Social class and social liberalism

The relationship between social class and politics has been a central concern of political sociologists over the years. Recently various scholars have contended that the last twenty years have witnessed the emergence of noneconomic or social issues (e.g., equal rights, personal freedom) and of a middle class liberalism, especially on these social issues. In fact, it was claimed that this privileged radicalism has led to an inversion of the traditional relationship between class and political ideology, as now it is the middle class which is more supportive than the working class of liberal positions on the important social issues of the day. In this paper we subject these claims to a rigorous empirical test using 1973–1982 NORC data. Our findings indicate that there is little support forclass differences in social liberalism, and that most of the apparent differences are due to education. Furthermore, affluence does not have a consistent effect on social liberalism. Finally, we discuss the implications of our analyses for the nature of class differences in American society.     

On the Impossibility of Getting It Right the First Time: Cultural Determinants of Theory

Although our very name, social work announces that this profession is attentive to the socio-cultural surround and the ways in which environment plays its role in the shaping of our psyches, the clinicians among us have drawn extensively on psychoanalytic theory, although they were aware that until very recently its theories remained rather culture-blind. Perhaps in some measure due to the increasing proportion of social workers trained as analysts, there now exists in the analytic world an intention to integrate into its practices and theories that fourth leg, the culture (or cultures) in which we are born and live. It may be that the largely female social work profession may play an important role in enabling psychoanalysis to overcome its previous unconsciousness about that component.     

A SOCIOLOGY FOR OUR TIMES: Alvin Gouldner's Message

For the St. Louis meeting of the Midwest Sociological Society, the author organized a special session to reflect on the particular sociological tradition associated with Washington University, with a particular focus on Alvin Gouldner's work. From that session came this symposium, for which various papers presented were developed into articles. The session and these articles raise important issues for what they tell us both about Gouldner's work and about where sociology is as a discipline today. Among these issues are (1) the optimistic quest for objective value-free knowledge positivism entailed in the past versus a self-reflexive quest for knowledge that entails a tragic acceptance of its limits at present, (2) the effort to distinguish social theory from sociology, ideology, and politics, with all of whom it overlaps as they strive to be both social diagnosis and social therapy, (3) the production of knowledge as dependent both on the lived experiences that shape our biographies and on the intellectual influences available in the local settings where we work, (4) the effort to warn us against the various excesses to which our disciplinary and personal commitments give way, and (5) the role social theory can play as a search light that illuminates our way in the darkness of the empirical world in which we live, while it simultaneously casts a shadow.     

What is the Shortest Russian Joke? Communism. Russian Cultural Consciousness Expressed Through Soviet Humor

In an environment like Soviet Russia where it was difficult, if not impossible, to make assertions that contradicted the official Communist Party word, political humor can be used to challenge, subvert, or uphold official “truths.” The Russian Soviet anekdot—a politically subversive joke—provides an intimate view into the perspective of the Russian people living under Soviet rule. The anekdot serves as a discourse of “cultural consciousness,” connecting otherwise atomized people to a homeland, collective culture, and memory. In conducting a paired content and critical discourse analysis of 1,290 anekdoty collected from Russian archives, I explore how this oral folklore served to construct a Russian collective consciousness that (1) resists Party rhetoric, social policy, and ideology, but also (2) adopts and reifies social boundaries established by Soviet discourse by constructing particular groups as “other.” Those who are familiar with cultural folklore—and the historical context to which it refers—are taught who are the perpetrators responsible for injustices, who are the victims, and how we should feel about these different people; folklore also gives insight into the perspectives of those from the hegemonic '"center."     

Creating the collective: social media,the Occupy Movement and its constitution as a collective actor

This paper examines the process through which Occupy activists came to constitute themselves as a collective actor and the role of social media in this process. The theoretical framework combines Melucci's (1996 Melucci, A. (1996). Challenging codes: Collective action in the information age. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press.[Crossref] , [Google Scholar]) theory of collective identity with insights from the field of organizational communication and particularly from the ‘CCO’ strand – short for ‘Communication is Constitutive of Organizing’. This allows us to conceptualize collective identity as an open-ended and dynamic process that is constructed in conversations and codified in texts. Based on interviews with Occupy activists in New York, London and other cities, I then discuss the communication processes through which the movement was drawing the boundaries with its environment, creating codes and foundational documents, as well as speaking in a collective voice. The findings show that social media tended to blur the boundaries between the inside and the outside of the movement in a way that suited its values of inclusiveness and direct participation. Social media users could also follow remotely the meetings of the general assembly where the foundational documents were ratified, but their voices were not included in the process. The presence of the movement on social media also led to conflicts and negotiations around Occupy's collective voice as constructed on these platforms. Thus, viewing the movement as a phenomenon emerging in communication allows us an insight into the efforts of Occupy activists to create a collective that was both inclusive of the 99% and a distinctive actor with its own identity.     

