Is low fertility a twenty-first-century demographic crisis?

Nearly half of the world's population in 2000 lived in countries with fertility rates at or below replacement level, and nearly all countries will reach low fertility levels in the next two decades. Concerns about low fertility, fertility that is well below replacement, are widespread. But there are both persistent rationales for having children and institutional adjustments that can make the widespread intentions for two children attainable, even in increasingly individualistic and egalitarian societies.     

Returns to scale to family size - who gains from high fertility?

Summary In this paper the hypothesis put forward by J. C. Caldwell in a number of recent articles, including one in this journal is tested, that there are social and economic increasing returns to scale to family size. Using two village samples of household data collected in Bangladesh in 1977, it is shown that there is a statistically significant inverse correlation between adjusted consumption of rice per head and family size. This result holds true when age and size of landholding are taken into account. From this, it is concluded that the hypothesis is not empirically supported by the data from Bangladesh. This result is partially explained by the extreme poverty of the region and the fact that women are exploited in Bangladesh society.     

Is the fertility of Asian and Pacific Islander Americans converging to the U.S. norm?

This paper examines the process of assimilation in fertility behavior for Asians and Pacific Islanders in the US, using census-based estimates of recent fertility trends for the period 1965-1980. The authors examine fertility trends for all Asians and all Pacific Islanders, and separately for Asian Indians, Chinese, Filipinos, Japanese, Koreans, Vietnamese, Guamanians, Hawaiians, and Samoans. The authors also examine, for each of these groups, differential fertility by urban-rural residence, educational attainment, nativity, and year of immigration if foreign-born. The fertility of most Asian and Pacific Islander groups in the US fell substantially between 1965 and 1980, as did the fertility of the US population as a whole. The fertility of most Asian groups was initially lower than that of most Pacific Islander groups. Most Asian groups experienced fertility trends not much different from those of the US as a whole. In contrast, most Pacific Islander groups experienced faster than average fertility decline, thereby showing some evidence of assimilation toward the US fertility norm. Differential fertility conformed to familiar patterns; urban fertility tended to be lower than rural fertility. The fertility of the more-educated tended to be lower than the fertility of the less-educated. The fertility of the native-born tended to be lower than the fertility of the foreign-born. The fertility of established migrants tended to be lower than the fertility of recent migrants. Fertility tended to fall not only for each racial group as a whole, but also for each socioeconomic category.     

Do male reproductive preferences really point to a need to refocus fertility policy?

Independently collected data from a 1994 survey in Accra, Ghana, are used here to verify earlier findings from Demographic and Health Survey (DHS) data which indicate the existence of a closer tie between men's reproductive preferences and contraceptive use, than between the latter and women's preferences. Indeed, the findings corroborate the earlier studies and suggest that fertility transition in Africa may be accelerated if the family planning establishment would recognize the contribution of the male role, and bring men into the mainstream of their agenda.     

Why Is It So Difficult for Girl Graduates to Get a Job?

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Is a significant socio-economic structural change a pre-requisite for "inital" fertility decline in the LDCs? Evidence from Thailand based on a multivariate cointegration / vector error correction modelling approach

This study is the first attempt at placing the analysis of fertility in a temporal dynamic framework in the case of a developing Asian economy such as Thailand by binding the relationship between fertility and its determinants within a cointegrated system. The analysis is based on the application of the following recently developed dynamic time series techniques: cointegration, vector error-correction modelling, variance decompositions and the impulse response functions. The results tend to indicate that in the complex dynamic interactions, the importance of the conventional `structural' hypothesis as a significant factor in bringing fertility down in the longer term cannot be denied. However, in the short to longer term, our findings, although not fully supportive of any particular hypothesis, appear to be broadly consistent more with the hypothesis emphasising the critical role played by the `ideational' or diffusion forces along with the demographic variables in ensuring `initial' fertility decline than with the conventional `structural' hypothesis emphasising a significant socio-economic structural change as a pre-condition for `initial' fertility decline. Received: 7 April 1995/Accepted: 15 May 1998     

The health returns to schooling—what can we learn from twins?

