Organized labor and electoral participation in American national elections

I consider the role of unions in fostering electoral participation in the U.S. Using aggregate and individual data, I argue that turnout varies directly with the organizational strength of unions, not only through their ability to mobilize their own members per se, but also, and more importantly, through their ability to affect the rate of participation of voters in general. My results imply that unionization helps explain much of the post-1960 decline in voter turnout. The magnitude of the relationship is demonstrated to rival that of more conventional determinants of voter turnout such as education.     

Wahlbeteiligung im Lebensverlauf

This empirical investigation attempts to answer the question whether the change in voter turnout at the German general elections is related to cohort specific voting behavior of political generations, also taking into account age and period effects. Furthermore, it is asked whether the decline of voter turnout after the 1972 German general election is a statistical artefact of official statistics. Both questions are investigated with retrospective life history data about voting behavior of individuals from several birth cohorts. It is analyzed that the voter turnout has really declined in the 1980s because of the increased number of determined non-voters. There is evidence that the changes of the voting behavior of younger individuals in successive political generations results in the social change of the general voter turnout. While the effects of the citizens’ age on the voter turnout are minimal for the whole period between 1953 and 1987, the impact of period effects are less important for the historical change of voter turnout as often assumed.     

Relative wages and exit behavior among registered nurses

I examine the exit decision of registered nurses using the longitudinal data files generated by the March Current Population Surveys (CPS) from 1983 through 1994. By examining the wages of workers outside of nursing, a measure of the reservation wage is constructed and related to the decision to leave nursing, either for an alternative job or to exit employment. My results indicate that nurses respond to outside wage opportunities. A one standard deviation decrease in the difference between the actual and predicted log wage results in an 8 percent increase in the exit of nurses. Secretaries, however, are shown to have a much greater sensitivity to outside wages due to the lower degree of occupation-specific training required for secretarial jobs. A similar increase in the wage gap for secretaries results in an 18 percent increase in turnover. RNs employed in hospitals, covered by a union contract, and employed in the public sector are relatively attached to the nursing profession. The author appreciates the helpful comments of Barry Hirsch, David Macpherson, and Leola Ross.     

Bandwagon, underdog, and political competition: the uni-dimensional case

This article studies the effects of bandwagon and underdog on the political equilibrium of two-party competition models. We adapt for voter conformism the generalized Wittman?CRoemer model of political competition, which views political competition as the one between parties with factions of the opportunists and the militants that Nash-bargain one another, and consider three special cases of the general model: the Hotelling?CDowns model, the classical Wittman?CRoemer model, and what we call the ideological-party model. We find that the presence of voter conformism significantly affects the nature of political competition, and its effect on political equilibrium is quite different depending on the model one uses. In the Hotelling?CDowns model, political parties put forth an identical policy at the equilibrium, regardless of the type of voter conformism, and this is the only equilibrium. In both the ideological-party and classical Wittman?CRoemer models, parties propose differentiated policies at the equilibrium, and the extent of policy differentiation depends on the degree of voter conformism.     

The Effect of Residential Concentration on Voter Turnout among Ethnic Minorities

Utilizing a large and unique dataset composed of government records, we study the widely contested effect of co‐ethnic residential concentrations on voter turnout. Non‐Western immigrants are moderately affected by the concentration of co‐ethnic voters in their neighborhoods. As the local concentration of same‐ethnicity voters increases, so does the individual's propensity to turn out for the election. In general, the concentration of non‐Western immigrants in the neighborhood has only a very limited impact on an immigrant's propensity to vote. Finally, we investigate the possible mobilizing effect of local candidates and, in particular, local co‐ethnic candidates on voter turnout. We find that the presence of candidates in general and co‐ethnic candidates running for office in a neighborhood has a moderate positive mobilization effect. However, taking this factor into account, the effect of residential concentrations was not eliminated.     

Contest with attack and defense: does negative campaigning increase or decrease voter turnout?

There are two ways of winning a competition, by increasing one’s own chances of winning or by decreasing those of one’s opponents. I consider a model of contest with attack and defense and propose an application to negative political campaigns, where two candidates choose between disparaging their opponent or valorizing their own image. I provide sufficient conditions for the existence and uniqueness of the symmetric Nash equilibrium of the contest game. Through this model, I then contribute to the controversy concerning the effect of negative campaigning on voter turnout.     

