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1.
The financial allocations made for the family planning program in India since the early 1950s suggest that a very high priority is attached to population control policy. At the current rate of exchange, the public sector investment will have been over 5.3 billion U.S. dollars by the end of the Seventh Five Year Plan, 1985–1990. It is claimed that over 85 million births have been averted over the last three decades. The number of couples currently protected by the various contraceptive methods, as of March, 1987, is estimated to be 55 million, or 41.4% of the 132.6 million eligible couples with wives 15–44 years-old.The long-term goal of the national population policy is to attain replacement level fertility (approximately 2.3 children) per couple by the turn of the century, implying a crude birth rate of 21 and a death rate of 9 per 1,000 persons. In view of very slow progress in the reduction of the crude birth rate, particularly in the Hindi-speaking populous states of Bihar, Madhya Pradesh, Rajasthan, Uttar Pradesh, and Haryana, the target for the country as a whole is most likely to be reached by 2010–2015 A.D.The observed stalled decline in the crude birth rate between 1975 and 1984 at the national level is analyzed in terms of changing age-sex composition, marital status, set-back to the family planning efforts, and other factors.The long-term projections indicate a national population of 996 million by the year 2,000 A.D., and 1,336 million in the year 2030 A.D. Further, for the very long run, a stationary population of 1.7 billion is hypothesized for India in the middle of the 22nd century.The data analyzed in this paper was collected in 1986 at the Delhi School of Economics through the courtesy of the Shastri Indo-Canadian Institute, Calgary/New Delhi. Appreciation is expressed to both institutions and to Drs. P.P. Talwar, M.K. Premi, K.B. Pathak, and Dr. Ashish Bose. Please direct correspondence to Dr. Chaudhry, Department of Political and Economic Science, Royal Military College of Canada, Kingston, Ontario, Canada K7K 5L0.  相似文献   

2.
Daniel Goodkind 《Demography》2017,54(4):1375-1400
China launched an unprecedented program to control its population in 1971. Experts have dismissed the official estimate of 400 million births averted by this program as greatly exaggerated yet neglect to provide their own estimates. Counterfactual projections based on fertility declines in other countries suggest that China’s program-averted population numbered 360–520 million as of 2015. The low end of this range is based on Vietnam—China’s best national comparator, with a two-child program of its own—and the high end is based on a 16-country comparator selected, ironically, by critics of the official estimate. The latter comparator further implies that China’s one-child program itself averted a population of 400 million by 2015, three-quarters of the total averted population. All such estimates are projected to double by 2060, due mostly to counterfactual population momentum. These and other findings presented herein affirm the astonishing impact of China’s draconian policy choices and challenge the current consensus that rapid socioeconomic progress drove China’s fertility well below two children per family. International comparisons of fertility and income suggest instead that China’s very low fertility arrived two or three decades too soon. If China had not harshly enforced a norm of 1.5-children during the last quarter century, most mothers would have had two children, one-half birth higher than observed.  相似文献   

3.
According to official estimate, the total population of Myanmar reached 59.8 million in 2010. Yet, serious doubt exists on the reliability of these data. From the body of empirical evidence, best estimates of mortality and fertility are derived and serve to reconstruct prospectively the population of the country from 1983 to 2010. Despite the uncertainty regarding the levels and trends in international migration, the results are unequivocal: given the observed development in mortality and fertility, the population of Myanmar could not have reached 59.8 million in 2010. In addition to encouraging reconsideration of current population estimates, this analysis should also prompt the government and the international community to redouble their efforts in preparing for the 2014 census; carrying out a high‐quality count of the entire population, ideally followed by a post‐enumeration survey; conducting a thorough analysis of the census data; and publicly releasing the census results and accompanying analytical volumes in a timely manner.  相似文献   