The elements of social capital in the context of six high schools

Purpose: The study described in this paper is part of a larger research project entitled, “Social Capital and Its Effects on the Academic Development of Adolescents At Risk of Educational Failure.” We drew the data for this study from in-depth case studies of six United States public and private secondary schools. We selected the schools based on two criteria: (1) they enrolled substantial proportions of students who would be considered to be at risk of educational failure due to their academic status, social background, or geographical location; and (2) they had qualities that led us to believe that the probability of finding school-based forms of social capital would be high. In selecting schools, we sought variation among settings, selecting case-study sites that allowed us to learn about how schools create and sustain social capital supportive of the academic development of students, particularly students characterized as at risk of failure.Background: In the first part of the larger research project, we used quantitative methods and a large, nationally representative sample of U.S. secondary schools and students. In that study, we documented the existence of a relationship between school-based social capital and such student outcomes as positive academic behaviors, achievement growth over the secondary years, and the probability of dropping out of high school. We operationalized the construct of social capital with two measures of the quality of students’ relationships with their teachers—the extent to which students saw their teachers as supportive and whether students sought guidance from their teachers outside of class. We believed, however, that school-based forms of social capital are more varied and complex than this. Moreover, we thought that it was important to examine in greater detail how social capital itself varies with the organizational and structural characteristics of high schools. Therefore, we embarked on a second phase of our study in which we relied on qualitative methods: specifically, the in-depth investigation of a small set of high schools thought to have social capital but exhibiting important variation on organizational and structural characteristics. Within these schools, we used field-based methods to examine social capital and students’ access to it.Methods: In general, we asked, “What does social capital look like in the six high schools that we studied?” “Do the quality or characteristic of social capital depend on a school’s student body composition, its programs and policies, or the ideologies and traditions that underlie its operation?” “If so, how do these factors influence the quality of school-based social capital that students have access to in a school?” “Are characteristics or elements of social capital especially prevalent or dominant in certain types of schools?” “Which types of schools, given our case-study sites?” “What do the results of these investigations tell us about the nature of social capital—its creation, maintenance, and usefulness to students and teachers in high schools?”Results: Our analyses of interview data and field notes suggest that school-based forms of social capital may be viewed from six different perspectives. These perspectives, which we refer to as elements of social capital in our paper, are:

• 1. Volition and perceived interest in membership. What are the opportunities that individuals have, both in terms of choices between schools and choice of programs within schools, to affiliate with others based on their interests? These choices may strengthen social capital within groups but weaken social capital between groups that comprise a school and its adjacent community.
• 2. Location and integration of social capital across social relationship networks. Where is social capital located in a school? Although we see the primary location for social capital to be between students and teachers, other networks of relationships also influence the extent to which students can gain access to social capital through teachers (e.g., teacher-to-teacher relationships or teacher-to-parent relationships). Integration across these relationships facilitates the formation of new relationships, trust building, and flows of information.
• 3. Impetus for social capital. What are the reasons that people seek to form supportive, collaborative relationships within schools? Such reasons may be individual or organizational, we argue. Nonetheless, social capital is most powerful when the impetus for its creation and maintenance coincide—that is, when organizational factors reinforce personal inclinations, perceived interest, and a sense of community.
• 4. Formation and stock of social capital. How much effort is required to create social capital? Social capital may occur naturally, as in small, rural schools, or it may require substantial effort and purposeful actions, as in large, urban schools. Natural forms of social capital may have negative consequences if they restrict exchanges with external groups to an extent that academic development is curtailed. Purposeful forms may also have negative consequences, if too much effort is required to create and sustain social capital, drawing deeply on already scarce resources.
• 5. Focus and quality of social capital. How is social capital used in a school? Social capital may be used for many different purposes, not all of which promote academic development. Social capital may be used to primarily promote social goals or ends, or even to undermine students’ development and a school’s academic mission. Differences in interest between school members diminish the focus of social capital, weaken its utility for academic purposes, and can create conflicts over its use and function.
• 6. Norms and social control. Do school norms and sanctions promote positive expectations and interactions between members of a school? Behavioral expectations and official actions are an important element of school-based forms of social capital. Over reliance on sanctions can undermine trust, just as does failure to sanction significant violation of rules. The consequences, norms, and sanctions for social capital depends on how much socialization is required to comply with norms, the perceived fairness of norms and sanctions, and the costs and benefits associated with compliance.
• 7. Conclusion: Using these conceptual lenses, we examine how social capital takes shape and is used in six different high schools. We provide examples of how each of the above six elements helps to understand the quality of interactions between students and teachers, as well as the educational environment in which students’ academic development takes place. In concluding the paper, we argue that social capital is a complex yet useful construct for examining the operation of high schools and the academic development of the students who attend them. Moreover, our examination of six high schools suggests that there can be too much social capital in schools and that social capital is most difficult to nurture in places that need it most. Using our field data, we give examples and provide further explanation for why this is so.