This paper estimates the health returns to schooling, using a twin design. For this purpose, I use data on monozygotic twins from the Midlife in the United States survey. The results suggest that completing high school improves health, as measured through self-reported health, chronic conditions, and exercise behavior, but that additional schooling does not lead to additional health gains. Controlling for certain early life factors that may vary within twin pairs does not alter the main conclusions of this paper.     

Does low fertility call for new policies in some Asian countries?

Over the past 2 decades, Japan, China, Singapore, Hong Kong, and South Korea have completed a demographic transition from high birth and death rates and runaway population growth to reduced fertility and mortality and population growth approaching replacement levels. Among the outcomes of fertility decline, 3 have particularly far reaching effects: 1) Changes in family types and structures. Marriage and family formation are postponed, childbearing is compressed into a narrow reproductive span that begins later and ends earlier, and higher-order births become rare. Large families are replaced by small ones, and joint and extended families tend to be replaced by nuclear families. 2) Shifts in the proportions of young and old. Declining fertility means that the population as a whole becomes older. Decreases in the proportion of children provides an opportunity to increase the coverage of education. Increases in the proportion of the elderly means higher medical costs and social and economic problems about care of the aged. 3) Changes in the work force. There is concern that low fertility and shortages of workers will cause investment labor-intensive industries to shift to countries with labor surpluses. Another outcome may be an increase in female participation in the work force. The potential consequences of rapid fertility decline have sparked debate among population experts and policy makers throughout Asia. Current family planning programs will emphasize: 1) offering a choice of methods to fit individual preferences; 2) strengthening programs for sexually active unmarried people; 3) encouraging child spacing and reproductive choice rather than simply limiting the number of births; 4) making information available on the side effects of various family planning methods; 5) providing special information and services to introduce new methods; and 6) promoting the maternal and child health benefits of breast feeding and birth spacing.     

Declining fertility and policy intervention in Europe: Some lessons for Australia?

The contemporary fertility situation in Europe is outlined with emphasis on trends in the late 1990s. It is shown that while most European countries have lower fertility levels than Australia there is wide variation between countries with respect to both their levels of fertility and their rate of fertility decline. While almost all countries are experiencing fertility decline the rate of decline is higher and the fertility is lower in countries where the male-breadwinner model is strongest. Attempts to influence fertility in European nations are discussed, particularly those involving the introduction of family-friendly policies. It is clear that despite popular beliefs to the contrary, societies where male-breadwinner models influence policy most are those with lowest fertility. The lesson for Australia is that family-friendly policies not only are desirable from the perspective of moving toward gender equality but are likely to stabilize or perhaps even marginally increase fertility.     

Is consanguinity an impediment to child development?

Marriages between blood relatives—also known as consanguineous unions—are widespread in North Africa, Central and West Asia, and South Asia. Researchers have suggested that consanguinity has adverse effects on child development, but assessing its impact is not straightforward, as the decision to marry a relative might be endogenous to other socio-economic factors. Using a unique data set collected in rural Pakistan, this paper assesses the extent to which consanguinity is linked to children’s cognitive and physical development. It exploits grandfathers’ land ownership (current and past) and maternal grandparent mortality to identify the effect of endogenous consanguinity on child development. Children born into consanguineous unions have lower cognitive scores, lower height-for-age, and a higher likelihood of being severely stunted. More importantly, adverse effects are greater after accounting for the endogeneity of consanguinity, suggesting that impacts on child development are substantial, and likely to be larger than suggested in previous studies.     

Unwed fathers’ ability to pay child support: New estimates accounting for multiple-partner fertility

We present new estimates of unwed fathers’ ability to pay child support. Prior research relied on surveys that drastically undercounted nonresident unwed fathers and provided no link to their children who lived in separate households. To overcome these limitations, previous research assumed assortative mating and that each mother partnered with one father who was actually eligible to pay support and had no other child support obligations. Because the Fragile Families and Child Wellbeing Study contains data on couples, multiple-partner fertility, and a rich array of other previously unmeasured characteristics of fathers, it is uniquely suited to address the limitations of previous research. We also use an improved method of dealing with missing data. Our findings suggest that previous research overestimated the aggregate ability of unwed nonresident fathers to pay child support by 33% to 60%.     