4.
We study the interrelationships between union-formation forms and fertility in Swedish and West German female cohorts born in 1949–1971. We apply simultaneous hazard models, permitting the presence of correlated unobserved heterogeneity. This method allows us to control for country-specific composition of the population with respect to several socio-economic variables, as well as with respect to unobserved factors jointly affecting childbearing and union formation behavior. Our results confirm that partnership formation and the transition to parenthood are partially interchangeable. Net of those selection effects, we find that the impact of being in a union on first birth is higher in Sweden than in Germany, in particular for cohabitation.  相似文献   

5.
Attention in this discussion of the population of India is directed to the following: international comparisons, population pressures, trends in population growth (interstate variations), sex ratio and literacy, urban-rural distribution, migration (interstate migration, international migration), fertility and mortality levels, fertility trends (birth rate decline, interstate fertility differentials, rural-urban fertility decline, fertility differentials by education and religion, marriage and fertility), mortality trends (mortality differentials, health care services), population pressures on socioeconomic development (per capita income and poverty, unemployment and employment, increasing foodgrain production, school enrollment shortfalls), the family planning program, implementing population policy statements, what actions would be effective, and goals and prospects for the future. India's population, a total of 684 million persons as of March 1, 1981, is 2nd only to the population of China. The 1981 population was up by 136 million persons, or 24.75%, over the 548 million enumerated in the 1971 census. For 1978, India's birth and death rates were estimated at 33.3 and 14.2/1000 population, down from about 41.1 and 18.9 during the mid-1960s. India's current 5-year plan has set a goal of a birth rate of 30/1000 population by 1985 and "replacement-level" fertility--about 2.3 births per woman--by 1996. The acceleration in India's population growth has come mainly in the past 3 decades and is due primarily to a decline in mortality that has markedly outstripped the fertility decline. The Janata Party which assumed government leadership in March 1977 did not dismantle the family planning program, but emphasis was shifted to promote family planning "without any compulsion, coercion or pressures of any sort." The policy statement stressed that efforts were to be directed towards those currently underserved, mainly in rural areas. Hard targets were rejected. Over the 1978-1981 period the family planning program slowly recovered. By March 1981, 33.4 million sterilizations had been performed since 1956 when statistics were 1st compiled. Another 3 million couples were estimated to be using IUDs and conventional contraceptives.  相似文献   

6.
This paper reconstructs the trend in the population sex ratio in India between 1971 and 1996 from available information on changes in sex differentials in mortality in the country since the beginning of the century. It is estimated that, although the mortality of females relative to that of males in India has improved since 1968, the population sex ratio increased between 1971 and 1981, stayed constant between 1981 and 1991, and started to decrease only after 1991. This implies that the recorded decrease and increase in the periods 1971–81 and 1981–91 respectively were both spurious and were the results of undercounts of females in 1971 and 1991. Another implication of this finding is that, owing to the lagged effect of past mortality on current trends in the population sex ratio, this ratio is a bad proxy for use in the study of changes in differential mortality by sex.  相似文献   

7.
National surveys monitored growth in the foreign-born population for the 1980s, especially net undocumented migration's continuing role, but the 1990 census portrayed an even larger foreign-born population than these surveys. Undercoverage in 1990 could have been higher than initially presented because preliminary studies may have insufficiently accounted for decadal net immigration. Assumptions intended to maintain a high undocumented undercount performed poorly when census counts of foreign-born residents became known. Any point estimate for net undocumented migration, calculated as a residual, is likely to be biased by assumptions and data gaps for components of calculating net legal immigration, especially in the direction of underestimation. A reasonable statement is that at least 2.1–2.4 million undocumented residents were enumerated in the 1990 census. The number of unenumerated undocumented residents may easily have ranged between 0.5 million and 3.0 million, and a narrower range of 1 million to 2 million is plausible. Despite the importance of undocumented migration measurement for census evaluation and policy purposes, differences among various undocumented estimates are more likely to stem from discrepancies in universe, reference dates, or individual judgment, rather than analytic refinement. Better measurement of the foreignborn population or its census coverage would aid in setting upper limits on net undocumented migration.  相似文献   