%Rather than provide an in-depth treatment of each element, we have instead attempted to lay the groundwork for deeper study and conceptual development of the notion of social capital in this paper. Each of the elements deserves more careful scrutiny, we believe, especially if we are to weave together in a meaningful fashion the conceptual threads that make social capital such an appealing construct. This initial study reveals some of the richness and complexity of social capital as a construct, as well as the utility of examining it through the six conceptual lenses that we use in this paper.     

Goffman's legacy to political sociology

Conclusion I don't claim that Goffman addressed the questions that animate political sociologists. He was not interested in analyzing interaction to learn how it contributed to mobilization for collective action aimed at social change. He was not interested in changing political consciousness or in how the mass media and other social institutions make such change so difficult. But for those who are interested in such questions, he is worth heeding. His is an unanticipated bequest — from the cranky uncle who we always thought had no great love or admiration for our line of work.I have tried to show how Goffman's arguments about the nature of the interaction order and frame analysis can be applied to increase our understanding of micromobilization and political consciousness. The help here is concrete and empirical, aiding us in interpreting historical cases and guiding us in systematic research.But perhaps Goffman's most enduring legacy is in the moral stance that pervades his observations about social institutions. It goes beyond ideology, to the spirit of our intellectual pursuits. It is eloquently captured in words written after Goffman's death by the poet, Joseph BrodskyThe surest defense against Evil is extreme individualism, originality of thinking, whimsicality, even — if you will — eccentricity. That is, something that can't be feigned, faked, imitated; something even a seasoned impostor couldn't be happy with .... Evil is a sucker for solidity. It always goes for big numbers, for confident granite, for ideological purity, for drilled armies and balanced sheets. For Goffman, it was a lesson he knew and lived.

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Jack Michael’s Motivation

Among many of Jack Michael''s contributions to the field of behavior analysis is his behavioral account of motivation. This paper focuses on the concept of motivating operation (MO) by outlining its development from Skinner''s (1938) notion of drive. Conceptually, Michael''s term helped us change our focus on how to study motivation by shifting its origins from the organism to the environment. Michael''s account also served to stimulate applied research and to better understand behavioral function in clinical practice.     

