent upon a national commitment, and often on a strong socioeconomic setting. The private sector has had a limited role except in some countries, notably in Latin America, but its involvement is likely to expand in the future. Also, as financial support from the US and international organizations wanes, national governments will cover a larger share of the cost. The worldwide increase in the practice of family planning has led to fertility declines in many third world countries, slowing rapid population growth rates. For individuals, family planning has been a liberating influence, allowing them to participate more fully in the shift from traditional to modern society.     

An analysis of the fertility transition in developing countries]

Most developing countries are in the demographic stage of early mortality, high birth rates and high rates of natural population increase. A characteristic of developing countries is that after World War ii, particularly since the 1960s fertility rates are on the decline, even though they still remain high. The fertility rate of developed countries fell from a 1950 rate of 22.9/1000 to 15/1000 in 1982, a decrease of 34.5%, whereas the fertility rate of developing countries hovered around 43/1000 between 1930-1950, 40.6/1000 during the 1960s and 33/1000 in 1982. Between 1950 and 1982 there was a decrease of 24.8%. But the main reason for this decrease is the decline in the last 20 years of the fertility rates of China and India, whose rates fell 34.9% from 1960-1980. Changes in fertility rates are influenced by the age structure of a country, as seen in the changing age structure of developing countries from 1960-80. For example, an increase in fertility rates was 1 consequence of an increase in the number of fertile women aged 15-45 from 42.6% in 1960 to 44.4% in 1980. Nevertheless, there exists some sort of birth control, whether conscious or subconscious, because the number of births per fertile woman is 3-4 fewer than the 14-15 children a woman can theoretically bear. The reason for changes in fertility rates in developing countries can be traced to marriage and family customs, and even more important, to social and economic factors. For example, Asian, African and Latin American cultures tend to support early marriages. When the fertility rates of developed and developing countries are looked at for a comparable period, then the rate of decrease for developing countries is slower than developed countries. But, if the comparison is made for a transitional period (i.e., industrialization), then the rate of decrease for developing countries is faster than for developed countries. Currently there are 25 developing countries that have attained a fertility rate of 25/1000 or lower, and 52 developing countries with a rate of 35/1000.     

The End of “Lowest‐Low” Fertility?

Total fertility rates fell to previously unseen levels in a large number of countries beginning in the early 1990s. The persistence of TFRs below 1.3 raised the possibility of rapid population aging and decline. We discuss the recent widespread turnaround in so‐called lowest‐low‐fertility countries in Europe and East Asia. The number of countries with TFRs below 1.3 fell from 21 in 2003 to five in 2008. Moreover, the upturn in the TFR was not confined to lowest‐fertility countries, but affected the whole developed world. We explore the demographic explanations for the recent rise in TFRs stemming from fertility timing effects as well as economic, policy, and social factors. Although the current economic downturn may suppress TFRs in the short run, we conclude that formerly lowest‐low‐fertility countries will continue to see increases in fertility as the transitory effects of shifts to later childbearing become less important.     

Family planning achievements as suggested by changes of total fertility and party birth rate]

The dynamic characteristics of China's 5 distinct stages of population development since the People's Republic of China was established in 1949, namely, 1950-1958, 1959-1963, 1964-1970, 1971-1981, and 1982-present, are outlined and discussed. By tracing both the overall rate of population growth and age-specific fertility rates for women aged 15-45 (5-year groups), a clear pattern emerges which indicates that the rates of early and late fertility (ages groups 15-19 and 30-45) are significantly declining. This is interpreted as a key factor in the overall decline in fertility rate. Annual statistics showing the number of children per woman of childbearing age and interval between 1st marriage and 1st birth are compared and discussed. It is concluded that the overall decline in birth rate and fertility rate since the 1970's is attributable to China's successful family planning campaign.