Strategic voting and nomination

Using computer simulations based on three separate data generating processes, I estimate the fraction of elections in which sincere voting is a core equilibrium given each of eight single-winner voting rules. Additionally, I determine how often each rule is vulnerable to simple voting strategies such as ‘burying’ and ‘compromising’, and how often each rule gives an incentive for non-winning candidates to enter or leave races. I find that Hare is least vulnerable to strategic voting in general, whereas Borda, Coombs, approval, and range are most vulnerable. I find that plurality is most vulnerable to compromising and strategic exit (causing an unusually strong tendency toward two-party systems), and that Borda is most vulnerable to strategic entry. I use analytical proofs to provide further intuition for some of my key results.     

Policy convergence in a two-candidate probabilistic voting model

We propose a generalization of the probabilistic voting model in two-candidate elections. We allow the candidates have general von Neumann–Morgenstern utility functions defined over the voting outcomes. We show that the candidates will choose identical policy positions only if the electoral competition game is constant-sum, such as when both candidates are probability-of-win maximizers or vote share maximizers, or for a small set of functions that for each voter define the probability of voting for each candidate, given candidate policy positions. At the same time, a pure-strategy local Nash equilibrium (in which the candidates do not necessarily choose identical positions) exists for a large set of such functions. Hence, if the candidate payoffs are unrestricted, the “mean voter theorem” for probabilistic voting models is shown to hold only for a small set of probability of vote functions.     

Informatization, voter turnout and income inequality

In recent years, voter turnout has been decreasing in most industrial countries, and about 40% of all electors abstain from voting. This may affect income inequality and the GDP growth rate through a redistribution policy determined by majority voting. In this paper, we explore the reasons for this continuing decrease in voter turnout and assess its social costs. We conclude that informatization lowers voter turnout by generating an information overload, and that a decrease in voter turnout lowers GDP growth by limiting income redistribution.      

Income inequality,redistribution and the position of the decisive voter

A large literature explaining patterns of redistribution makes use of the median voter theorem. Using a novel approach, this contribution shows that in OECD countries the decisive voter, determined by the earner who sees her preferred tax rate being implemented, on average sits around the 50^th percentile in the income distribution, although significant within and between country differences exist. Under the assumption of a lognormal distribution of gross income, we derive the required tax rate to align the observed gross and net Gini coefficients in OECD countries. This estimated tax rate is compared to the tax rate preferred by the median income earner, which gives a new index capturing a nation’s deviation from the median voter position, measured as the difference between the estimated percentile position of the decisive voter and the 50^th percentile position of the median voter. We provide a comparative overview of this index over time and between countries. We also locate the positions of alternative versions of the decisive voter, among which following the ‘one dollar, one vote’ rule, in a Lorenz curve diagram.     

A Signaling Model of Repeated Elections

I develop a two period model of elections in which voters’ first period actions affect candidates’ estimates of voter preferences and thus affect second period electoral and policy outcomes. I find an equilibrium in which centrist voters abstain in the first election, despite facing zero costs of voting and having a strict preference between the alternatives before them. The reason centrists abstain is to signal their preferences to future candidates and thereby promote future policy moderation.For helpful discussions and comments I thank David Austen-Smith, Tim Feddersen, Roger Myerson, Tom Palfrey, Ronny Razin, two anonymous reviewers, and seminar participants at Kellogg, NYU, and the 2000 World Congress of the Game Theory Society.     

Rational voters in a partisanship model

This paper examines a voter model for the US which is interconnected with the partisan theory. In our model, voters are rational and forward-looking. They are perfectly informed about the preferences of political parties and about the state of the economy. The predictions of our voter model differ from the predictions of conventional voter models, according to which the incumbent benefits from low unemployment and low inflation, irrespective of its political colour. In a partisan setting, the democratic party benefits from high unemployment and the republican party benefits from high inflation. Regressions of presidential approval rates indicate that the predictions of both the partisan voter model and the conventional model are consistent with the data.     

Voter Registration

Abstract

Historically, social workers have used voter registration to politically empower their clients. This paper describes the agency-based voter registration project of the University of Connecticut School of Social Work, Nancy A. Humphreys Institute for Political Social Work, including the project's implementation, and evaluation. Voter registration principles emerge from analyses of successful agency-based voter registration programs.     