From labour Zionism to New Zionism

Conclusions The evidence in this article suggests that the appeal of New Zionism is due at least in part to its ability to breach the gap between the excessively routinized ideology and current events in Israel. Labour Zionism had provided its adherents with a new, secular national identity, the core value system which consolidates a society. It remained accepted and served to legitimize the political center as long as it fulfilled this function. But once it failed to do so, it lost all appeal. The state and, consequently patriotism for its own sake, had become the only remaining value. Without further justification, the young regarded this patriotism as sounding like slogans from a Zionist book. By equating patriotism with Zionism, routinized Zionism was identified with what it had itself rejected. And, indeed, without a value system delineating national identity, patriotism is meaningless. The events of the Six Day War did not create the crisis of identity, but precipitated it by making Israelis aware of it. These events also favored New Zionism above all other attempts to formulate a new Israeli ideology as a basis for a renewed national identity. An ideology based on Jewish religion may not have been as successful under different circumstances. Under the given ones, it furnished the best answer to questions existential to Israelis.In Palestine, and during the early years of Israel, the young were surprisingly conformist, and this is another factor helping to explain their subsequent dissatisfaction, quest, and discovery of a renewed value system. Having internalized the truncated version of Zionism only, they were less well equipped to draw on discarded components of the ideology in order to make sense of current affairs. They, more than their elders, had to find new answers, since for them the old ones had been disparaged. Thus, the young became aware of the inefficacy of routinized Zionism merely because they had been so well socialized to it. This applies equally to the Soviet Union and to China. In both these societies, socialization of the young to the prevalent ideology is very effective, and therefore makes the young more aware of its failings. New Zionism does not appeal only to large sections of the young in Israel, but seems to have influenced attitudes in general. The recent law declaring united Jerusalem the eternal capital of Israel is a pertinent case in point. There has been general consensus in Israel on the status of united Jerusalem as its capital, and this was tacitly accepted by part of the international community. But to declare so publicly at a time of delicate negotiations regarding the autonomy of the West Bank (of which East Jerusalem forms a part) is another matter altogether. The law serves no apparent useful purpose: it has alienated even friendly foreign nations, and has not improved Israel's foreign relations in any way. Yet, it received an overwhelming majority vote in parliament, which included Labour members. It seems that its main function was to proclaim New Zionism the ideology of Israel. By so doing, Zionism has turned full circle, starting from a secular revolutionary ideology and gradually turning into a legitimizing one, until routinization had reached a point of no return. Thereupon, New Zionism reformulated the original revolutionary ideology in religious terms, and succeeded in gaining first the support of the young, and subsequently of a large part of the general Israeli public.At first glance, Israel seems a unique case from which one cannot generalize. Israel is exceptional on numerous points, but the following three are particularly relevant to this discussion: (a) its political center had no coercive power, and was, therefore, more vulnerable to challenges to its position; (b) its population is part of a much larger people living in various countries other than Israel, yet identifying itself as a single nation; and (c) due to its geopolitical position, the entire country is more than usually vulnerable to threats from neighboring states, which reject its very existence. Furthermore, the country is poor in natural resources. Both of these make Israel and its political center unusually dependent on outside aid, principally from non-Israeli Jews. These are exceptional circumstances indeed, but then each historical case has unique features. These need not prevent the possibility of drawing general conclusions, provided the relationship of such features with the process studied is made clear. Since the political center of Jewish Palestine was exceptionally vulnerable to challenges, routinization occurred more quickly than might normally have been expected. In fact, most stages of Zionist routinization did occur in the pre-state period. An ordinary regime can be maintained by clever legislation, as well as economic measures, such as taxation and monetary policy. Challenges to the power center can thus be met by various means. But when a political center has no coercive power, ideological appeal is of greater importance. Every additional step in routinization broadens the base of support further, and thus averts the threat posed by the challenge. It was therefore used more frequently in Jewish Palestine than in any other post-revolutionary society, speeding up the entire routinization process and leading to such an extreme case of routinization in such a relatively short period.Other post-revolutionary societies seem to have undergone a similar process, albeit at a slower rate. It is beyond the scope of any one article to make a detailed analysis of this process in more than one society, but I shall bring a single example of routinization of Soviet ideology to illustrate its occurence. According to Marx, the state would become obsolete once society had become classless. In 1919, Lenin maintained that the state would be used by the Soviet classless society to destroy class exploitation elsewhere, and would be dissolved only when the entire world had become classless. According to Stalin, in 1924, the proletarian state was an instrument for the suppression of the bourgeoisie. By 1956, Khrushchev in his famous speech to the Twentieth Party Congress made the state synonymous with Soviet society. The change of meaning given to the concept state is a pertinent example of ideological routinization. In 1919 it could no longer become obsolete, since it was required to maintain power. But as the revolution had only just occurred, adherence to ideological dicta was still considered imperative. External threats, which were real enough at the time, seemed the most convincing justification for delaying implementation of an important ideological component. By 1924 the political center was better entrenched, yet still challenged by the peasantry. Stalin no longer felt compelled to emphasize the temporary character of the state, yet deemed it necessary to justify its permanent existence. It was therefore defined as a necessary instrument for combating counter-revolution. By 1956, no hint indicated that the state was an instrument of suppression; by then it was a positive, integral part of the social order, the mainstay of society. Thus the meaning of the concept changed with each new challenge, first external, later internal. And each change of meaning served to legitimize the political center: as the protector from external threats, as the protector of the revolutionaries and, finally, as the leader of the entire society.Ideology may not be as important to a political center which has coercive power than to one which lacks such power, but the above example shows that it does have some importance even in a totalitarian state, where coercive power is certainly evident. In this respect, too, the Israeli case is probably more extreme, but not substantially different among post-revolutionary societies. Its unique features explain the specific contents of each stage of ideological routinization, and the timing of ideological revival, but not the general direction of routinization. Thus, the dependence on world Jewry provides explanations for the last two stages of routinization; the constant external threat made the experience of the Six Day War particularly traumatic and expedited the search for a new meaningful ideology and national identity. But these were not determinants of the general direction in which routinization proceeded, which is always towards further legitimation of the power center. The conclusions drawn from the Israeli case should therefore apply to other modern post-revolutionary societies, both with regard to ideological routinization and to generational shift in ideological allegiance.

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Ethnomethodology and Marxism: Their use for critical theorizing