8.
Measures of Canadian fertility (total fertility rate and fifteen-year age-specific fertility rate F15–29) and relative cohort size (population aged 30–64 years divided by population aged 15–29 years) show a close co-movement between 1940 and 1976 but record a marked departure since then. The application of cointegration techniques to these series (1921–1988) shows that they do not form an equilibrium relationship even over the period 1940–1976. Contrary to the expected relationship between relative cohort size and relative income, income data by age groups show that there is no tight relationship between them. The absence of an equilibrium relationship between relative cohort size and fertility, therefore, does not necessarily imply that Easterlin's hypothesis is false.I would like to thank Paul Maxim for allowing me to use his data set for this analysis. My thanks are also due to Peter Smith and three anonymous referees for their constructive comments on this work.  相似文献   

9.
In India many of the past goals for reduction in birth rates have not been achieved for various reasons, and although contraceptive usage has increased it has not been sufficient to overtake the reduction in death rates. From 1971-80 about 1/2 of the population of the country was subject to a decline in growth rate, and the number of eligible couples using effective contraception was 10.6% in 1971 and 22.7% in 1981 in spite of an increase in the number of such couples. The death rate declined from 27.4 in 1941-51 to 14.8 in 1971-81 with a corresponding increase in life expectancy from 32-52 years. However the growth rate has reached a plateau during 1971-81. Since its inception the Family Welfare Program in India is estimated to have averted 49 million births including 5 million in 1981-82. Future goals are: 1) reduction in birth rate from 35 in 1981 to 21, death rate from 14 to 9 and infant mortality rate from 125 to 60 by the year 2000 along with reductions in maternal mortality and morbidity, and 2) an increase in the percentage of couples protected from 23.6 in 1982 to 60 in 2000, and 3) population size of 950 million by the year 2000 and the commencement of population stabilization leading to a population of about 1200 million by the middle of the 21st century. Future strategies for the promotion of planned parenthood include information, education, and communication programs, incentives and disincentives, involvement of nongovernmental agenices, provision of services and supplies, linkages with other sectors, and monitoring and evaluation activities. Emphasis will be put on interpersonal communication channels to promote the program as a mass movement.  相似文献   

10.
Abstract India is one of the very few developing countries which have a relatively long history of population censuses. The first census was taken in 1872, the second in 1881 and since then there has been a census every ten years, the latest in 1971. Yet the registration of births and deaths in India, even at the present time, is too inadequate to be of much help in estimating fertility and mortality conditions in the country. From time to time Indian census actuaries have indirectly constructed life tables by comparing one census age distribution with the preceding one. Official life tables are available for all the decades from 1872-1881 to 1951-1961, except for 1911-1921 and 1931-1941. Kingsley Davis(1) filled in the gap by constructing life tables for the latter two decades. He also estimated the birth and death rates ofIndia for the decades from 1881-1891 to 1931-1941. Estimates of these rates for the following two decades, 1941-1951 and 1951-1961, were made by Indian census actuaries. The birth rates of Davis and the Indian actuaries were obtained basically by the reverse survival method from the age distribution and the computed life table of the population. Coale and Hoover(2), however, estimated the birth and death rates and the life table of the Indian population in 1951 by applying stable population theory. The most recent estimates of the birth rate and death rate for 1963-1964 are based on the results of the National Sample Survey. All these estimates are presented in summary form in Table 1.  相似文献   

11.
This paper reconstructs the trend in the population sex ratio in India between 1971 ad 1996 from available information on changes in sex differentials in mortality in the country since the beginning of the century. It is estimated that, although the mortality of females relative to that of males in India has improved since 1968, the population sex ratio increased between 1971 and 1981, stayed constant between 1981 and 1991, and started to decrease only after 1991. This implies that the recorded decrease and increase in the periods 1971-81 and 1981-91 respectively were both spurious and were the results of undercounts of females in 1971 and 1991. Another implication of this finding is that, owing to the lagged effect of past mortality on current trends in the population sex ratio, this ratio is a bad proxy for use in the study of changes in differential mortality by sex.  相似文献   

