Lorenz undominated allocations for TU-games: The weighted Coalitional Lorenz Solutions

In this paper we introduce and study the w-Coalitional Lorenz Solutions to identify the similarities and differences between the prenucleolus and the Shapley value. The similarity is that they both use egalitarian criteria over coalitions. The two main differences are: the prenucleolus and the Shapley value use different egalitarian criteria, and they weight the coalitions differently when applying the criteria. Received: 27 October 2000/Accepted: 2 October 2001     

Equality Bargaining: Where,Who, Why?

It is common to identify a role for trade unions in combating sex inequality at work through collective bargaining. This article uses a survey of paid union officers to identify the context in which equality bargaining by unions is likely to occur, using the specific issue of bargaining on equal pay. It concludes that equality bargaining is a function of women’s voice within unions, the characteristics and preferences of bargainers themselves and of a favourable public policy environment. Bargaining on equal pay is also more likely in centralized negotiations that cover multiple employers.     

Provider Selection, Bargaining, and Utilization Management in Managed Care

Managed care controls cost through a combination of provider selection, bargaining, and utilization management. Provider selection will reduce expenditures if patients are funneled to efficient providers. Bargaining will reduce expenditures through lower rates. Utilization management will reduce expenditures if providers reduce treatment intensity due to monitoring. We estimate that about 30% of the reduction in inpatient expenditures in a mental health carve-out was due to provider selection, 5% was due to bargaining, and the remaining 65% was due to utilization management. We find that both the provider selection and utilization management effects were likely to be welfare improving.     

Bargaining power and equilibrium consumption

We examine how a shift of bargaining power within households operating in a competitive market environment affects equilibrium allocation and welfare. If price effects are sufficiently small, then typically an individual benefits from an increase of bargaining power, necessarily to the detriment of others. If price effects are drastic, the welfare of all household members moves in the same direction when bargaining power shifts, at the expense (or for the benefit) of outside consumers. Typically a shift of bargaining power within a set of households also impacts upon other households. We show that each individual of a sociological group tends to benefit, if he can increase his bargaining power, but suffers if others in his group do the same.     

Collective Bargaining and Alcoholism:

In this project 106 collective bargaining contracts were analyzed to identify union-management responses to the problem of alcoholism in the workplace. The original contracts were collected by the Bureau of Labor Statistics and published on microfiche by the Microfilming Corporation of America. The contracts in this set were executed between 1977 and 1982, and cover all private sector employers with over 900 employees in Michigan. The purpose of this study was to determine the present state of collective bargaining language as a basis for identifying how employers in a unionized setting handle the problem of alcoholism at the work site. The authors discovered that alcoholism is most frequently dealt with in the disciplinary procedure. Clauses dealing with insurance benefits are the next most frequent site. There is evidence of alcoholism increasingly becoming an area for labor-management cooperation. The paper concludcs with some suggestions as to how EAP practitioners can enhance the success of programs in a unionized setting.     

Bargaining Experiments With Deadlines and Random Delays

In many bargaining environments there are random delays in the transmission of proposals. Two computerized bargaining experiments are designed to study behavior with this condition. A clock starts counting down from three minutes when the first offer is sent. In one experiment the clock is not stopped once the bargaining begins; in the other it is paused during the time an agent thinks about a counteroffer. All proposals are randomly delayed. Results are compared to a control design with no such delays. Delays create a first mover advantage, and agreements are more uniformly spread across a bargaining period.     

Strategic Bargaining Over Child Support and Visitation

When parents divorce, child support and visitation must be determined. The 1988 Family Support Act requires all states to have child support guidelines for courts to use in determining child support obligations. However, many divorcing couples arrive at agreements without court intervention, or they simply fail to enforce the court decision ex post. Given that the guidelines provide a starting point for negotiations, couples may be able to find self-negotiated, Pareto-improving solutions. In this paper we model the bargaining process that divorcing couples engage in when coming to agreements on visitation and child support. The model suggests that individuals may arrive at agreements that are Pareto improvements for both parents but that the children's welfare may decline as a result of these self-negotiated settlements. Data from the Stanford Child Custody Study show that the changes made in child support and visitation agreements are consistent with our model in only 30 percent of the cases. Therefore, we consider alternative specifications of the model and show that both significant costs of enforcing the original agreement and alternative assumptions on parental preferences can explain these empirical results.     

Airline Negotiations and the New Concessionary Bargaining

I ask whether the highly confrontational collective bargaining in the airlines is unique to that industry or a sign of a deepening crisis in union–management relations nationally. First, airline labor relations are reviewed in the context of extremely contentious negotiations, intense industry competition, complex and fragmented bargaining structures, frequent bankruptcies, and unpredictable external shocks. Next, concessionary bargaining in the airlines is discussed, and a new and extreme form of concessionary bargaining is identified. The emergence of the new concessionary bargaining in the airlines and its spread to the automobile sector is then interpreted as the early signs of a fundamental transformation of collective bargaining. The implications of the new concessionary bargaining are then described at the workplace, company, union, and societal levels.