Conclusion Each theory and, ultimately, school of theorizing exposes and criticizes the theorizing of others, and at the same time contains false or misleading statements. Theory as it is must rest on some presuppositions. Thus, Marxism exposes the flaws and lies of capitalism while positing another world view-Marxism—which it does not treat critically. Marxism also provides a critique of positivistic thinking. In The Grundrisse, Marx engages in a dialogue with economists and philosophers of his day. His theory emerges out of the rejection of their theory. Ethnomethodology can be seen as critique of positivism, too. It can also tell us something about Marxism, as some of its concerns are similar, although the methods are dissimilar. At the same time, ethnomethodology denies us certain information about itself. Theorists, then, question others and not themselves. Theory can be seen as a product of inquiry; the theorist shows only the product and hides what made the product. Indeed, just as the statistician reveals a correlation between two variables and omits all the common sense reasoning that went into the process (a method of theorizing ethnomethodologists criticize), so does the ethnomethodologist or Marxist omit, to a great extent, the process of theorizing involved.Thus, while neither form of theorizing, taken literally, can be critical (for to be critical, one must sometimes suspend belief in one's own theory, bracket it, or see it as strange), either form, if taken metaphorically (and in a way that is unfaithful to Marxism and ethnomethodology), can be used for critique.The ethnomethodological and Marxist critiques of social information, as in their processual framework and their emphasis on the thinking individual, provide critiques of contemporary society and an impetus to try to change it. Links between the two schools of theorizing would perhaps help overcome the deficiencies of each mode of theorizing. Taylor, Walton, and Young advocated (although they never carried it out) building a bridge in criminology so to speak, between ethnomethodology and Marxism. The advantage would be to enable us to escape from the straitjacket of an economic determinism and the relativism of some subjective approaches to a theory of contradiction in a social structure which recognizes in deviance the acts of men (men and women) in the process of actively making, rather than passively taking, the external world.Our special thanks to Ishna Abrams, Igor Freund, and Peter Schwarzburg for their tireless assistance.     

Social Stratification and the Division of Household Labor in Japan: The Effect of Wives' Work on the Division of Labor among Dual-earner Families

Abstract:  This article explores the relationship between social stratification and the division of household labor by examining how the contribution to housework by husbands in dual-earner families varies across the Japanese social stratification structure. First, I review previous studies concerning the determinants of husbands' participation in housework and construct four hypotheses regarding the relative resources explanation, the time constraints explanation, the ideology/sex role explanation, and the alternative manpower explanation. Second, I examine the empirical support for these hypotheses in dual-earner couples and the effect of social stratification on husband's participation in housework, which has not been studied thus far. Third, I investigate the effect of social stratification in more detail. According to the results of TOBIT regressions and other supplementary analyses, the principal findings are as follows:

• 1) 

  the relative resources explanation is not supported;

       
  
  

Capitalist development and educational reform

Conclusion The early formulations of reproduction theory fail to grasp uneven educational development because of a reliance on a mechanical, base/ superstructure model of social organization. Unlike neo-Weberian models which attempt to sever the necessary connection between the existence of public education and commodity production, reproduction theory emphasizes the correspondence of public education and the capitalist economy. But this correspondence does not adequately conceptualize the unity of form and content in capitalist relations of production. As a causal model it implies that economic relations develop in the absence of their institutional counterparts. The weight of economic needs then calls institutional reform into play. Such a model reduces historical development to the movement of pure forms.The early formulations of reproduction theory confuse abstract and historical levels of analysis. They also fail to adequately grasp social units. Capitalism is a world economy in which production extends well beyond national boundaries, yet in which labor power is reproduced on the whole by national states. Without an analysis of relations among nations, uneven educational development is unintelligible.The patterns of educational development seen in Ireland and Upper Canada resulted from the colonial status of these countries which made educational reform appear a potential solution to imperialist struggles. Educational reforms blocked in England because of class struggles and sectarian divisions could be invoked in the colonial situation by virtue of the relative independence of the colonial state. These reforms, however, embodied structural features peculiar to capitalist relations of production. Precocious educational development in these cases results from the heightened development of the colonial state in relation to the colonial political economy.Public education does not, one would think obviously, eliminate class relations. Rather, public educational reform is a mode of reformulating class relations by the state. This reformulation changes the appearance of class relations but not their basis. Public education is not compensation for the loss of liberty political subjects endure by consenting to be ruled by the state; it is more usefully seen as one way in which the state administers class relations. As such, it reproduces class struggles in displaced forms. Such displaced struggles are seen by neo-Weberian writers as constellations of interests, but one should not lose sight of the structural origins of such interests.While reproduction theory has presented serious critiques of liberal theory and has stressed the historically specific character of public education, it has embodied functionalist assumptions which limit its ability to come to grips with concrete historical development. To escape these assumptions it is necessary to reject a base/ superstructure model and to seek rather to understand the expanded reproduction of the essential social forms of capitalist society.     

Differential Effects of Time Constraints on Athletic Behavior and Survey Reports of Athletic Behavior

Time constraints—having more to do than time to do it—can prevent us from doing everything we need and want to do. When lack of time constrains our behavior, the behavior linked to voluntary role identities (like being a member of a softball team or bowling league) may be the first to be cut. Although, as many of these role identities are socially desirable, survey respondents may still claim to have performed them. Thus, this study examines role behavior and its measurement in the face of time constraints. The athlete identity is examined as a potential casualty of the time crunch, used because it is a common, typically voluntary identity that has a relatively standard set of role behaviors (e.g., participating in sporting events, like games or matches, as an athlete). Situational constraints, namely, a lack of time, are brought into a model based on the structure posited in identity theory (Stryker [1980] 2003 Stryker, Sheldon. [1980] 2003. Symbolic Interactionism: A Social Structural Version. Caldwell, NJ: The Blackburn Press. [Google Scholar]) to help explain variation between self-reported and actual role behavior. Thus, the current study examines the extent to which feeling pressed for time reduces actual athletic activity but fails to result in a concomitant reduction in self-reported athletic activity.     