12.
C Li 《人口研究》1985,(6):1-5
The author discusses the evaluation by IUSSP members of China's 1982 population census and outlines questions raised at the 1985 conference in Florence. While the quality of the census data was generally favorably assessed by those attending the workshop, the following points were made: The population size, obtained by summing all age groups, is inconsistent with the total population recorded in the census; fertility, mortality, and national growth rates for the Chinese population over the years are different in various official publications; and the sex ratio, 1.08:1 in 1981, may be caused by underreporting.  相似文献   

13.
During the 1940s and 1950s in India, a relatively low level of fertility of 6–8 children per woman of unbroken marriage is implicated by the social and cultural factors; the fertility was probably depressed by 15–20 percent. An appraisal of the trends over the last 2–3 decades of the pertinent variables—age at marriage (an early and almost universal marriage); the widow remarriage rates; the induced abortion rate; postpartum infecundability (breastfeeding) and postpartum abstinence; the son preference; and the other sexual attitudes and taboos—suggests that during the late 1970s and early 1980s, the fertility enhancing and retarding forces were offsetting each other. But, over the next two decades, the variables responsible for enhancing the fertility level will play a more dominant role than the corresponding fertility-reducing factors. However, the role of induced abortion remains somewhat unclear. For any significant reductions in the national crude birth rate in India during the 1990s, the family planning efforts will have to be considerably accelerated.  相似文献   

14.
Although 10 countries and two of China’s special administrative areas, totalling 1,528 million people or 44 per cent of Asia’s total population, are now characterized by fertility rates below long-term replacement levels, no such countries are yet found in South Asia. This paper first examines the characteristics of 12 Asian administrations with very low fertility at various stages of their fertility declines and then compares the findings with the present situation in three South Asian countries, Sri Lanka, India and Bangladesh. This allows a prediction of when the South Asian countries will reach replacement fertility in accord with the trends in two key criteria, the percentage of girls in secondary school and the infant mortality rate. These conclusions are then buttressed for each country by the findings of anthropological demographic research programs in which the authors were involved. The predictions are that all three countries will attain a total fertility rate of 2.1 within the next 30 years and that the UN2000 Revision of the medium population projection is plausible in that regard. However, the authors part company with the UN projection in their assessment that the nature of these societies means that they will all subsequently fall to still lower fertility levels.  相似文献   

15.
Summary The development of population in Bangladesh was affected by a succession of man-made and natural calamities, such as the Bengal Famine of 1943, refugee movements following the partition of India and Pakistan in 1947, devastating floods and cyclones around 1970, and the military action during the war of liberation. Though there had been a tradition of census taking and vital registration in Bangladesh, as part of the Indian sub-continent, extending for over a century, vital registration was so deficient as to be almost valueless, and there were gross misstatements of age and under-enumeration in the censuses. In the census of 1941, on the other hand, political manoeuvring led to a substantial overcount of the population. In this paper, Bangladesh population trends are studied within the broader framework of the subcontinent, taking account of plausible differentials. A considerable element of uncertainty was introduced into growth trends as a result of variations in the completeness of census-taking and of unrecorded refugee and labour movements across open land borders. In this connection the substantial inflationary bias associated with techniques of population estimation using the dual record system is discussed. The application of stable population models is even less justified in Bangladesh with its history of declining mortality. A transitional age structure model was constructed on the basis of the information available on declining mortality and accelerating growth and the model was made even more specific by modifications which took care of the impact of recent calamities and of unrecorded migration. The population base of the census of 1961 was adjusted in accordance with this model. The local mortality age pattern was used in projecting the population by sex and age groups to the date at which the census was originally due to be taken in 1971, and to the date when it was actually taken in March 1974. The post-1970 calamities and their effect on mortality were ignored. The aggregate estimate of population of 72.9 million in March 1974 is slightly in excess of the census count (by about two per cent) reported provisionally as 71.3 million. The excess in our estimate could be accounted for by the losses due to cyclone and military action.  相似文献   