Inequality orderings and unit consistency

The paper examines the implications of the newly proposed unit consistency axiom for partial inequality orderings. We first show that some intermediate Lorenz dominance conditions violate the axiom. We then characterize a class of intermediate Lorenz orderings and demonstrate that the only unit-consistent member is the one related to Krtscha (Models and measurement of welfare and inequality. Springer, Heidelberg, 1994)’s intermediate notion of inequality which has recently been investigated by Zoli (A surplus sharing approach to the measurement of inequality. Discussion paper no. 98/25, University of York, 1998; Logic, game, theory and social choice. Tilburg University Press, Tilburg, 1999) and Yoshida (Soc Choice Welf 24:557–574, 2005). Finally, we provide a general characterization for unit-consistent Lorenz orderings and the Krtscha-type dominance again turns out to be the only one that is intermediate and unit-consistent.     

Bargaining with Confucian Patriarchy: Money,Culture, and Gender Division of Labor in Taiwanese Immigrant Families

Qualitative Sociology - Previous studies of immigrant families have reported consistent findings concerning the positive effects of employed wives’ financial contributions and Western gender...     

Sexual identity development among gay, lesbian, and bisexual youths: consistency and change over time

A longitudinal report of 156 gay, lesbian, and bisexual youths examined changes in sexual identity over time. Fifty-seven percent of the youths remained consistently self-identified as gay/lesbian, 18% transited from bisexual to gay/lesbian, and 15% consistently identified as bisexual over time. Although youths who consistently identified as gay/lesbian did not differ from other youths on time since experiencing sexual developmental milestones, they reported current sexual orientation and sexual behaviors that were more same-sex centered and they scored higher on aspects of the identity integration process (e.g., more certain, comfortable, and accepting of their same-sex sexuality, more involved in gay-related social activities, more possessing of positive attitudes toward homosexuality, and more comfortable with others knowing about their sexuality) than youths who transited to a gay/lesbian identity and youths who consistently identified as bisexual. Contrary to the hypothesis that females are more sexually fluid than males, female youths were less likely to change identities than male youths. The finding that youths who transited to a gay/lesbian identity differed from consistently gay/lesbian youths suggests that identity integration continues after the adoption of a gay/lesbian sexual identity.     

Collective Bargaining and the Gender Pay Gap in the Printing Industry

This paper considers the effect of collective bargaining on the gender pay gap in the printing industry. This sector was subject to multi‐employer bargaining for around 90 years, until 2010. The article analyses gendered collective bargaining processes through the mechanism of symbolic power, that is, the power of interpretation and definition, and utilizes Walton and McKersie's seminal work on bargaining behaviour to understand the processes that have prevented the closing of the pay gap. It finds that symbolic power operates within the sub‐processes of attitudinal structuring and intra‐organizational bargaining to de‐legitimize women's role in equal pay bargaining, alongside distributive bargaining tactics that preclude equal pay bargaining, thereby creating the impression that women are irrelevant to bargaining processes and ensuring relative invisibility for issues of importance to equality bargaining.     

Bargaining policies and social exchange: Review of a neglected concept

Social exchange is distinguished from the “economic” through restriction of inquiry to the universe of nonpecuniary counters, chief among which are inclusion, position, and exclusion—in and from enduring groups. Explicitly or implicitly, sociological exchange theorists accept Edgeworth's neoclassical model as settled social scientific knowledge that can be explained and further elaborated in terms of institutionalized norms. Blau's elaborated neoclassical model of bilateral exchange is compared to Shackle's “action” model. Shackle allows actors a choice of bargaining policies, whereas Blau, following Edgeworth, arbitrarily imposes a single policy to objectify indifference curves and enable “outside observers” to test hypotheses relating the terms of exchange to the differentiation of power in enduring groups. Were the imposition unwarranted, such “empirical” claims would vanish. The neoclassical restriction also prevents actors from conceiving “investment opportunities” in bilateral exchange, thus defeating the sociological objective of deriving power from social exchange. Three figures illustrating Edgeworthian indifference curves are provided along with an appendix to clarify the distinction between objective and subjective theory.     

Union decertification election outcomes: Bargaining unit characteristics and union resources

Previous analysis using aggregate data has concluded that union decertification activity is “exclusively a product of market conditions.” We employ data disaggregated by local (county) labor market which permits a preliminary investigation of the importance of potential nonmarket influences that are not measurable using aggregate data, namely, the type of bargaining unit, the type of union, the type of employer, and proxies for union resources. It also allows a more precise specification of the labor market characteristics previously found to influence decertification. Our results confirm the importance of market conditions in decertification activity and outcomes, but they also suggest that the likelihood of decertification is much greater in independent unions and in industry-county combinations in which the typical employee works part-time and has limited alternative income opportunities. Institutional characteristics of the union and employer, individual characteristics of bargaining unit members, and local economic conditions are important determinants of decertification.