Citizen radicalism and democracy in the Dutch Republic

Conclution In this article I have investigated one of the supposed founder-members of R. R. Palmer's Age of Democratic Revolution, the Dutch Patriot movement of the 1780s. My purpose was to show that this movement, even though the Patriots made extensive use of such standard items of the democratic vocabulary as popular sovereignty and representation, did not envisage a political system that might be reasonably fitted into the revolution that Palmer had in mind.Instead, the Patriots stood within a long tradition of urban middle-class opposition politics. They held on firmly to both form and content of that tradition. What was new about them was the intensity and thoroughness with which they worked toward their goal of remedying the, as they saw it, corruption of the political system. We might even speculate that they had carried this particular tradition of urban corporatist republicanism to its logical extremes; that is to say, to a point where an even more radical step would be necessary to overcome the resistance of the established powers. They might, for example, have considered to take popular sovereignty at its face value, and over-come their distaste of democracy, so as to include the lower classes into their movement. That step, however, would have taken them outside the tradition that provided them with a specific brand of political liberty. Before the intervention of Prussian troops in the fall of 1787 they were not prepared to make such a momentous decision. For this would have implied a dropping of much that was essential to the corporatist ideology, which had been the prime motivation for their actions in the first place.Corporatism was deeply rooted in the Dutch society of the Old Regime. Economically, it provided major sections of the middle class with some sort of protection against the vicissitudes of conjunctural fluctuations and other uncertainties besetting the small but independent merchant or craftsman. Socially, it made these people into a community, in which they had some sort of social status. Politically, it gave the whole of the middle class a claim on the authorities, while at the same time keeping the lower classes at bay.Corporatism was not unique to the Dutch Republic. We have seen that German towns knew a similar middle-class ideology and similar political movements. French towns too had their privileges and their guilds. Nevertheless, they did not produce anything like the kind of political protest that was voiced by the Dutch and German middle classes. Against the idea of a single democratic revolution I have pitted the differentiated model of European state-formation, and tried to link an investigation of a particular form of collective action to that model. The pattern of a politically vital urban middle class in Germany and the Netherlands on the one hand, and its absence in France - and Britain, for that matter - on the other, in fact seems to coincide very well with the model of a commercial versus agrarian (or feudal) zone. These conclusions may lead us to some further speculations, both on the theoretical level, as well as in regard to this particular piece of Dutch history.When we look forward, toward the Batavian Republic that was founded in the wake of the French invasion of 1794–95, the ensuing struggles between moderates and radicals about political reforms - deemed necessary by all parties - do not so much present themselves as a clash between conservatives and revolutionaries, but as one between two different strands of reform. The moderates kept to the traditions of localism and corporatism, and strove for a return to the roots of the old republican constitution. The radicals on the other hand, had come to the conclusion that the problems of the Dutch state were of a magnitude that could only be overcome by wiping the slate clean and starting all over again, this time along the lines that had been suggested by the French example. The fact that many Dutch radicals had lived in exile in France in the years after 1787, where they had first-hand experience of a revolution in a completely different setting from the one at home, may perhaps in large part account for their specific brand of politics. At the same time, they can serve as prime examples of the revolutionaries-as-statemakers that Theda Skocpol has drawn attention to.This leads us to the second point. This investigation has, once more, suggested the importance of state formations in the analysis of political processes. The Dutch state had come into being in its specific form because this form served the interests of both the indigenous ruling class, that resented interference by centralizing bureaucracies, and the commercial community, that resented interference by anyone. For the local oligarchs it was of prime importance that the state's power should derive from theirs, instead of the other way. The merchants wanted the state to provide them with protection against foreign aggression and nothing more. Against this coalition any centralizing institution would have to muster an equally formidable coalition of its own. The attempt was hardly ever made.The state, being the way it was, refuted some ideologies and institutions, while supporting and legitimating others. Of course, the latter were generally concomitant with the larger make-up of the state. They did, however, leave room for maneuver as both ideologies and institutions tended to be two-sided: The stress on self-government by the local patricians, for example, might be taken up by other parts of the populace as well, and turned against patrician dominance. In the same vein, the militias that should preserve public order, might turn into vehicles for rebellion. Thus, the state could not prevent opposition, but it dictated the forms it would take - the demands put forward, the means of popular mobilization. Even though the Dutch state, in terms of organization, did not seem equal to these tasks at all, it held sway over both its supporters and its discontents.     