16.
The U.S. Census Bureau periodically releases projections of the US resident population, detailed by age, sex, race, and Hispanic origin. The most recent of these, issued 13 January 2000, for the first time extend to the year 2100 and also include information on the foreign‐bom population. (Earlier projections were carried up to 2080.) The extensive tabulations presenting the new set, and detailed explanation of the methodology and the assumptions underlying the projections, are accessible at the Census Bureau's web site: http://www.census.gov . A brief summary of some of the main results of these projections is reproduced below from United States Department of Commerce News, Washington, DC 20230. (The Census Bureau is an agency of the Department of Commerce.) Uncertainties as to future trends in fertility, mortality, and net migration over a period of some 100 years are very great, as is illustrated by the massive difference in the projected size of the population for 2100 in the three variants produced. The “middle” projected population figure of 571 million (which represents a growth of some 109 percent over its current level) is bracketed by “lowest” and “highest” alternative projections of 283 million and 1.18 billion, respectively. With somewhat lesser force, the point also applies to the 50‐year time span considered in the well‐known country‐by‐country projections of the United Nations. These projections are also detailed in three variants: low, middle, and high. The UN projections (last revised in 1998) envisage less rapid growth in the United States during the first part of the twenty‐first century than do the Census Bureau's. The projected population figures for 2050 in the three variants (low, middle, and high) are as follows (in millions):
U.S. Census Bureau 313.5 403.7 552.8
United Nations 292.8 349.3 419.0
Since the initial age and sex distributions from which the two sets of population projections start are essentially identical, these differences reflect assumptions by the Census Bureau with respect to the three factors affecting population dynamics in the next 50 years. In the middle series, each of these assumptions is more growth‐producing in the Census Bureau's set than in that of the United Nations. Thus, in the middle of the twenty‐first century the Census Bureau anticipates male and female life expectancies of 81.2 and 86.7 years; the corresponding figures according to the UN are 78.8 and 84.4 years. Net immigration to the United States per 1000 population at midcentury is assumed to be 2.2 by the United Nations and somewhat above 2.4 according to the Census Bureau. The factor most affecting the difference between the projected population sizes, however, is the differing assumptions with respect to fertility. The middle UN series anticipates a midcentury US total fertility rate of 1.9 children per woman; the Census Bureau's assumption is slightly above 2.2. A notable feature of the Census Bureau's projection methodology in comparison to that of the UN is the recognition of differences in mortality and fertility, and also in immigration, with respect to race and Hispanic origin. Thus, at midcentury the white non‐Hispanic population is assumed to have a total fertility rate of 2.03; the corresponding figure for the population of Hispanic origin is 2.56. (Fertility in other population subgroups is expected to lie between these values, although closer to the fertility of non‐Hispanic whites.) And Hispanic immigration, currently the major component within total immigration, is assumed to remain significant throughout the next five decades (although by midcentury it is expected to be far exceeded by immigration of non‐Hispanic Asians). As a result, the structure of the US population by race and Hispanic origin is expected to shift markedly. To the extent that fertility and mortality differentials persist, such a shift also affects the mean fertility and mortality figures of the total population.  相似文献   