EXIT FROM THE HOSPITAL INDUSTRY

We study the exit of hospitals from the market for inpatient services. More generous hospital reimbursement significantly reduces the probability of exit throughout the 1990s. Conditional on reimbursement levels, hospital efficiency was not a significant determinant in the early 1990s but in the mid‐ to late 1990s, less efficient hospitals were significantly more likely to exit. Throughout the period, high‐tech services increased the probability of survival, and for‐profit hospitals were more likely to exit. The role of Medicare as a determinant of exit became less important in the latter half of the 1990s. (JEL I11, L11)     

Limiting median lines frequently determine the yolk

In two-dimensional Euclidean spatial voting models the yolk is the smallest circle which intersects all median lines. It has been assumed that limiting median lines, which intersect two voter ideal points, are sufficient to determine the yolk but recently counter examples have been reported. This note describes the impact of those findings on the results of computation of the location and size of yolk.I wish to acknowledge a number of helpful conversations with Craig Tovey and Nicholas Miller. Any errors which remain are my own.     

FAVORITE SONS: INTERGENERATIONAL WEALTH TRANSFERS AMONG POLITICIANS

In this paper we investigate the degree of occupational following in politics, and its impact upon the career success, and behavior (while in office) of both sons and fathers. We find that sons follow into their politician/fathers' footsteps to a degree surpassed in the general population only among farmers and self-employed proprietors. There is substantial, indirect evidence which suggests that following is motivated to a large extent by the transfer of valuable name recognition and voter loyalty.     

Likely (and Unlikely) Voters and the Assessment of Campaign Dynamics

Only in recent years has the "likely voter" technology beenextended to polls well in advance of an election. In the caseof the 2000 U.S. presidential election, CNN/USA Today/Galluptracking polls indicated considerable fluctuations in likelyvoter preferences, greater than among the larger pool of registeredvoters surveyed. This article explores how Gallup’s likelyvoter model exaggerates the reported volatility of voter preferencesduring the campaign. Much of the reported variation in candidatepreference reported by Gallup in that election is not due toactual voter shifts in preference but rather to changes in thecomposition of Gallup’s likely voter pool. The findingshighlight dangers of relying on samples of likely voters whenpolling well before Election Day.     

Health Consequences of Laws and Public Policies That Target,or Protect,Marginalized Populations

Laws and public policies that are seemingly unrelated to health, nevertheless, can have health consequences in populations that are targeted, or protected, by that legislation. In this paper, I first review research showing that systems of oppression, such as racism and sexism, can cause negative health outcomes. I next discuss mechanisms underlying the relationship between such systems of oppression and negative health effects. Last, I review research showing that laws and public policies can be seen as components of systems of oppression and, as such, are linked to health outcomes. Some policies and laws I include in my review are anti‐same‐sex marriage bills, punitive immigration laws, stop and frisk policies, and state‐level voter disenfranchisement policies. The link between health outcomes and laws and public policies has implications for the current political climate.     

Sophisticated voting rules: the case of two tournaments

A voting rule maps voter preferences into outcomes, and is called sophisticated if there exists a voting tree whose sophisticated outcomes coincide with the voting rule for every voter preference. As yet, no complete characterization of such rules is available. In this paper, we provide an important step toward this characterization by completely solving the problem when there are two possible sets of voter preferences.The second author was supported by the Office of Naval Research, Grant N00014-92-J-1387.     

Locational effects on AFDC exits: Examining local labor markets

Recent welfare reform limits welfare recipients to a maximum of five years of cash assistance. This policy change raises the question of whether it is reasonable to expect welfare recipients to be able to leave the rolls within a five year period, regardless of the economic conditions of the state or area in which they live. This article pursues this issue by examining the effects of economic conditions and residential location on a welfare recipient’s likelihood of leaving welfare over time. The analysis uses linked files from the Panel Study of Income Dynamics, the 1970 and 1980 U.S. Censuses, and County and City Data Book data from 1972 to 1994 to determine AFDC exit probabilities. The results indicate that being low-skilled and living within one of the largest U.S. cities dramatically decreases the likelihood of exit from AFDC via increased earnings. The results also show that the job loss within cities has a significant negative impact on AFDC exit probabilities for marriage, increased earnings and all exits for high school dropouts and African American AFDC recipients. However, including city employment variables did not decrease the negative effects of living within large northern cities for earnings exits. These results indicate that negative economic conditions and poor transportation within cities impede low-skilled AFDC recipients from increasing earnings and leaving welfare.