Middle classes,democratization, and class formation

Conclusions This analysis of the South Korean case demonstrates the importance of the historical context for understanding the political role of the middle classes. In late industrialization, as occurred in South Korea and other East Asian countries, the new middle class has emerged as a significant social class, before the capitalist class established its ideological hegemony and before industrial workers developed into an organized class. Neither of these two major classes was able to offer an ideological or organizational leadership to the middle classes. In this context, the middle class can act as more than merely a dependent variable. In South Korea, the minjung movement led by an intellectual segment of the middle class played a critical role in the formation of the working class, by providing an opposition ideology, new politicized languages, organizational networks, and other resources.The Korean experience also highlights the significant role of the state in class formation. The predominant role of the state in economic and social development puts it at the center of major social conflicts. Social tensions and conflicts that emerge in rapid industrialization are directly and indirectly related to the character of the state and the economic policies it implements. A high level of politicization among Korean middle-class members, not only among intellectuals but also among a large number of white-collar workers, is the product of the authoritarian regimes of Park and Chun and their repressive control of civil society. Both the nature of Korean middle-class politics and its relationship with the working-class formation have been shaped by the nature of state politics.The role of the middle class in the South Korean democratization process has been complex and variable, in part because of its internal heterogeneity and in part because of shifting political conjunctures in the transition to democracy. It would not make much sense, therefore, to characterize the Korean middle class as progressive or conservative, because different segments of it were inserted into the shifting conjunctures of political transition differently. At the same time, it would be also unsatisfactory to characterize middle-class politics as simply inconsistent or incoherent, because there exists some definite pattern in their behaviors.This analysis suggests that political behaviors of different segments of the middle class can be explained in terms of their locations within the broad spectrum of middle-class positions between capital and labor and by the changing balance of power between the two major classes. This is to acknowledge the fact that capital-labor relations constitute the primary axis of conflict and that middle-class politics must be understood ultimately in terms of this principal mechanism of class struggle. This is, however, not to assume that middle-class politics is simply a terrain of struggle between the capitalist and the working classes, as many Marxist theorists do. To repeat, in certain historical contexts middle-class politics can have an independent effect on the formation of the two major classes and the outcomes of struggles between the two.     

The methodology of a multi-model project examining how facebook infrastructures social relations

It is the purpose of this paper to make explicit the methodology (the theory of the methods) by which we conducted research for an Economic and Social Research Council-funded research project on the relationship of values to value. Specifically, we wanted to study the imperative of Facebook to monetize social relationships, what happens when one of our significant forms of communication is driven by the search for profit, by the logic of capital. We therefore wanted to ‘get inside’ and understand what capital's new lines of flight, informationally driven models of economic expansion, do to social relations. Taking up the challenge to develop methods appropriate to the challenges of ‘big data', we applied four different methods to investigate the interface that is Facebook: we designed custom software tools, generated an online survey, developed data visualizations, and conducted interviews with participants to discuss their understandings of our analysis. We used Lefebvre's [(2004). Rhythmnanalysis: Space, time and everyday life. London: Continuum] rhythmanalysis and Kember and Zylinska's [(2012). Life after new media: Mediation as a vital process. Cambridge, MA: MIT Press] ideas about ‘lifeness’ to inform our methodology. This paper reports on a research process that was not entirely straightforward. We were thwarted in a variety of ways, especially by challenge to use software to study software and had to develop our project in unanticipated directions, but we also found much more than we initially imagined possible. As so few academic researchers are able to study Facebook through its own tools (as Tufekci [(2014 Tufekci, Z. (2014). Big questions for social media big data: Representativeness, validity and other methodological pitfalls. In ICWSM ‘14: Proceedings of the 8th International AAAI Conference on Weblogs and Social Media, pp. 505–514. [Google Scholar]). Big questions for social media big data: Representativeness, validity and other methodological pitfalls. In ICWSM ‘14: Proceedings of the 8th International AAAI Conference on Weblogs and Social Media (pp. 505–514)] notes how, unsurprisingly, at the 2013 ICWSM only about 5% of papers were about Facebook and nearly all of these were co-authored with Facebook data scientists), we hope that our methodology is useful for other researchers seeking to develop less conventional research on Facebook.     

Getting to Reparations: A Response to Fein

Despite its title, Fein's article provides us with little analysis of race relations. Fein's discussion of various models of intervention implies that they are generally impotent. His criticism of the President's Initiative on Race appears to reflect a limited reading of the Advisory Committee report. From these observations I conclude that Fein's article reflects a neoconservative, noninterventionist ideology that blames the victim for the persistence of racial stratification in the United States. I close by suggesting that a movement for reparations would be an appropriate response to this ideology.     