17.
中国人口出生控制成效的比较分析   总被引:2,自引:0,他引:2  
中国 ①的计划生育工作起始于 2 0世纪 5 0年代。从 1 95 5年到 1 971年 ,中国推行的是一般性的家庭计划生育政策 ,从 1 971年至今 ,中国推行的是家庭计划生育与国家计划生育相结合的政策。如果不实行任何形式的计划生育政策 ,2 0 0 0年末中国人口将会达到 1 8 5 8亿 ,如果象印度那样只倡导自愿实行家庭计划生育 ,将会达到 1 5 3 2亿。过去 45年中 ,中国一共少生了 5 88亿人 ,其中由于实行国家计划生育政策少生了 2 6 2亿人 ,而一般性的家庭计划生育政策少生了 3 2 6亿人。计划生育为中国的社会经济发展做出了巨大的贡献  相似文献   

18.
On July 1, 1982 China's 3rd national population census reported the population of the 29 provinces, municipalities, and autonomous regions on the mainland at 1,008,175,288, showing a net increase of 460,000,000 or 84% over the 548,000,000 recorded at the end of 1949. At this time China's population is about 1/4 of the world. Its population policy must conform to her national conditions and will be successful only to the extent that it does so. Discussion focuses on the main features of China's population policy. In 1953 the State Council instructed the Ministry of Health to support birth control by providing contraceptives. It also ratified provisions concerning contraception and induced abortions. In 1962 the State Council issued "Instructions on Conscientious Advocacy of Family Planning." China not only advocates and publicized family planning but also takes specific measures. Special administrative organizations were established in 1964 to oversee scientific research, production, and supply of contraceptives and to provide couples of childbearing age with free contraceptives. An all round attack on family planning work in 1966 led to unchecked childbirth resulting in rapid population growth. In 1971 Premier Zhou Enlai reiterated the importance of population control in 1971 and asked that it be incorporated into the 4th Five Year Plan for the development of the national economy. Family planning was incorporated into the Constitution in 1978. China's 20 years of experiences with family planning suggest that a country's population policy becomes effective only with repeated efforts. The 10-year period of turmoil undermined the enforcement of the population policy. Recently the State Family Planning Commission organized a nationwide fertility survey which indicated tremendous successes for China's population control drive. The total fertility rate dropped from 5.29 in the 1950s to 2.63 in the 1980s. The population census shows that the momentum of China's population growth cannot be checked without strict measures because the population is characterized by a huge base figure, a young age composition, and a fertility rate much higher than a population replacement level. China's population policy is formulated in line with her national conditions. Specific provisions for family planning reflect different ways to deal with different people.  相似文献   

19.

We consider a Leslie‐type model of a one‐sex (female) population of natives with constant immigration. The fertility and mortality schedule of the natives may be below or above replacement level. Immigrants retain their fertility and mortality, their children adopt the fertility and mortality of the natives. It is shown how this model may be written in a homogeneous form (without additive term) with a Leslie‐type matrix. Reproductive values of individuals in each age group are discussed in terms of a left eigenvector of this matrix. The homogeneous form of our projection model permits the transformation into a Markov chain with transient and recurrent states. The Markov chain is the basis for the definition of genealogies, which incorporate immigration. It is shown that genealogies describe the life histories of individuals in a population with immigration. We calculate absorption times of the Markov chain and relate them to genealogies. This extends the theory originally designed for closed populations to populations with immigratioa  相似文献   

20.
A brief overview is presented of the impact of population control on sustainable economic development in Shantong Province, China. Family planning education was initiated in 1970. Birth control is now widely accepted among the population. The birth rate in 1995 was 9.82/1000 population. The natural growth rate was 0.335%. The population growth rate was below the national average. The total fertility rate was 1.1 children/woman. Shandong Province has a total population of 81 million people. Shandong's share of Chinese total population declined from 8.4% in 1949 to 7.2% in 1995. Gross domestic product in 1995 was 500 billion yuan. The annual urban expenditure was 4000 yuan/person, which was an increase of 1500 yuan from 1991. The annual rural net income was 1650 yuan/person, which was an increase of 680 yuan from 1991. During 1971-95, expenditures for bearing children declined by 492 billion yuan. The party secretary of the province stressed that population quality is desired now that the birth rate is under control.  相似文献   

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