Is breast-feeding a substitute for contraception in family planning?

Using data from the Cebu Longitudinal Health and Nutrition Survey, I disentangle the complex interrelationship between breast-feeding, postpartum amenorrhea, and choice of contraceptive method. I find evidence that women substitute breast-feeding for contraception. Further, endogeneity bias, if not controlled, would cause the relationship to be slightly overstated. In addition, the results suggest that although increased education and income result in decreased breast-feeding, any effect on fertility will be offset by changes in contraceptive use.     

Increasing fertility in cohabiting unions: evidence for the second demographic transition in the united states?

As cohabitation becomes increasingly common and accepted, one might expect the meaning of this arrangement to change. In some countries in Europe (e.g., Sweden), as cohabitation became more prevalent, it moved from a deviant status to an acceptable alternative to marriage. Will the same thing happen in the United States? To investigate this question, I examine increases in the proportion of births occurring in cohabiting unions, using data from the 1987–1988 National Survey of Families and Households (NSFH) and the1995 National Survey of Family Growth (NSFG). The standardization and decomposition procedure shows that most of the growth in the proportion of births to cohabitors is the result of increases in the proportion of women cohabiting, rather than changes in union formation behaviors surrounding pregnancies.     

How to Create a Friendly Environment for Innovation? A Case for Europe

Social Indicators Research - It is a misjudgement to assume that R&D subsidies, patent protections or alike are sufficient to promote innovation. In fact, innovations incubate and hatch...     

Is money the main reason mothers return to work after childbearing?

Women’s reasons for returning to work after childbearing are complex, often including a mix of financial and other reasons related to their preferences, choices and constraints regarding employment; various qualitative studies have explored this decision-making process. This paper also considers how these decisions about returning to work are made, but uses quantitative techniques to analyse how reasons for return to work vary with factors such as women’s timing of return to work, what types of jobs they had previously worked in, or returned to, and what type of leave they used. This enables an examination of which women feel more constrained in their labour market options by returning to work sooner than preferred, and also their reasons for returning. Analysis is based on the 2005 Parental Leave in Australia Survey, a survey nested in the Wave 1.5 collection of the Longitudinal Study of Australian Children (LSAC). Mothers had children aged between 15 and 29 months at this time, and 56 per cent of these mothers had returned to work.     

Is Psychological Well-Being Linked to the Consumption of Fruit and Vegetables?

Little is known about the influence of people’s diet on their psychological well-being. This study provides evidence of a link between the consumption of fruit and vegetables and high well-being. In cross-sectional data, happiness and mental health rise in an approximately dose–response way with the number of daily portions of fruit and vegetables. Well-being peaks at approximately 7 portions per day. We document this relationship in three data sets, covering approximately 80,000 randomly selected British individuals, and for seven measures of well-being (life satisfaction, WEMWBS mental well-being, GHQ mental disorders, self-reported health, happiness, nervousness, and feeling low). The pattern is robust to adjustment for a large number of other demographic, social and economic variables. Reverse causality and problems of confounding remain possible. We discuss the strengths and weaknesses of our analysis, how government policy-makers might wish to react to it, and what kinds of further research—especially randomized trials—would be valuable.     

Is Subjective Well-Being of Concern to Potential Migrants from Latin America?

This paper examines the effect of life satisfaction on intention to migrate abroad using survey data on 18 Latin American countries. Three key findings emerge that support life satisfaction as a significant driver of intention to migrate abroad. First, the findings suggest that reporting high life satisfaction is negatively associated with intention to migrate abroad controlling for education and other background factors. Second, I find a consistently negative and significant effect of the interaction between high life satisfaction and education suggesting that more educated individuals reporting high life satisfaction are less likely to consider migrating abroad as compared to more educated individuals reporting low life satisfaction. And third, even after controlling for consumption and relative deprivation the negative effect of the high life satisfaction and education interaction term on intention to migrate abroad remains statistically significant suggesting that international migration decisions of those with higher education are not solely driven by economic motives. In addition, I find that those who are highly educated (college and higher) are more likely to consider migrating abroad, holding life satisfaction, consumption, and relative deprivation constant, mainly due to weak economic outlook of and low wages in the home country.