“Work as unto the Lord”: Enhancing Employability in an Evangelical Job-Readiness Program

The 1996 passage of welfare reform radically reshaped the principles and practices of poverty management in the U.S. On the one hand, it brought about an end to welfare as an entitlement and imposed rigid time limits, work requirements, and a programmatic supply-sided focus on “job-readiness.” On the other hand, it permitted and promoted the expansion of faith-based organizations in the provision of social services. This ethnographic case study of a prominent faith-based job-readiness program--Jobs for Life--is situated at the underexplored nexus of these two trends. Drawing upon participant observation in a Jobs for Life class, in-depth interviews with class instructors and participants, and content analysis of organizational materials, this article documents the program’s use of biblical principles and teachings to expound on the moral irreproachability of work and to fabricate “employable” subjects who submit themselves to both God and the employer. At play is a project that we call the “righteous responsibilization” of the poor, a responsibilization achieved through religious salvation. The case of Jobs for Life, we argue, not only extends our understanding of “religious neoliberalism” (Hackworth 2012), revealing how it shapes the process of subjectification and practices of poverty management. It also remediates a tension at the heart of neoliberal ideology between its emphasis on individualistic entrepreneurialism and its demand for submission to the abstract, alien decrees of the market. In the religious neoliberal framework exemplified by Jobs for Life, deference to capital is recast as the first step toward the entrepreneurial achievement of individual salvation.     

The social composition of the Communist nomenklatura: A comparison of Russia,Poland, and Hungary

Conclusion Reflecting, in conclusion, upon the significance of our inquiry into the social origins of the nomenklatura, we suggest that the main reason the term nomenklatura remains a loaded one in East European political discourse is that it raises the question of what the Communist period in East Europe meant, and what it might mean now. Was Communism an artificial break in the organic history of these societies, a history that now resumes? Or, were Communist institutions deeply embedded in the social logic of East European development in ways that mean the Communist legacy will endure into postcommunism? Our usage of the term upper class was calculated precisely to capture this notion of embeddedness. We argue that in some East European countries, most notably Russia, and probably Hungary as well, where the Communist elite became an organic component of the emerging social order as an upper class, it is not enough to ask if the Communistelites have reproduced or circulated. Whether an upper class existed, and to what degree, forms the class context of personnel changes: a lot of circulation at the individual level, for example, may mean nothing but the reproduction of privileges and advantages institutionalized during the Communist period via the upper class. Reproduction on the individual level, on the other hand, may indicate precisely the opposite; that an upper class did not form and therefore nomenklatura members were unable to enjoy such institutionalized mechanisms during the transition to postcommunism. To put it in the language of our introduction: to answer the question of whether the Communists are still in power, one has first to determine what kind of a social order Communism was in each country. It was these different social orders, comprising concrete groups and group identities, as distinct from the mechanisms of surplus allocation or the individuals who staffed them, which may have been left intact through the post-Communist transition.     

The Shi'i ulama and the state in Iran

Conclusion In this article I attempted to explain the politics of the ulama in terms of class struggle. I indicated that ulama political orientations, and the emergence of politically divergent factions in their midst, were historically correlated with the interests of the traditional petty bourgeoisie, the merchants, and the landlords. In other words, from the political class struggle viewpoint, diverse factions among the ulama tended to represent these diverse social classes. The ulama, it is true, defended their divergent political positions through their interpretations of the Islamic laws. Therefore, the assertion that a particular group of the ulama were political representatives of a particular class, say, the petty bourgeoisie, is not to suggest that they consciously interpreted their religious texts so as to justify the petty bourgeoisie interests, or that they were the enthusiastic champions of the petty bourgeoisie. What makes them representatives of the petty bourgeoisie, says Marx, is the fact that in their mind they do not get beyond the limits which the latter do not get beyond in life, that they are consequently driven, theoretically, to the same problems and solutions to which material interest and social position drive the latter practically. This is, in general, the relationship between the political and literary representatives of a class and the class they represent. I should stress that the relationship between class representatives and the class they represent is not unproblematic. Whenever the ulama have defended a particular issue, they have done so according to their own ideological mode of discourse. In their interpretations of the teachings of Shi'ism they all must follow, and submit to, the internal logic of the ideology of Shi'ism and its specific modes of discourse, which are considered proper and acceptable by all the ulama. In other words, all the ulama, conservative or radical, must base their argument on the same set of ideological premises. Thus the content of the (Usuli) teachings of Shi'ism, as well as its specific modes of discourse put limits on the range of ideologically defensible political actions. (Such limits might explain why the ulama never attempted to defend the interests of workers and peasants.) This factor combined with the ulama's conscious efforts to maintain an ideological uniformity and organizational unity may provide them with a certain degree of relative autonomy in the field of class struggle. How these factors affect the course and direction of class struggle is another aspect of ulama politics that needs an in-depth investigation.

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